MAHĀVĪRA

His Life and Teachings

By

Bimala Churn Law

[Ph.D., M.A., B.L.]

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

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PREFACE

In this little treatise an attempt has been made to give an account of the life and teachings of Mahāvīra, the last Tirthaṅkara of the Jains, from the original Buddhist and Jain texts. A comparative study of both the texts helps us greatly in elucidating some knotty points of his life and doctrine. We think that it will be found useful by all persons interested in the study of Jainism.

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Calcutta
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MAHĀVĪRA : HIS LIFE AND TEACHINGS

I

LIFE

Modern historical research establishes beyond doubt that Mahāvīra, well known as the founder of Jainism, is not a mythical figure like so many of his predecessors in the tradition of the Tīrthaṅkaras. Pārśva, Supārśva who too has been proved to be a historical person, was the immediate predecessor of Mahāvīra. There is, of course, no other evidence than literary to prove the authenticity of the Jain traditions regarding Mahāvīra and his predecessor Pārśva. The Jain inscriptional evidence is so far remote from the age in which they had flourished that nothing can be definitely built upon it. But as early as the 3rd century B. C., we have mention of the Niganṭhas in the Seventh Pillar Edict of Aśoka as a distinct class of Indian recluses. The Niganṭhas mentioned in this famous epigraph were no other than the followers of Mahāvīra. This very class of recluses has been honoured in the Hathigumphā inscription of Khāravela as the *Arhata*

Śramaṇas. In the inscription of Khāravela's chief queen, the same Order of recluses has been honoured as Śramaṇas who were believers in the faith of the Arhats (Arhaṃta.pasādānam samaṇānam)[1]. As a matter of fact, all the cavedwellings (leṇas) on the Udayagiri and Khaṇḍagiri hills were made by Khāravela and others for the residence of the Jaina recluses.

The literary evidence on which this account of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkara is based, is twofold : (1) direct, and (2) collateral. The direct evidence is that which is furnished by the texts of the Jaina Canon, called Āgama or Siddhānta. And the collateral evidence is that which may be gathered from the texts of the Buddhist Canon. Collating these two sources of information, we can not only prepare a sketch of the life of Mahāvīra but draw a fairly vivid picture of Northern India depicting the social, political, economic, religious, and other conditions of the time in which he lived, moved, and preached. The same two sets of texts enable us also to have a clear vision of the geography of that portion of Northern India which became the scene of activities of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkara and his

1. Epigraphia Indica, Vol. XIII.

immediate followers. All these may be so realistically painted before our eyes that nothing will appear to be either exaggerated or untrue.

If one wants to know who the Nirgranthas (Unfettered Ones) were, the answer comes straight from the Buddhist texts that they were the followers of a Tīrthaṅkara, named Niganṭha Nātaputta, One Sutta faithfully presents the fundamental doctrine of the Nirgranthas with a criticism from the Buddhist point of view.[1] One Sutta attributes to Niganṭha Nātaputta certain religious discipline which was in a way the cult of the earlier Nirgranthas, the followers of Pārśva.[2] One Sutta yields a faithful description of the *uposatha* as practised by the Nirgranthas.[3] One Sutta correctly hints at the fact that the lay supporters of the Nirgranthas were called Sāvakas or Śrāvakas instead of Upāsakas.[4] One Sutta accurately names the place where the demise of Niganṭha Nātaputta took place, and how immediately after his demise, his followers, the Nirgranthas, became divided into two camps.[5] There

1. Cūladukkhakkhandha Sutta, M.N., I, pp. 91 foll.
2. Samaññaphala Sutta, Digha-N., I, pp. 47 foll.
3. Niganṭhūposatho, Aṅguttara-N., I, pp. 205 foll.
4. Upāli Sutta, M.N., I, pp. 371 foll.
5. Sāmagāma Sutta, M.N., II, pp. 243 foll.

are several Suttas in which Niganṭha Nātaputta is associated with five other Tīrthaṅkaras who passed as notable personalities and leaders of thought.[1] Some of the Suttas introduce to their reader some of the immediate disciples and contemporary lay followers of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkara.[2] There is a Sutta which vividly points the character of the Nirgranthas as strong advocates of vegetarian diet.[3] There are Suttas that furnish a catalogue of the punctilious ways of certain naked ascetics of the time,[4]—the ways which might be shown to be precisely those observed by the Jinakalpikas among the Nirgranthas. The same set of texts introduces to us the kings and clans and classes of people who directly or indirectly supported the Nirgrantha movement in Northern India in the Tīrthaṅkara's lifetime. These very texts precisely name the countries and places important in the early history of Jainism. The same authorities help us to form a fairly accurate idea of the distances between those countries and places, and of the roads or routes by which they might be reached by a person in course of his wanderings.

1. Samaññaphala Sutta, Digha, I, pp. 47 foll.
2. Vinaya Texts, S.B.E., Vol. XVII, pp. 108 foll.
3. Cf. Siha's account, *ibid.*, Vol. XVII pp. 108 foll.
4. Kassapasihanāda Sutta, Digha, I, pp. 161 foll.

Lastly, these texts of the Buddhists coupled with those of the Jains enable us to breathe very atmosphere of thought and of life in which Mahāvīra moved with his Nirgrantha followers.

Niganṭha Nātaputta is the name by which Mahāvīra was and has been known to the Buddhists. It is undoubtedly the name by which he was known to his own followers as well as to his other contemporaries. The name is composed of two separate epithets, Niganṭha and Nātaputta, the first of which is religious and the second secular. He was *niganṭha* (*nirgraṇtha*) in a literal as well as in a figurative sense : outwardly unclothed and inwardly unfettered. His followers were accordingly known as *Niganṭhaputta* (*Nirgranthaputras*), or simply *Niganṭhas* (*Nirgranthas*). And his lay followers became known as *Niganṭha-sāvakā*.[1]

The Buddhist texts and commentaries do not definitely explain why he was called Nātaputta, With the aid of the Jain literature, however, we at once know that he was called Nātaputta because he was a scion of the Nāya, Nāta or Jñātṛ clan of Kṣatriyas. Just as the Buddha was called Sākyaputta because he was a scion of the Sakya clan, so was Mahāvīra

1. Culla-Niddesa, p. 173.

called Nātaputta because he was a scion of the Nāta clan.

He is introduced in some of the Buddhist texts, along with five other contemporary teachers, as 'the head of an order, of a following, the teacher of a school, well-known and of repute as a sophist, revered by the people, a man of experience who has long been a recluse, old, and well stricken in years'.[1] The phrase 'old and well-stricken in years' was not meant to be interpreted literally and too rigorously. It was meant to be interpreted rather loosely as signifying that Mahāvīra was senior to the Buddha in age, i.e. an elder contemporary.[2] In point of fact, in some of the texts this phrase is omitted altogether.[3] And all the six teachers, including Mahāvīra, predeceased the Buddha.[4]

The early records of the Buddhists clearly attest that Mahāvīra died at Pāvā. When the news that as soon as Mahāvīra died, his followers fell quarrelling among themselves, having been divided into two camps, was conveyed to the Buddha, it caused much alarm to him as to how his own

1. Dialogues of the Buddha, S.B.B., II, p. 66 ; Sāmañ ñaphala Sutta, Digha, I, p. 49.

2. Cf. Sabhiya Sutta, Sutta Nipāta, pp. 92 foll.

3 Majjhima-Nikāya, II, pp. 2-3.

4 Majjhima-Nikāya, II, 243 ; Pātika Sutta, Digha, III.

followers would behave after his death.[1] These very records also attest that Mahāvīra was alive even after Ajātaśatru had usurped the throne of Magadha[2] and Devadatta had been declared by the Buddha to be a hopelessly wicked man and utterly incorrigible in his ways.[3]

Aṅga-Magadha,[4] the territories of the Vṛji-Licchavis, and Mallas, and the kingdom of Kāśi-Kośala are mentioned as the places which became the scene of wanderings of Mahāvīra and activities of his Nirgrantha followers in the Buddha's lifetime. The Buddhist texts specifically mention Rājagaha (Rājagṛha), Nālandā, Vesālī (Vaiśālī), Pāvā, and Sāvatthī (Srāvastī), as places where the activities of Mahāvīra and his immediate followers were concentrated. These texts clearly mention Vesālī as the place where the religion of Mahāvīra found its staunch supporters among the Licchavis.

The Nirgranthas claimed that their Master was 'all-knowing and all-seeing and endowed with unlimited knowledge and vision', who alone could declare that, whether he was walking or standing

1. Sāmagāma Sutta, Majjhima N., I.
2. Sāmaññaphala Sutta, Dīgha, I.
3. Abhayarājakumāra Sutta, M.N., I.
4. Majjhima-Nikāya, II, p. 2.

still, sleeping or awake, the unlimited knowledge and vision were constantly his—continuous and unperturbed.[1] The Pāli *aparisesa*, occurring as it does as a predicate of that knowledge and vision, is just a synonym of the Jaina term *kevala*.

The teaching of Mahāvīra which commended itself to the Nirgranthas and satisfied them is characteristically represented thus : 'Whatsoever a person experiences, whether it is pleasant or painful or neither pleasant nor painful is due to his *karma* (totality of deeds) in the past. Hence by extenuating throught penance (tapasā) the effect of all past deeds and by not accumulating the effect of fresh deeds, the future gliding in rebirth is stopped ; with the future gliding in rebirth stopped, the past is wiped out ; with the past wiped out, ill is no more ; with ill no more, painful feelings are no more ; with painful feelings no more, all ill is outworn (exhausted or negated).[2] Here penance (tapa) means the practice of austerities (dukkaracariyā).

Mahāvīra is correctly represented an exponent of the doctrine of action (kiriyāvādo).[3] This doctrine

1. Majjhima, I, pp. 92-93 ; *ibid.*, II p. 31 ; Aṅguttara, I, p. 220 ; *ibid.*, IV, p. 428.
2. Aṅguttara, I, pp. 220-221 ; Majjhima, II, p. 214.
3. Aṅguttara, IV, pp. 180-181.

invests man with moral responsibility for all his deeds. One of the texts refers to limited knowledge (antavanta jñāṇa) as propounded by Mahāvīra : 'The knowledge which comprehends the limited world is itself limited in its character'.[1] The Pāli *antavanta jñāna* is evidently the same term as the Jaina *avadhijñāna*.

The Nirgrantha argument of the practice of penance or austerity is clearly set forth : 'Beatitude cannot be reached through mundane happiness. It is attainable through the mortification of the flesh. Had it been possible to reach beatitude through mundane happiness, king Srenika Bimbisāra of Magadha would certainly have attained it.'[2] We are told that according to Mahāvīra, the practice of penance involved three kinds of *daṇḍa* or self-inflicted punishment : bodily vocal and mental, the first kind far outweighing the last two in gravity and importance.[3] A concrete example of the penance practised by the Nirgranthas

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1. Aṅguttara, IV, p. 428 : *antavantena ñāṇena antavantaṁ lokaṁ jānaṁ passaṁ.*

2. Majjhima. I, p. 93 : *Na sukhena sukhaṁ adhigantabbaṁ dukkhena kho sukhaṁ adhigantabbaṁ sukhena casukhaṁ adhigantabbaṁ abhavissa, rājā Māgadho Seṇiyo Bimbisāro sukhaṁ adhigaccheyya.*

3. Majjhima, I, p. 372.

is mentioned. The Nirgranthas were once seen engaged in remaining in an upright posture without sitting down (ubbhaṭṭhakā āsanapaṭikkhittā).[1]

The ancient Buddhist texts offer a typical description of the punctilious ways of all Indian ascetics of the time which, as convincingly shown by Mr. Kamta Prasad Jain,[2] were also the approved ways of the Jaina recluses who must have sought to imitate the life of the Master. The correspondence may be shown in a tabular form as follows :

Buddhist Description.	*Jaina Description.*
1. He goes naked.	1. This is styled as the 'highest state' of a Jaina recluse. (Jaina-Sūtras, I, p. 56.)
2. He is of loose habits (performing his bodily functions and eating in a standing posture, not crouching down as well-bred people do).	2. The 24th (non-bathing), 26th (non-brushing), 27th (taking meal in a standing posture) *mūla-guṇas* of a Jaina muni. (Mūlacāra, 31-33)

1. Majjhima, I, p. 92.
2. I.H.Q., Vol. II, pp. 698 foll. The Jaina references in the Buddhist Literature.

Buddhist Description.	*Jaina Description.*
3. He licks his hands clean, etc. (after eating, and not washing them as well-bred people do).	3. A Jaina muni takes food in the hollows of his hand, etc. (Jaina-Sūtras, I, p. 57)
4. When on his rounds for alms if politely requested to step aside, he passes stolidly on.	4. Described in full in the commentary on esaṇāsamiti in the Mūlācāra.
5. He refuses to accept food brought (to him before he has started on his daily round of alms).	5. The Jaina recluse is allowed to take only pure food void of 46 defilements.
6. He refuses food (if told it has been specially prepared for him).	6. This refers to the prohibited Auddesika food.
7. He refuses to accept any invitation, etc.	7. This is precisely the case with the Jaina recluses.
8. He will not accept (food taken) from the mouth of the pot or pan, etc.	8. This refers to the *sthāpita* or *nyaṣṭa doṣa*.
9-10. He will not accept food within the threshold, etc. He will not accept food placed within the sticks, etc.	9-10. These refer to the *prāduṣkara doṣa*.
11. He will not accept food placed within the pestle, etc.	11. This refers to the *unmiśra-āsana doṣa*.

Buddhist Description.	*Jaina Description.*
12. When two persons are eating together he will not accept food ... if offered to him by only one of the two.	12. This refers to the *aniśvara-vyaktāvyakta aniśārtha doṣa.*
13-14. He will not accept food from a woman suckling baby, etc. He will not accept food from a woman talking with. etc.	13-14. These refer to the dāyaka-āśana doṣas.
15. He will not accept food collected ... in draught.	15. This refers to the *abhighāta-udgama doṣa.*
16. He will not accept food where a dog is standing.	16. This refers to the *daśaka doṣa.*
17. He will not accept food where flies are swarming by.	17. This refers to the *prāṇi-jantu-vadha doṣa.*
18. He will not accept fish, nor meat, nor strong drink, nor intoxicants, etc.	18. This needs no corroboration.
19. He is a 'one-houser', etc.	19. This corresponds with the *vratapratisankhyāta* practice.
20. He takes food only once a day or once every two days, etc.	20. This corresponds with the *sākānkṣaṇākṣa navrata.*

The Nirgranthas are represented as a class of recluses (samaṇajātikā) who used to drink hot water, rejecting cold water.[1] There is no sound reason to suggest with the author of the Milinda that they did not drink cold water because they believed there were 'souls' in it.[2] They are credited with the scrupulous practice of a 'fourfold self-restraint' (cātuyāma-saṁvara), according to which they used to live 'restrained as regards all water', 'restrained as regards all evil', 'washing away all evil', and 'suffused with the sense of evil held at bay'. It is for this reason that they were called *gatatta* (whose heart has gone to the summit, to the attainment of their aim), and *yatatta* (whose heart is subdued). *Cātuyāmasaṁvara* was, no doubt, a phraseology of the religion of Pārśva, but, as presented in Buddhist literature, it acquired altogether a new connotation with the followers of Mahāvīra. Some are inclined to think that by the 'fourfold self-restraint' the Buddhist author has simply expressed the four characteristics of a Jaina recluse : (1) that

1. Majjhima, I, p. 376 : *Nigaṇṭho .....sūtodaka-paṭikkhitto uṇhodaka-paṭisserī.*

2. The Questions of King Milinda, S.B.E., XXXV, pp. 85-91.

he should be free from passion and desire ; (2) that he should keep himself aloof from all kinds of traffic ; (3) that he should get rid of all *parigrahas* (ideas of possession) ; and (4) that he should remain absorbed in knowledge and meditation of self.[1]

A correct representation of the 'fourfold self restraint', even in the sense in which the followers of Pārśva understood it, is not wanting in Buddhist literature. Just a fifth point, chastity, has to be added to the 'fourfold self-restraint' to complete the list of five great vows (pañca mahāvratas) promulgated by Mahāvīra. The definite path prescribed by Mahāvīra for the realization of the world of absolute happiness consisted in the abstinence from the idea of killing, the idea of theft, the idea of unchastity, the idea of lying, and some such *tapoguṇa* or virtue of an ascetic.[2] It is very interesting indeed to note that even some of the Jaina phrases are reproduced in the Buddhist text.[3]

The Aṅguttara-Nikāya speaks of the Nirgranthas as a distinct Order of recluses who on the sabbath

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1. I.H.Q., Vol. II, p. 705.
2. Majjhima, II, pp. 35-36.
3. *Ibid.*, II, p. 36 ; *sake ācariyake samanuyuñjiyamānā samanuggāhiyamānā samanubhosiyamānā.*

exhorted their lay disciples thus : 'Lay aside the stick as regards all creatures that exist eastwards beyond a hundred *yojanas* : likewise westwards, northwards, and to the south' ; 'Off with all your clothes and say—I have no part in anything anywhere, and herein for me there is no attachment to anything'.[1] Thus they exhorted them to kindness, and the idea of *apalibodha* or aparigraha (non-handicap, no possession) was made clear to them.

The same Nikāya records an instance where the Nirgranthas became deeply concerned and disconsolate to brook the idea that a recluse would eat meat knowing for certain that it was specially prepared for him by killing an animal (undissakatam mamsam)[2]

The evidence of Buddhist literature is sufficient to establish the contemporaneity of Mahāvīra and the Buddha. Although they had not personally met each other, there were occasions when they felt interested in knowing and discussing each other's views and position through some intermediaries. Dīrghatapasvī and Satyaka (Pāli Saccaka) among the Nirgrantha recluses and Abhaya the Prince, Upāli the Banker, and Simha the Licchavi General among the Jaina laity loom large among those intermediaries.

1. Gradual Sayings, I, p. 186.
2. Aṅguttara, IV, p. 187.

Both Mahāvīra and the Buddha claimed to be scions of two ruling clans of Northern India, and both of them declared themselves as *kriyāvādins* or upholders of a doctrine of action Mahāvīra was senior in age to the Buddha ; the former predeceased the latter by a few years. The synchronism between them is proved by the coincidence of certain historical facts. When they had started their career as religious teachers and reformers, Srenika Bimbisāra was the powerful king of Magadha, and Aṅga became annexed to the kingdom of Magadha ; the vṛji-Licchavis of Vaisālī and the Mallas of Kusīnārā and Pāvā formed two powerful confederacies ; Prasenajit was the monarch of Kośala and Kāśī became annexed to the kingdom of Kośala. It is significant that the immediate Nirgrantha disciples of Mahāvīra argued a point of his doctrine thus : 'Had it been possible to obtain bliss through worldly happiness, king Srenika Bimbisāra of Magadha would certainly have obtained it'.

The Majjhima-Nikāya immortalizes the name of the Black Stone on a ridge of the Ṛṣigiri, where the Nirgranthas practised a difficult penance, while a Jaina Image inscription records the name of Mount Vipula and king Srenika. The same Nikāya refers

to an occasion when Mahāvīra was staying at Nālandā with a large body of Nirgranthas. It also refers to an occasion when the Jaina Tirthaṅkara remained seated with a large train of lay worshippers headed by Upāli the Banker, all hailing from a village called Bālaka. The same authority attests that women found admittance into the Nirgrantha Order along with men. The Visākhāvatthu in the Dhammapada Commentary distinctly represents Mṛgāra the Banker of Srāvastī, father-in-law of the Buddhist lady Visākhā, as a staunch lay supporter of Mahāvīra.

It is not without reason that Mahāvīra has been represented in the Abhayarājakumāra-Sutta as personally interested in the welfare of Devadatta who fomented a schism within the Buddhist Order of the time.[1] As Dr. Barua suggests, Devadatta was a man with Jaina leaning. It is probably under the influence of Mahāvīra's teaching that Devadatta insisted on having the following five special rules introduced in the Buddhist Order and enforced :

1. Majjhima, I, pp. 392-393.

'1. That a bhikkhu shall live all his life in the forest.

2. That he shall depend for his subsistence solely on doles collected outdoors ;

3. That he shall wear garments made by stitching together rags picked up from dust-heeps ;

4. That he shall always live under a tree and not under a roof ; and

5. That he shall never eat first or meat.'[1]

Such are the main outlines of the life and teachings of Mahāvīra and of the early activities of the Nirgranthas which may be drawn with the aid of Buddhist literature. Now let us see how far the narrative may be developed with the facts supplied in the canonical literature of the Jains themselves.

In the Jaina literature Mahāvīra, the last Tirthaṅkara of the Jains, is described as a supreme personality, who was acknowledged as 'great Brāhmana', 'a great guardian', 'a great guide', 'a great preacher', 'a great pilot', and 'a great recluse'.[2] He figures as a supremely gifted Kṣatriya teacher and leader of

1. Barua, 'The Old Brāhmī Inscription of Mahāsthān', I.H.Q., Vol. X. p. 61 : Vinaya Cullavagga, VIII, 1 ; Oldenberg, Buddha, pp. 160-161 ; N. Dutt, Early History of the Spread of Buddhism, p. 222.

2. Uvāsaga-dasāo, Lec. VII.

thought who gathered unto him many men and women, and was honoured and worshipped by many hundreds and thousands of *śrāvakas* or lay disciples. He belonged to the Kāśyapa gotra and shone forth as the moon of the clan of the Nāyas or Jñātras. He was the son of Kṣatriya Siddhārtha who is otherwise named Śreyāṁsa and Yasaṁsa and of Kṣatriyānī Triśalā, also known as Videhadattā and Priyakārinī of the Vasiṣṭha gotra. His mother was a sister to Ceṭaka of Videha, at whose call all the Licchavis and Mallas rallied together for the purpose of offence and defence.

His parents who belonged to the jñātṛ Kśatriyas were lay worshippers of Pārśva. They were pious, chaste in life, and virtuous, and cherished a very tender regard for all the six classes of living beings (*cha·jīva-nikāyā*). Following the teaching of Pārśva, they peacefully died by the practice of slow starvation of the senses.

He was born in the town of Kuṇḍanagara, a suburb of Vaiśalī and an important seat of the Jñatṛkas. He was therefore called Vesālie (Vaiśālika),—a citizen of Vaiśālī.[1] On the day of his birth

1. Sūtrakritāṅga, 1. 2. 3. 22.

the prisoners in Kuṇḍanagara were released. Festivals kept the whole town bound in mirth and joy for ten days after which many offerings were made to the gods. But he was also known as a Videha,—the son of Videhadattā. His parents fixed his name as Varddhamāna or 'Prosperous One', because with his birth the wealth, fame, and, merit of the family increased. His aversion to love and hatred earned for him the appellation of Sramaṇa or Recluse. The gods gave him the name of Mahāvīra for his fortitude and hardihood in patiently bearing all sorts of privation and hardship, for his strictly adhering to the rules of penance, and no less for his indifference to pleasure and pain. He was equally known as Jñātṛputra or 'Scion of the Jñātṛ, clan', Sāsananāyaka or 'Head of the Order', and Buddha. The Jñātṛkas are described as a people who were afraid of sin, who abstained from wicked deeds, did not cause harm to any living being, and did not partake of meat.

Mahāvīra was called Nirgrantha becasue he was outwardly unclothed and inwardly free from all worldly bonds and ties. And it is not surprising at all that he should be described in Buddhist literature as 'the head of an order, of a following, the teacher of a school, well-known and of repute as a sophist,

revered by the people, a man of experience who has long been a recluse'.[1]

In his thirteenth year, Mahāvīra married Yasodā a Kṣatriya lady who belonged to the Kauṇḍinya gotra, and had by her a daughter, named Anojjā (Anavadyā) or Priyadarsanā. Anojjā was married to Yamalī, a Kṣatriya 'who after becoming one of Mahāvīra's followers and fellow-workers ended by opposing him'.

In his thirtieth year, he lost his parents. Afterwards with the permission of his elder brother and the authorities of the kingdom, he fulfilled his promise of going out to establish a universal religion of love and amity. After twelve years of penance and meditation he attained omniscience at the age of forty-two, and lived thereafter for thirty years to preach his religion in Northern India. The famous Ohāṇa-Sutta in the Āyāraṃga contains the following account of his soul-stirring *sādhanā* :

For a year and a month since he renounced the world, Mahāvīra did not leave off his robe. Thereafter he gave up his robe and became unclothed. Even while he used robe, he used it only in winter.

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1. *Saṁghī c'eva gaṇī ca gaṇācariyo ca ñāto yasassī titthakaro sādhusammato bahujanassa rattaññū cirapabbajito.*

More than four months many living beings gathered on his body, crawled about it, and caused pain. Then he meditated, walking with his eye fixed on a square space before him of the length of a man. Many people who were shocked at the sight struck him and cried. He shunned the company of the female sex and of all house-holders. Asked, he gave no reply. He did not even answer those who saluted him. He was beaten with sticks and struck by sinful people. He wandered about disregarding all sights, not being attracted by any worldly amusement.

For more than a couple of years he went without using cold water. He realized singleness, guarded his body, obtained intuition and became calm. He carefully avoided doing injury to the meanest form of life. He did not use what was expressly prepared for him. He used to eat only clean food. He did not use another man's robe, nor did he eat out of another man's vessel. He observed moderation in eating and drinking. He neither rubbed his eyes nor scratched his body.

He sometimes took shelter in workshops, sometimes in manufactories, sometimes in garden houses, sometimes in a cemetery, in deserted houses, or at the foot of a tree. In such places he sought for shelter for thirteen years.

He meditated day and night, undisturbed, unperturbed, exerting himself strenuously. He never cared for sleep for the sake of pleasure. He waked up himself and slept only a little, free from cares and desires. Waking up again, he lay down exerting himself, going outside for once in a night, he walked about for an hour.

In his resting places, crawling or flying animals attacked him. Bad people, the guard of the village, or lance-bearers attacked him. Well-controlled, he bore all dreadful calamities and different kinds of feelings, and he wandered about, speaking but little. Ill treated, he engaged himself in his meditations, free from resentment. He endured all hardships in calmness. Well guarded, he bore the pains, caused by grass, cold, heat, flies and gnats.

He travelled in the pathless country of *Rāḍha*,—in *Vajrabhūmī* and *Svabhrabhūmi*, where he used miserable beds and seats. The rude natives of the place attacked him and set dogs to bite him. But he never used the sticks to keep off the dogs. He endured the abusive language of the rustics, being perfectly enlightened. The inhabitants of the place caused him all sorts of torture, and disturbed him in his religious postures. Abandoning the care of his body, he bore pain, free from desire.

He abstained from indulgence of the flesh, though never attacked by diseases. Whether wounded or not, he did not desire medical treatment. In the cold season he meditated in the shade. In summer he exposed himself to the heat. He lived on rough food : rice, pounded jujube, and jujube. Using these three kinds of food, he sustained himself eight months. Sometimes he did not drink for half a month or even for a month. Sometimes he did not drink for more than two months, or even six months. Sometimes he ate only the sixth meal, or the eighth, the tenth, the twelfth. Sometimes he ate stale food. He committed no sin himself, nor did he induce others to do so, nor did he consent to the sin of others.

He meditated persevering in some posture, without the smallest motion. He meditated in mental concentration on the things above, below, beside. He meditated free from sin and desire, not attached to sounds and colours, and never acted carelessly.

Thus, as hero at the head of a battle, he bore all hardships, and remaining undisturbed, proceeded on the road to deliverance. Understanding the truth and restraining the impulses for the purification of the soul, he finally liberated.[1]

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1. Ācārāṅga-Sūtra, I, 8. 9 ; Jaina-Sūtras, Part I, pp. 79-87.

Mahāvīra renounced the world at the age of thirty. It would seem that he joined the Order of Pārśva of which his parents were lay supporters. In the Ācārāṅga, the members of this Order are simply referred to as Śramaṇas or Recluses. It would further seem that the recluses of Pārśva's Order used to wear robes. Mahāvīra remained with them for more than a year, after which he turned a naked ascetic.

The Bhagavatī-Sūtra says that when Mahāvīra was spending the second year of his ascetic life in a weaver's shed in Nālandā, a suburb of Rājagṛha, Maṣkariputra Gośāla who was then wandering about in the country showing pictures to the people at large happened to arrive and put up there. One day, observing the extraordinary respect shown to Mahāvīra by Vijaya, a rich householder of Rājagṛha, Gośāla approached the venerable ascetic and asked to be admitted as his disciple, but the latter declined his request. His prayer was not granted on two successive occasions, even though the Master was entreated by the rich householders Ānanda and Sudarśana. In the mean while Mahāvīra went to the settlement of Kollāga, at some distance from Nālandā, where he was hospitably greeted by the Brahmin Bahula.

Gośāla sought him in vain in the city of Rājagṛha and its suburbs. He returned to the weaver's shed where he gave away his clothes, vessels, shoes, and pictures to a Brahmin of the place, shaved off his hair and beard, and in despair departed in search of the Master. On his way he passed Kollāga, where he met a large crowd applauding Bahula's liberality towards Mahāvīra. He continued his search and met the Master at last in Paṇiyabhūmi, where again he begged to be received as a disciple. This time his prayer was granted, and both the Master and the disciple lived together for six years in Paṇiyabhūmi, practising asceticism. Thereafter they travelled from Paṇiyabhūmi to Kūrmagrāma, and from Kūrmagrāma to Siddhārthagramā. While at Kūrmagrāma, they met ascetic Vesayana who remained seated with upraised arms and upturned face in the glare of the sun, while his body was swarming with lice. Gośāla enquired whether he was a sage or a bed of lice. Vesayana, being angry, attempted to strike Gośāla with his supernormal powers. Mahāvīra explained to him the severe ascetic discipline by which such powers could be obtained.

While at Siddhārthagrāma, Gośāla uprooted a sesamum shrub and threw it away. The shrub, owing

to a lucky fall of rain, came to life again. From this he jumped to the conclusion that all plants were capable of reanimation, nay, he drew the further conclusion that 'not only plants, but in fact all living beings were capable of reanimation'. Such generalization of the theory of reanimation apparently not finding favour with Mahāvīra, Gośāla thenceforward servered his connection with him and followed a course of asceticism for six months, which enabled him to acquire supernormal powers. He then proclaimed himself a Jina, and became the head of a sect, called the Ājīvika.[1]

Gośāla, figures in the early tradition of Buddhism as an independent leader of thought, who too was highly revered by the people of Northern India as 'the head of an Order, of a following, the teacher of a school, well-known and of repute as a sophist . . . a man of experience who has long been a recluse'. There is no suggestion ever made as to his personal relation with Mahāvīra. But there is sufficient reason to believe that the Nirgranthas and the Ājīvikas were two allied sects, having many points in common between them. In the immediate background of the religions of both the teachers, were the teachings of

1. Uvāsaga-dasāo, Tr. Höernle, App. I.

Pārśva. The Eight Mahānimittas of the Ājīvika Canon were extracts made from the Ten Pūrvas representing the literary authority of the sect of Pārśva.[1] Pārśva was honoured by both the sects as the last but one Tīrthaṅkara, while they were sharply divided in their claim for the position of the last Tīrthaṅkara. The Nigranthas, of course, legitimately claimed that Mahāvīra was the rightful successor of Pārśva in the tradition of the Tīrthaṅkaras.

It is remarkable that the Ācārāṅga account of Mahāvīra's *sādhanā* does not bring in Gośāla to form an episode in it. The same holds true of the account in the Kalpa-Sūtra which agrees substantially with that in the Ācārāṅga. Further, the names of the places where Mahāvīra is said to have spent the rainy seasons during the first twelve years of his asceticism differ from those mentioned in the Bhagavatī-Sūtra. The Kalpa-Sūtra offers the following account of Mahāvīra's earnest efforts prior to his Kevaliship :

When the moon was in conjunction with the asterism *Uttaraphālgunī*, Mahāvīra, after fasting two days and a half without drinking water and putting

1. Barua, The Ājīvikas, pp. 28, 41 foll.

on a divine robe, left the house and passed into the state of houselessness. For more than a year he wore clothes. Thereafter he walked about naked, and accepted alms. For more than twelve years he neglected his body and took no care of it. With equanimity he bore, underwent, and suffered all pleasant or unpleasant occurrences. He stayed the first rainy season in Asthigrāma, three rainy seasons in Campā and Pṛṣṭicampā, and eight in Vaiśālī and Vāṇijagrāma.

He remained circumspect in his walking, speaking, begging, accepting anything, carrying his drinking vessel, and obeying the calls of nature. He remained circumspect in his thoughts, words, and acts. He guarded his thoughts, words, acts, senses, and chastity. He moved without wrath, pride, deceit, and greed. He remained calm, tranquil, composed, liberated, free from temptations, without egoism and without property. In short, he had cut off all earthly ties, and was not stained by any worldliness. Like water in a vessel, he was unattached in the midst of sins. His course was unobstructed like that of life. Like the firmament he wanted no support. Like the wind he knew no obstacles. His heart was pure like the water in autumn. He remained unsoiled like a lotus-leaf. His

senses were well protected like those of a tortoise. Like a rhinoceros he lived single and alone. He was free like a bird, always walking like the fabulous bird Bhāruṇḍa, valorous like an elephant, strong like a bull, difficult to attack like a lion, steady and firm like Mt. Mandara, deep like the ocean, mild like the moon, effulgent like the sun, pure like gold, patient like the earth, and shining in splendour like a well-kindled fire.

He lived, except in the rainy season, all the eight months of summer and winter, in villages only a single night and in towns only five nights. He was indifferent alike to the smell of ordure and the sweet scent of sandal, to straw and jewel, dirt and gold, pleasure and pain, this world or the world beyond, to life and death. He exerted himself for the stoppage of the defilement of *karma*.

With supreme knowledge and faith and conduct he meditated on himself for twelve years. During the thirteenth year, in the second month of summer, in the fourth fortnight, the light fortnight of the month of Vaiśākha, on its tenth day, outside the town Jṛmbhikagrāma on the bank of the river Ṛjupālī, not far from an old shrine, in the field of the householder Śyāmāka under a *sal* tree and the asterism Uttaraphālgunī, he reached the highest

knowledge and intuition, called Kevals, which is infinite, supreme, unobstructed, unimpeded, complete, and full. He was then lost in deep meditation in a squatting position with joined heels, exposing himself to the heat of the sun, after fasting two days and a half even without drinking water.

Thus at the age of forty-two he had become a Jina and Arhat,—a Kevalin, omniscient, all-seeing and all-knowing. He knew and saw all conditions of the world of the gods, men, and demons : whence they come, whither they go, where they are born as men or animals, gods or infernal beings, according to their deeds.[1]

During the thirty years of his career as Teacher, he spent four rainy seasons in Vaiśāli and Vāṇijagrāma, fourteen in Rājagṛha and Nālandā, six in Mithilā, two in Bhadrikā, one in Ālabhikā, one in Praṇitabhūmi, one in Śrāvastī, and one in the town of Pāvā which was his last rainy season. In the fourth month of that rainy season, in the seventh fortnight, in the dark fortnight of Kārttika, on its fifteenth day, in the last watch of the night in the town of Pāvā, in king Hastipāla's office of the writers, the venerable Ascetic died, went off,

1. Jaina-Sūtras, Part I, pp. 260-264.

quitted the world, cutting as under the ties of birth, decay, and death.[1]

The Kalpa-Sūtra list is so worded as to suggest an idea of succession as regards the places where Mahāvīra spent forty-two rainy seasons since he had renounced the life of a householder. The idea of succession is suggested by the two expressions : 'first rainy season in Asthigrāma' and 'last rainy season in Pāpā or Pāvā'. Taken in order, the places stand in the list as follows :-

1. Asthigrāma—first rainy season.
2. Caṁpā and Pṛṣṭicampā—next three rainy seasons.
3. Vaiśālī and Vāṇijagrāma—next twelve rainy seasons.
4. Rājagṛha and Nālandā—next fourteen rainy seasons.
5. Mithilā—next six rainy seasons.
6. Bhadrikā—next two rainy seasons.
7. Ālabhikā—next one rainy season.
8. Paṇitabhūmi—next one rainy season.
9. Śrāvastī—next one rainy season.
10. Pāpā—last rainy season.

According to the commentary on the Kalpa-Sūtra, Asthigrāma was formerly called Vardhamāna.

1. Jaina-Sūtras, Part I, p. 264.

It would perhaps be more correct to say that Asthigrāma was the earlier name of Vardhamāna (modern Burdwan). But none need be surprised if Asthigrāma was the same place as Hatthigāma (Hastigrāma) which lay on the high road from Vaiśālī to Pāvā.[1]

Campā was the capital of Aṅga, which, after many vicissitudes of fortune in its war with Magadha, was conquered in Mahāvīra's time by Śreṇika Bimbisāra and permanently annexed to Magadha. Aṅga of the Sanskrit Epics comprised modern district of Bhagalpur and Monghyr and extended northwards up to the river Kosi. Its capital Campā was situated on the river of the same name and the Ganges, at a distance of 60 yojanas. Its actual site is probably marked by two villages of Campānagara and Campāpura near Bhagalpur.

Pṛṣṭicampā must have been a place not far from Campā. One of the Pāli Jātakas mentions a town, Known by the name of Kāla-Campā and situated in the kingdom of Aṅga.

Vaiśālī (modern Besarh in the Muzaffarpur District

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1. Most probably Pāvā is the same as Kasia situated on the little Gandak river to the east of the district of Gorakhpur. It is considered as one of the sacred places of the Jains. Its ancient name was Pāpā or Appāpurī.

of Bihar) was the chief seat of government of the Vṛji-Licchavis in Mahāvīra's time,[1] and Vāṇijagrāma was a centre of trade in the suburb of Vaiśālī.[2]

Rājagṛha (modern Rājgīr) wast he capital of Magadha in Mahāvīra's time. It was guarded by five hills, called Isigili. Vebhāra, Pāṇḍava, Vepulla, and Gijjhakūṭa. The Mahābhārata gives the names of the five hills as : Vipula, Vaibhāra, Varāha Vṛṣabha, and Ṛṣi.[3]

Nalandā, which is described in the Kalpa-Sūtra as a suburb (bāhirika) of Rājagṛha, was situated on the high road from Rājagṛha to Vaiśālī, at a distance of one yojana from Rājagṛha. It is identified with modern Bargoan, 7 miles to the north-west of Rājgīr in the district of Patna.[4]

Mithilā, which was the capital of once prosperous kingdom of Videha, stood as the chief seat of government of the Videhas. It is identified by tradition with modern Janakapura, a small town within the Nepal border, north of which the Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga districts meet.[5] Videha may be iden-

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1. Law, Geography of Early Buddhism, p. 12.
2. Law, Some Kṣatriya Tribes of Ancient India, p. 38.
3. Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, Chap. 21. Slokas 1-3.
4. Law, Geography of Early Buddhism, p. 31.
5. C.A.G.I., p. 718 ; Law, Some Kṣatriya Tribes of Ancient India, p. 134.

tified with Tirabhukti (modern Tirhut).[1]

Bhadrika, which is the same name as the Pāli Bhaddiya, was an important place in the kingdom of Aṅga.[2]

Ālabhika, which is the same name as the Pāli Āḷavī, is identified by Cunningham and Hoernle with Newal or Nawal in Unao District in U.P., and by Nandalal Dey with Aviwa, 27 miles north-east of Etwah.[3]

Paṇitabhūmi, which is the same name as the Ardha-Māgadhi Paṇiyabhūmi, was a place in Vajrabhūmi, a division of the pathless country of Rāḍha.[4]

Śrāvastī, which is correctly identified with Saheth-Maheth on the south bank of the river Rāpti, was the flourishing capital of the kingdom of Kośala in Mahāvīra's time. It was situated on the high road from Vaiśālī, Pāvā, and Kapilavastu to Kauśāmbī, Ujjayinī and Pratisthāna.[5]

Pāpā which is the same name as the Pāli Pāvā, was one of the chief seats of government of the

1. Law, Geography of Early Buddhism, p. 30.
2. Dhammapada Commentary, I, p. 384.
3. Law, Geography, p. 24.
4. jaina-Sūtras, Part I, p. 264, f.n. 4 ; also p. 84.
5. Law, Geography, p. 5, f.n. 2.

Mallas. It was in Mahāvīra's time one of the halting stations on the high road from Vaiśālī to Kuśīnārā and Kapilavastu.[1]

What Mahāvīra did after having attained the position of a Kevalin, where did he go, to whom did he proclaim his religious experience, and by whom was he first accepted as the Jina, are the interesting points that still remain unknown to us. The Bhagavatī-Sūtra would have us believe that extraordinary respect was shown by certain rich householders even long prior to his Jinahood, while the Ācārāṅga and the Kalpa-Sūtra narrate the account of his *sādhanā* in such a manner as to suggest that he had to make superhuman efforts before he could aspire to obtain the coveted position of a Kevalin. According to the Kalpa-Sūtra account, after leaving his home and passing into the houseless state of a recluse, he stayed with the followers of Pārśva for one year and a month at Asthigrāma. After that time, he went to Campā and Pṛṣṭicampā, and thereafter he returned to Vaiśālī and Vāṇijagrāma, near which he attained Jinahood in the thirteenth year of his career as an ascetic. The Ācārāṅga says that during this period, he travelled once in the country of Rāḍha, where he was rudely treated by its inhabitants.

1. Law, Geography, p. 15.

The Bhagavatī-Sūtra associates Nālandā, Rājagṛha, Paṇiyabhūmi, Siddhārthagrāma, and Kūrmagrāma with his early wanderings. There is reason to believe that these places were visited by him after his attainment of Jinahood.

The Uvāsaga-dasāo mentions Vāṇijagrāma, Campā, Bāraṇasī, Ālabhi (Pāli Āḷavi), Kampilyapura, Polāsapura, Rājagṛha, and Srāvastī as the places that were visited by the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra. The town of Campā had near it the shrine of Pūrṇabhadra, Vāṇijagrāma, the shrine called Dvipalāsa ; Bārāṇasī, the Koṣṭhaka shrine ; Ālabhī, the garden called Saṅkhavana ; Kampilyapura the garden called Sahaśrāmravana ; Polāsapura, a garden known by the name of Sahaśrāmravana ; Rājagṛha, the shrine called Gunasiḷa ; and Srāvastī, the Koṣṭhaka shrine.

In Vāṇijagrāma the great lay disciples of Mahāvīra and lay supporters of his Order were Ānanda and his wife Sivanandā ; in Campā, Kāmadeva and his wife Bhadrā ; in Bārāṇasī, Cūḷanipriya and his wife Śyāmā, Sūradeva and his wife Dhanyā ; in Ālabhi, Cullasataka and his wife Bahulā ; in Kampilyapura, Kundakolita and his wife Puṣyā ; in Polāsapura, Sardalaputra and his wife

Agnimitrā ; in Rājagṛha, Mahasataka ; and in Śravastī, Nandinipriya and his wife Aśvinī, Salatipriya and his wife Phālgunī.

These lay disciples of the Venerable Ascetic and lay supporters of the recluses of his Order, both male and female, are all mentioned as persons of opulence and influence, and as those noted for their piety and devotion. The typical description of each of them, as given in the Uvāsaga-dasāo, may enable the reader to form as idea of his worldly prosperity. Ānanda of Vāṇijagrāma, for instance, is described as a householder who 'possessed a treasure of four kror measures of gold deposited in a safe place, a capital of four kror measures of gold put out on interest, a well stocked estate of the value of four kror measures of gold, and four herds, each herd consisting of ten thousand heads of cattle'. He was a person whom many kings and princes and merchants made it a point to refer to, and to consult, on many affairs and matters needing advice. . . . . in short, on all sorts of business. He was also the main pillar, as it were, of his own family, their authority, support, mainstay, an guide. In short, he was a cause of prosperity to whatever business he was concerned with'. Each of them had a Posaha-house (hall for practice of upavasatha or religious observances). Ānanda, for instance, had his Posaha-house in the

Kollāga suburb of Vānijagrāma, in the midst of his people of the Nata or Jñātṛ clan.[1]

This is no exaggeration. The Pāli Upāli-Sutta[2] introduces to us the rich householder Upāli of Balakagrāma, near Nālandā, who was a lay disciple of Mahāvīra and a liberal supporter of the recluses of his Order, both male and female. We are indeed told that a very large number of inhabitants of Balakagrāma, headed by Upāli, became lay disciples of Mahāvīra. The Banker Mṛgāra or Mṛgadhara of Srāvastī, father-in-law of the Buddhist lady Visākhā, is mentioned as a lay disciple of Mahāvīra and a lay supporter of the Nirgantha recluses. Besides Upāli and Mṛgāra, the Buddhist texts mention, as we noted, Prince Abhaya, son of king Sreṇika Bimbisāra of Magadha, and Simha, a Licchavi general, among the lay disciples of the Jaina Tirthaṅkara.

The Jaina Bhagavatī Sūtra speaks of two other rich householders among the lay disciples of Mahāvīra, namely, Vijaya and Sudarsana, of whom the former was a citizen of Rājagṛha.[3]

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1. Uvāsaga-dasāo, Lec I, Höernle's Translation.

2. Majjhima-Nikāyā I, 371-387 ; cf. Sutrakṛtāṅga, Jaina-Sūtras, II, pp. 414-417.

3. Uvāsaga-dasāo, Höernle's Translation, App. pp 1-2.

The Ugras and Bhogas are 'repeatedly mentioned in several of the professedly oldest sacred books as being among the most prominent of the earliest converts'.[1]

In so old a Buddhist text as the Majjhima-Nikāya we have mention of a great many (sambahula) Niṛgantha recluses who, following the instruction and example of the Tirthaṅkara, practised a rigorous form of penance on a ridge of Mt. Ṛsigiri, near Rājagṛha.[2] The same work introduces to us two Nirgrantha recluses, Dīrghatapasvī[3] and Satyaka of Agniveśyāyana gotra[4] and to one Wanderer (parivrājaka) who was much influenced by the teaching and personality of Mahāvīra.[5] The Buddha is said to have met Dīrghatapasvī at Nālandā and Satyaka at Vaiśālī in the land of the Vṛji-Licchavis.

According to the Kalpa-Sūtra, Mahāvīra in his lifetime had an excellent community of fourteen thousand recluses with Indrabhūti at their head, thirty-six thousand female recluses with Candanā at their head, one hundred and fiftynine thousand lay

1. Uvāsaga-dasāo, Introduction, p. xiv.
2. Majjhima, I, p. 92.
3. *Ibid.*, I, p. 371.
4. *Ibid.*, I, p. 237.
5. *Ibid.*, II, pp. I, 29.

disciples with Śaṅkhaśataka at their head, and three hundred and eighteen thousand female lay disciples with Sulasā and Revatī at their head. There were 'three hundred sages who knew the fourteen Pūrvas, who though no Jinas came very near them, . . . ; thirteen hundred sages who were possessed of the Avadhi knowledge and superior qualities ; seven hundred Kevalins . . . ; seven hundred who could transform themselves . . . ; five hundred sages of mighty intellect . . . ; four hundred professors who were never vanquished in disputes . . . ; seven hundred male and fourteen hundred female disciples who reached perfection . . . ; and eight hundred sages in their last brith'.[1]

Among the immediate followers of Mahāvīra, eleven became distinguished as *gaṇadharas* guiding and instructing nine separate groups of Nirgrantha recluses, placed under them. The eldest monk Indrabhūti, the middle-aged monk Agnibhūti, and the youngest monk Vāyubhūti, all of the Gautama gotra, instructed 500 recluses each. The venerable Ārya Vyakta of the Bhāradvāja gotra and the Venerable Ārya Sudharman of the Agniveśyāyana gotra instructed 500 recluses each. The Venerable

1. Kalpa-Sūtra, 134 ; Jaina-Sūtras, Part I, pp. 265-266.

Maṇḍikaputra of the Vaśiṣṭha gotra and the Venerable Mauryaputra of the Kāśyapa gotra instructed 250 recluses each. The Venerable Akampita of the Gautama gotra and the Venerable Acalabhrātṛ of the Hāritāyana gotra instructed together 300 recluses each. Similarly the Venerable Metārya an Prabhāsa, both of the Kauṇḍiṇya gotra, instructed together 300 recluses each. All the eleven gaṇadharas died at Rājagṛha after fasting a month without even drinking water. Indrabhūti and Ārya Sudharman died after the demise of Mahāvīra. The Nirgrantha recluses trace their spiritual descent from Ārya Sudharman, because the remaining gaṇadharas left no descendants.[1]

What was the form of his first declaration about himself which aroused confidence in so many hundreds and thousands of his followers who had gathered round his personality and impelled them to follow his example in their own life ? And what was the special attraction of religious life which was held out to the householders, both men and women, who came to form a large body of lay disciples ?

The answer to the first question comes from several Buddhist texts, and the answer to the second

1. Jaina-Sūtras, Part I, pp. 286-287.

has been given in Lecture I of the Uvāsagadasāo. According to the Buddhist texts, the form of his first declaration or address was : 'I am all-knowing and all-seeing, and possessed of an infinite knowledge. Whether, I am walking or standing still, whether I sleep or remain awake, the supreme knowledge and intuition are present with me,—constantly and continuously. There are, O Nirgranthas, some sinful acts you have done in the past, which you must now wear out by this acute form of austerity. Now that here you will be living restrained in regard to your acts, speech, and thought, it will work as the non-doing of *karma* for future. Thus by the exhaustion of the force of past deeds through penance and the non-accumulation of new acts, (you are assured) of the stoppage of the future course of rebirth, from such stoppage, of the destruction of the effect of *karma*, from that, of The destruction of pain, from that, of the destruction of mental feelings, and from that, of the complete wearing out of all kinds of pain.'[1]

The gift of supernormal vision was vouchsafed even to a householder,—to one who resided within his own house but conformed himself to the rule of religious life as laid down by the great teacher. Gautama Indrabhūti was taken to task by the Master

1.Majjhima, I, pp. 92-93.

when he sought to claim a difference in degree in this respect between a recluse and a lay disciple.[1] The gift of supernormal vision was no monopoly of any Order or caste or sex. In this matter, Mahāvīra made no distinction between men and men, or between men and women. He had not enjoined one set of rules for male recluses and another for female, one set of rules for male lay disciples and another for female. When he wandered about in the country, he was accompanied by male as well as female recluses.

The Jain text clearly give us to understand that the Master had not only instructed his followers to observe penances and live restrained in all ways but keenly watched how they had been progressing. He also encouraged them in the study of the Pūrvas and in developing their power of reasoning and arguing. The Buddhist records themselves attest that there were some able and powerful disputants among the Nirgantha recluses[2] and lay disciples,[3]

The Jain tradition of Tīrthaṅkaras was built up by the noble career of certain Kṣatriya teachers. In this tradition, the role played by Mahāvīra was that of the very last reformer. His immediate

1. Uvāsaga-dasāo, Lec. I.
2. Majjhima-Nikāya, I, p. 22
3. *Ibid.*, I. pp. 374-375.

predecessor was Pārśvā or Pārśvanātha who too has been proved to be 'an historical personage'. He 'lived a hundred years, and died 250 years before Mahāvīra'.[1] According to the Kalpa-Sūtra, 'the Arhat Pārśva, the people's favourite, lived thirty years as a householder,.....full seventy years as a Śramaṇa, and a hundred years on the whole'.[2] And he died on the summit of Mt. Sammeta (modern Paresnath hill in the Hazaribagh District)

As for his popularity and great influence, we are told that he 'had an excellent community of sixteen thousand śramaṇas.....(and) thirty-eight thousand nuns',[3] The religious Order founded by him continued to exist till the time when Mahāvīra saw the light of the day. The followers of Pārśva referred to as Śramaṇas in the Jain books, used to wear clothes. The Pūrvas were their sacred books. The catuyāmasaṁvara or 'fourfold restraint' was regarded as a distinctive feature of their discipline. The parents of Mahāvīra were lay worshippers of Pārśva. The influence of

1. Chimanlal J. Shah, Jainism in Northern India, p. 12.
2. Kalpa-Sūtra, 168.
3. *Ibid.*, 166.

his teachings on the life of Mahāvīra's parents is described in the Ācārāṅga thus : 'Mahāvīra's parents were worshippers of Pārśva and followers of the Śramaṇas. During many years they were followers of the Śramaṇas and for the sake of protecting the six classes of lives they observed, blamed, repented, confessed, and did penance according to their sins. On a bed of *kuśa* grass they rejected all food, and their bodies dried up by the last mortification of the flesh, which is to end in death. Thus they died.....and leaving their bodies, were born as gods in Adbhuta Kalpa (better, Acyuta Kalpa).'[1]

The existence of Pārśva's Order in Mahāvīra's time is further proved by the reported disputes between the followers of Pārśva and those of Mahāvīra. The Bhagavatī-Sūtra describes one of such disputes which arose between Kālāvesiyaputta, a follower of Pārśva, and a disciple of Mahāvīra. The dispute, of course, ended when the former 'changed the law of the four vows for the law of the five vows enjoining compulsory confession',[2]

1. Jaina-Sūtras, I, p. 194.
2. Chimanlal J. Shah, Jainism in Northern India, p. 10.

The Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra records the following conversation between Keśī, a follower of Pārśva, and Gautama, a chief disciple of Mahāvīra :

'When the four precepts promulgated by the great sage Pārśva are held equally binding upon our two Orders, what is the cause of difference between us ?' Gautama replies : 'Wisdom recognizes the truth of the law and the ascertainment of true things. The first saints were simple but slow of understanding, the last saints prevaricating and slow of understanding, those between the two simple and wise ; hence there are two forms of the law. The first could but with difficulty understand the precepts of the law, and the last could only with difficulty observe them, but those between them easily understood and observed them.'[1]

The historical importance of the dialogue lies not only in the contrast sharply drawn between the two Orders but in the necessity felt for amalgamating them into one Order. In the Rāyapasesi, Keśī figures as a disciple of Mahāvīra.

It may be thought thus : 'The religious Order founded by Pārśva enjoyed the reputation of a high and rigid standard of conduct, verging upon the

1. Jaina-Sūtras, II, pp. 122-123.

stoic or ascetic. He made four moral precepts binding upon his followers, precepts which were later enforced by Mahāvīra and Buddha.'[1]

As a reformer of Pārśva's religion, Mahāvīra added a fifth, namely, the vow of chasity to the list of four-vows enjoined by his predecessor. Secondly, he restricted the practice of religious suicide by slow starvation only to those among his disciples who followed his personal example.

And as a happy result of the amalgamation of the two Orders, the oldest known Jain literature came to consist of the fourteen Pūrvas and the twelve Aṅgas. The Pūrvas, as it appears, formed the scriptural basis of the Upāngas and other books of the Jain Canon. Similarly Pārśva's doctrine of six classes of living beings served as the basis of Mahāvīra's doctrine of six *leśyās*.

When Pārśva lived Kaśī was probably the most powerful kingdom in Northern India. The Buddhist Jātakas relate stories of repeated wars between Kāśī and Kośala, which ended ultimately in the establishment of the supremacy of the latter kingdom. Both the Jaina and Buddhist sacred books point to a time when there arose four powerful monarchies

1. A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy, p. 380 ; Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 169.

in Northern India, and the rest of the country was divided into the principalities of several oligarchical or republican clans. Magadha, Kośala, Vatsa, and Avantī were the four powerful kingdoms where reigned Sreṇika Bimbisāra, Prasenajit, Udayana. and Candapradyot respectively. Among the republican clans of Kṣatriyas, the two most powerful were the Vṛji-Licchavis and the Mallas, who formed two separate confederacies in Mahāvīra's time. The Jñātrikas of Kuṇḍagrāma and the Videhans of Videha were included in the confederacy of the Vṛji-Licchavis with Vaiśālī as their chief seat of government. It is among these confederate Kṣatriyas that Mahāvīra was born and found strong supporters of his religion.

The Uvāsaga-dasāo refers to that early period of Mahāvīra's career as a teacher when there seems to have been an alliance of Kāsī-Kośala, Aṅga, Āḷavī, Videha, Vaiśālī, Pāvā and Kusīnārā against the growing power of Magadha. But, in spite of such an alliance, Aṅga was conquered by Sreṇika Bimbisāra and permanently annexed to Magadha. Kuṇika-Ajātaśatru, son and successor of Sreṇika Bimbisāra, is represented throughout the Jain literature as the king of Campā, that is, of Aṅga. The fact perhaps is that Kuṇika-Ajātaśatru was

appointed to govern Aṅga as a viceroy, and while he was the viceroy of Aṅga, he picked up a quarrel with the Licchavis of Vaiśālī. The Pāli scholiast Buddhaghosa says that the first qurrel arose on account of the arbitrary action of the Licchavis in violation of the term of a treaty by which half the mineral products of a mine was to be received by them, and the other half by Ajātaśatru.[1]

The Bhagavatī-Sūtra, however, suggests that some sixteen years before Mahāvīra's demise, a quarrel arose between Kuṇika and his brother or half-brother Vaihalya over the succession to the throne of their father. In this quarrel, the Licchavis lent their support to Vaihalya's claim. The result was that Kuṇika had to fight a battle with the Licchavis who allied themselves with the mallas and others.[2] Kuṇika must have suffered a defeat, although he successded in usurping the throne of Magadha. The alliance of the Licchavis and the Mallas existed till the demise of Mahāvīra, The Licchavis and the Mallas were indeed the two people to whom the rise of Mahāvīra was an object of national pride. Accordingly we read in the Kalpa-Sūtra that when Mahāvīra died at Pāvā, 'the

1. Law, Some Kṣatriya Tribes of Ancient India, p. 113.
2. Barua, The Ājīvikas, p. 28.

eighteen confederate kings of Kāśī and Kośala, the nine Mallakis and the nine Licchavis' instituted an illumination.[1]

The people of Aṅga-Magadha were equally proud to think that their country was hallowed by the presence of so great a teacher and guide as Mahāvīra. According to the Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra, king Sreṇika Bimbisāra of Magadha paid the following glowing tribute to Mahāvīra when he met him at Rājagṛha : 'You have made the best use of human birth, you have made a true Jina, . . . you are a protector (of mankind at large) and of your relations, for you have entered the path of the best Jinas'. Even we are told that forthwith the king, 'together with his wives, servants, and relations, became a staunch believer in the law, with a pure mind'.[2]

The Jain works represent Ceṭaka, maternal uncle of Mahāvīra, as the most powerful king of Videha at whose call all the allied powers of the time combined, either for the purpose of offence or of defence. He had seven daughters, the eldest of whom was married to king Udayana of Vatsa, and

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1. Kalpa-Sūtra, p. 128.

2. Uttarādhyayana, XX, V, 58 ; Chimanlal J. Shah, Jainism, p. 117.

the youngest to king Sreṇika Bimbisāra of Magadha. One joined the religious Order of Mahāvīra and the other four 'were married in one or the other royal family of Eastern India'. There may be some truth in the suggestion made by Mr. Chimanlal J. Shah that these princesses were instrumental in the propagation of Jainism in Northern India.[1]

The Kalpa-Sūtra definitely records that Mahāvīra 'lived thirty years as a householder, more than full twelve years in a state inferior to perfection, something less that thirty years as a Kevalin, forty-two years as a (recluse), and seventy-two years on the whole'. That at the age of seventy-two, in the town of Pāvā, and in king Hastipāla's office of the writers, Mahāvīra died, freed from all pains.

Some nine centuries elapsed since his demise when the council of Valabhi under the presidency of Devarddhi met to make a final redaction of the words of Mahāvīra as handed down by an oral tradition, and caused the same to be written in books. These sacred books of the Jain Āgama or Siddhānta, all worded in Ardha-Māgadhī, represent the oldest known literary monument in Prākrit, other than Pāli. The impetus given by the Master to the

1. Jainism in Northern India, pp. 88 foll.

development of the current speech of the people at large contiuned to act, and his later followers greatly helped in the literary development of all the main Prākrit dialects of mediæval India.

The Jains place the event of Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa (demise) in B. C. 527, while the Buddhists of Ceylon fix B. C. 544 or 543 as the date of Buddha's Mahāparinirvāṇa. These two dates, one proposed for the demise of Mahāvīra and the other for that of the Buddha, cannot be hermonized with the historical facts connected with the life of the two great teachers of India. Two things may be taken as certain : (1) that Mahāvīra predeceased the Buddha by 5 or 6, 7 or 8, or even 14 or 15 years ; and (2) that Mahāvīra passed as a Jina before the Buddha. The authenticity of B. C. 544 or 543 as the date of Buddha's demise has been questioned by modern scholars who propose either 486 or 484 as the correct date. The figure 544 or 543 is accounted for as the date of accession of Sreṇika Bimbisāra. Similary the figure 527 is accounted for as the date of attainment of Jinahood by Mahāvīra. Accepting this date for Mahāvīra's Kevaliship, one has to compute the date of his birth as B. C. 570, and that of his demise as B. C. 498 (or 500 in round numbers).

Mahāvīra was one of the great teachers of mankind. He was indeed one of those teachers through whom the problem of the perfection of man came to be recognized as the highest problem before progressive humanity. All the rule of relgious life which he had enjoined, were intended to be a practical aid to the attainment of perfection of the self. He did not preach to others what he had not practised himself. The goal set before mankind was the blissfulness of the entire being which could not be bought by the wealth and pomp and power of the world. This happy state is to be attained through patience, forbearance, self-denial, forgiveness, humanity, compassion and consideration, in short, sufferings and sacrifice. love and kindness. If he died, he died to live as an eternal porsonality. Before we close this short account of his life, it may repay our labours to briefly recount the impress of his personality on the life and civilization of India of his time.

Ahiṃsā or non-harming is the very first principle of higher life that he inculcated to his disciples and followers. The visible effect of *ahiṃsā* was sought to be proved by a practical demonstration. It was sought to be shown how even such brute creation as the beasts and birds, reptiles and fishes, happily responded to the non-harming and

compassionate attitude or disposition of men. Already in Mahāvīra's time, the righteous king of India made it a point of duty to vouchsafe the lawful protection to all forms of life within the compound of a religious establishment (*dhammika, rakkhāvaraṇa-gutti*).[1] This very principle of non-harming had a salutary effect on man's habitual diet. Those who came under the influence of Mahāvīra's personality and teachings gave up the eating of meat and fishes for good, and adhered to vegetarian diet. This change in diet went to improve the art of preparation of vegetable dishes.

The same principle served to mitigate the rigour and ruthlessness of the criminal justice of ancient India. The ancient laws were considerably modified and humanized. Compassion for the suffering fellow-beings is just the other side of non-harming. The principle of compassion was at the back of many philanthropic and humanitarian deeds and institutions which he encouraged. There must have been something very special and most forceful which appealed to the heart of the people of the trading community who realizing the utter worthlessness of the earthly good came forward to forsake all things for the good and happiness of others.

1. Majjhima, II, p. 101, etc.

Chastity, sexual and moral, is a virtue alike for individuals and nations to develop. And this he taught alike to individuals and nations that came under his influence.

Salvation was preached as the birthright of men, and it was assured to all without distinction of caste or creed or sex.

The *Kriyāvāda* or doctrine of action which he taught went to make men conscious of their responsibility for all their acts, mental, vocal or bodily. The same also awakened the consciousness that salvation was not a gift of favour but an attainment within human possibility.

Thus he dispensed with the idea of hereditary priesthood. It is for all persons to decide for themselves whether they will live as householders or turn monks according to their choice and fitness.

The *Syādvāda* forming the basis of Jain metaphysics and dialectics is still a doctrine, which is very imperfectly understood. But certain it is that this doctrine was formulated as a scheme of thought in which there is room for consideration of all points of view, and of all ideals. This was brought forward at a most critical period of Indian life when many conflicting dogmas were adumbrated without leading to certitude. The *Syādvāda* stands out as an intellectual idea of that harmony among men

which is based upon mutual understanding. In literature it has served as a basis of encyclopædic knowledge in which many of his votaries have excelled.

Jainism spread all over India since Mahāvīra's demise. The Chronicles of ceylon attest that it spread also in Ceylon. The places hallowed by the dust of his feet became sacred as places of pilgrimage to the millions of his votaries. Those very places became sites of the Jain shrines, the architecture, sculpture, and painting of which are still the most precious objects of admiration to all.

II

TEACHINGS

The teachings of Mahāvīra have come down to us as a living tradition which grew up and took a complete literary form through ten centuries from his demise. This tradition was up to a certain date known as fourteen Pūrvas. The fourteen Pūrvas themselves presuppose the existence of an earlier ten that had embodied the religious tradition of Pārśva and formed, as we are led to think by a legend in the Bhagavatī-Sūtra, a common basis of the Jaina and Ājīvika Canons. The gradual loss of those Pūrvas may be accounted for by the rise of the sacred books of the Jaina Canon, —the Siddhānta or Āgama by way of compilations from time to time. The process of compilation passed through a few stages till it was stopped with the preparation of a final redaction of the Canon at the council of Valabhi, under the presidency of Ārya Devarddhi, in 454 (or 467) A.D.[1] The casual references to the books representing various divisions of the said Canon seem to suggest a stratification of the Aṅgas, the Upāṅgas, and the

1. Jaina-Sūtras, Part I, Introd., p. xxxvii.

rest and a chronology of their gradual development. The process of growth is comparable to that of an embryo in the womb, the various parts and limbs manifesting themselves, one after the other, till the organism reaches its full-fledged form.

There was obviously a stage when the twelve Aṅgas were known and acknowledged as the only authoritative sacred books of Jainism. The twelfth Aṅga, called Dṛṣṭivāda, has been lost, as the tradition of the Jaina Church persistently informs us. But even the loss of this Aṅga may be accounted for by the rise of other books on its basis. So, looked at from this point of view, nothing has been lost.

The Sūtrakṛtāṅga expressly refers only to the twelve Aṅgas as 'the Canon of the Ganins, which has been taught, produced, and declared by the Śramaṇas, the Nirgranthas, viz. the Ācārāṅga (all down to) the Dṛṣṭivāda'.[1] These are indeed the sacred texts that were venerated as *maiṭṭhāna* (mātṛsthāna, matrices),[2] precisely as the Buddhists viewed the five Nikāyas as *mātuka* or matrices of their Canon.[3] Professor Jacobi misses the real import

1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, II. 1. 27.
2. *Ibid.*, I. 9. 24.
3. For this meaning of *mātukā*, see D. L. Barua's note, I.C., Vol. I. pp. 107 foll.

of the word *maiṭṭhāna* when he inclines to equate it with māyāsthāna.[1] The twelve Aṅgas were the matrices or fundamental bases of the Jaina Siddhānta.

Even with regard to the Aṅgas, it may be shown that Ardha-Māgadhī, the literary idiom developed in them is younger than Pāli of the Buddhist Canon preserved in Ceylon.[2] In the same connection, one may think with Professor Jacobi that 'the first book of the Ācārāṅga and that of the Sūtrakṛtāṅga-Sūtra may be reckoned among the most ancient parts of the Siddhānta', or that the Vaitāliya metre used in the Pāli Dhammapada represents 'an older stage in the development of the Vaitāliya' than that in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga.[3] Even one may cite instances of parallelism between Jainism and Buddhism, and of influence of the latter on the former. When we see that Mahāvīra is honoured with such epithets as Buddha, Tathāgata, Sugata, and Sambuddha, we cannot help feeling that these are borrowed. Just take them away, and you see that Jina, Arhat, Tīrthaṅkara, Vīra, Mahāvīra, Vaiśālika, Nirgrantha,

1. Jaina-Sūtras, Pt. II, p. 304, f.n. 3.
2. Āyāraṁga, edited by Jacobi, Introd.
3. Jaina-Sūtras, Pt. I, Introd., p. xli.

the great Brāhmaṇa, the great Śramaṇa, and the rest of usual titles of Vardhamāna come into prominence as Jaina specials.[1]

The text of the Aṅgas and that of some of the Upāṅgas do not fail, not withstanding their later accretions, to suggest that very atmosphere of society, religion, and thought in which it was possible for Jainism and Buddhism to arise and make a wide appeal to the classes of people to whom they were addressed. Śīlāṅka and other Jaina commentators have assiduously tried, no doubt, to clear up allusions in these ancient Jaina texts to the views, beliefs, and practices by means of systems and doctrines of the Sāṅkhya, the Vedānta or the Buddhist Śūnyavāda philosophy, But similar allusions to those very views, beliefs, and practices in the text of the Pāli Canon suggest at once a much earlier stage of Indian religious thought, which was only imperfectly understood by the Jaina scholiasts. Thus even in dealing with the teachings of Mahāvīra, the safer means of distinguishing between things earlier and later in the Jaina Aṅgas consists in the side-lights that may be gathered from the Pāli Nikāyas, but not from the guesses of the Jaina scholiasts who flourished long, long after the age

1. *Ibid.*, pp. xix-xx.

in which Mahāvīra or his immediate disciples and followers had lived.

Thus the Aṅgas are the main set of texts upon which we should rely in giving an account and estimate of Mahāvīra's teachings and the Pāli Nikāyas are of help to us only in so far as they corroborate the Jaina evidence.

We have seen that the Pāli Nikāyas bring before us a great personality, who was known to his contemporaries as Nirgrantha Jñātṛputra. Around this personality there gathered a large number of men and women, from all families or social grades. His disciples and followers sincerely believed that their master was a great Śramaṇa, a great Brāhmaṇa, a great Tīrthaṅkara, a great Guru, a great Master, who whether walking or sitting still was gifted with a supreme knowledge and vision of the *summum bonum*. It is this earnest belief or deep conviction about the greatness of the Teacher that had induced them to repose their trust in him and in his words. To them he stood as a living example of highest human virtue and perfection. His life was to them a perennial source of light and inspiration. His sufferings and forbearance kept them steady in all their trials and tribulations. And his teachings or instructions were to them not ordinary words but

utterances of one who saw the light of truth and was able to lead others along the path to truth. In all earnestness they sought to obey those words, both in the letter and in the spirit. In other words, those teachings of his were readily accepted by them as a means of satisfying their supreme religious need.

The goal of their religious life, as we are informed in a Pāli Sutta, was *sukha* or infinite bliss, which was not to be measured by the finite happiness of mortals. So the main formula or aphorism of Mahāvīra's teachings was : The infinite bliss is not reachable through the finite happiness of even so fortunate among men as the reigning monarchs, it is reachable only through *dukkha* or pain of foregoing and forsaking all finite happiness.[1]

The formula suggets a twofold inquiry : one regarding the nature of the goal, and the other regarding the nature of the path. The nature of the goal suggested is *sukha* or infinite bliss, and the implication is that it is attainable by human efforts. And the nature of the path suggested is *dukkha* or pain of foregoing and forsaking all finite happiness, and the implication is that the path that leads to worldly happiness is not the path that leads to infinite bliss.

1. Majjhima-Nikāya, I, pp. 93-94.

Now let us see how the Tīrthaṅkara has been described in the Jaina Sūtrakṛtāṅga, and in what light his personality and teachings were viewed by his immediate disciples. He is the glorious man who lived before their eyes. He is the great sage who possessed infinite knowledge and infinite faith. He is the highest and the wisest in the whole world. He is the omniscient sage Kāśyapa who proclaimed the highest law of the Jinas. His knowledge is inexhaustible like the water of the sea. He is limitless and pure like the great ocean. He is passionless, unfettered, and brilliant like Sakra, the king of the gods. By his vigour he is the most vigorous. He stands in the centre of the earth like Mt. Sudarśana, the best of all mountains. He is seen in a pure light like that of the sun. He is noble, glorious, full of faith, knowledge, and virtue. After having taught the highest law he practised the highest contemplation which is the purest of pure, thoroughly white as it were like mother-of-pearl and moon. Having annihilated all his karman by his knowledge, virture, and faith, he reached the unsurpassable, highest perfection, which is a state with a beginning but without an end. He is the best of teachers who have taught Nirvāṇa. He is the hero who grants protection to all, and whose perfection is infinite. He had mastered all philosophical systems, and practised

control as long as he lived. All that is the best in nature and the highest in the world serves as a point of comparison, and yet he remains incomparable and unsurpassed,[1]

The 'distant end'[2] or ulimate object of Jainism, as taught by Mahāvīra is Nirvāṇa which 'consists in peace'.[3] Nirvāṇa is just another name of *mokṣa* or liberation, *mukti* or deliverance, The liberation is not 'anything unreal, but the best thing'. This is no false assertion to declare that there is such a thing as liberation, which can be realized by man in the highest condition of aloofness and transcendentality of himself.[4] As Gautama, a disciple of Mahāvīra, explained to Keśī, a disciple of Pārśva, 'There is a safe place in view of all, but difficult of approach, where there is no old age, nor death, no pain nor disease'. 'It is what is called Nirvāṇa, or freedom from pain, or perfection, which is in view of all ; it is the safe, happy, and quiet place which the great sages reach. This is the eternal place, in view of all, but difficult of approach'.[5] If it is liberation, liberation from what ? The reply given is—from a state of

1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, 1, 6 ; Jaina-Sūtras, Pt. II, pp. 287-292.
2. *Ibid.*, I, 8. 18 ; Jaina-Sūtras, II, p. 299.
3. *Ibid.*, I, 11. 11.
4. *Ibid.*, I, 10. 12.
5. Uttarādhyayana, XXIII, 81-84 ; Jaina-Sūtras, II, p. 128.

bondage brought on by karman. If it is deliverance, deliverance from what ? To this, the reply is—from old age, disease, death, in short, all that constitutes a painful existence for the self.

If Nirvāṇa or *Mokṣa* is a real state of *sukha* or bliss, how can it be reached ? The opinion that 'Pleasant things are produced from pleasant things', 'Mokṣa, a pleasant thing, is arrived at through a comfortable life, another pleasant thing' is opposed and proved to be futile. The precedents cited from the tradition of such ancient and renowned Ṛṣis as Asita, Devala, Dvaipāyana, and Parāśara, who were generally belived to have reached perfection, notwithstanding the fact that they had eaten seeds and drunk water are considered no valid proof in support of the above proposition.[1] Even the Buddhist mode of life appeared to be too comfortable to be compatible with the right path to salvation as promulgated by the great Teacher.[2] So the proposition had to be rather reversed in formulating the path set out for the Nirgranthas :

Na sukhena sukham adhigantabbam,

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1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 3, 4, 4-6 ; Jaina-Sūtras, II, p. 269.
2. Jaina-Sūtras, II, p. 269, f. n. 3.

dukkhena sukham adhigantabbam.[1]

What is the *dukkha* or painful and difficult path whereby the disciples of the Jina were called to seek *sukha* or infinite bliss,—the liberation, the deliverance, the beatitude, the salvation, the Nirvāṇa ? On this head we are informed in the Pāli Sutta that by the *dukkha* or painful and difficult path was meant *dukkarakārikā* or rigorous practice of penances. *Samvara*[2] or practice of self-restraint with regard to the body, speech, and mind was just the other aspect of *dukkarakārikā* or *tapas*. The practice of austerities or penances was to be resorted to as a means of wearing out and ultimately destroying the effects of sinful deeds (pāpakamma) committed in former existences (pubbe), and that of the threefold self-restraint as a means of not giving effect to a new *karman*. Thus from the undoing of the effects of old karman by means of penances (purānānaṁ kammānaṁ tapasā vyantibhāvā) and the non-doing of such acts as are likely to produce a new karman effect (navānaṁ kammānaṁ akaraṇā) there follows, as a result, the non gliding of the self in the course of *saṁsāra* in

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1. Majjhima-Nikāya, I, Cūladukkhakkhandha-Sutta.
2. The term is supplied, as it does not actually occur in the text, but is clearly implied.

future (āyatim anavassavo). The sequel of this is the destruction of *karman* (kammakkhayo), the sequel of that is the destruction of the painful physical condition of the self (dukkhakkhayo), the sequel of that is the destruction of the painful mental condition of the self (vedanākkhayo), and from that ultimately results a complete wearing out of all pain, bodily or mental (sabbaṁ dukkhaṁ nijjiṇṇaṁ bhavissati).[1]

Thus here we have a somewhat clumsy but, upon the whole, a correct and faithful reproduction of the words of Mahāvīra as represented by his disciples to those of the Buddha. The historical importance of this Buddhist statement of Mahāvīra's teachings is that it points to a very early formulation of the main ideas of Jainism. Its importance lies also in the fact that it sets forth the whole chain of reasoning by which the terms of the Jaina thought were interlinked, the squence ending in *nirjarā* or *mokṣa*. It serves also to unveil the plan of thought in which the chain of reasoning was sought to be developed by arranging the terms broadly under two heads : positive and negative, or negative and positive.

The books of the Jaina Canon clearly show that the terminology of exposition of the Jaina thought

1. Majjhima-Nikāya, I, 93.

had developed by stages. The system, when it had reached its final shape in the Canon itself, came to be represented by the following terms and groups of terms :

On its logical or dialectical side it came to be described as a doctrine of nayas,[1] and on its pragmatic or practical side, as Kriyāvāda.[2]

The three spheres of the self to which it was required to administer came to be represented by these three terms : *jñāna* or sphere of knowledge and intuition, *darśaṇa* or sphere of faith and devotion, and *cāritra* or sphere of conduct and *behaviour*.[3]

The main system of Jainism came to be represented as *navatattva* or doctrine of nine terms.[4]

1. *jīva*
2. *ajīva*
3. *bandha*
4. *puṇya*
5. *pāpa*
6. *āśrava*
7. *saṁvara*
8. *karmakṣaya*
9. *mokṣa*

1. Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra, XXVIII, 24.
2. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 12. 21.
3. *Ibid.*, I, 6. 14.
4. Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra, XXVIII, 14 ; Jaina-Sūtras, Pt. II, p. 154.

As corollaries, to these terms, it came to include two other groups of terms.[1]

1. The five *astikāyas* or 'terms comprehending and characterizing the world of existence :

(1) *dharma,* (2) *adharma,* (3) *kāla,* (4) *ākāśa,* and (5) *ātmā.*

2. The three terms of *dravya, guṇa,* and *paryāya* comprehending and characterizing five *astikāyas.*

The doctrine of *nayas* is just what is termed *syādvāda* in the post-canonical works, and the *nayas* are no other than the seven modes of syādvāda (saptabhanginyāya). The cononical texts just mention the *nayas* without fixing up their number, four or seven.

The term *kiriya* or *Kriyāvāda,* and the three terms relating to the three aspects of the Jaina faith may be shown to have formed a part of the oldest known nomenclature of Jainism.

The terms representing the main system and the terms forming corollaries to them are indiscriminately set out together with other terms of a similar import in a passage in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga presenting certain important articles of faith :

'Do not maintain that the world does not exist. maintain that it exists.'

1. Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra, XXVIII, 5-7.

Do not maintain that *jīva* and *ajīva* do not exist, but that they exist.

Do not maintain that *dharma* and *adharma* do not exist, but that they exist.

Do not maintain that bondage and liberation do not exist, but that they exist.

Do not maintain that virtue (puṇya) and (pāpa) vice do not exist, but that they exist.

Do not maintain that *āśrava* and the stoppage of *āśrava* (saṁvara) do not exist, but that they exist.

Do not maintain that the experiencing of the effect, and the annihilation of karman do not exist, but that they exist.

Do not maintain that activity and non-activity do not exist, but that they exist.

* * *

Do not maintain that there is no such thing as perfection and non-perfection, but that there is such a thing.

Do not maintain that there is no place exclusively reserved for those who attain to perfection, but that there is such.'[1]

The articles of faith formulated from an implied *syādvāda* point of view read :

'He (a Jaina monk) should not believe that (this

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1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, II, 5 ; Jaina-Sūtras, II, pp. 405-409.

world) is without beginning or without end eternal or not eternal, according to the argumentation (of others).

From these alternatives you cannot arrive at truth ; from these alternatives you are certainly led to error.'

Similarly, 'One should not say : that there will be an end of beings who (know and) teach the truth : nor that all beings are not alike, nor that they shall be in (perpetual) bondage, or (that the prophets are eternal)'.[1]

Thus the main points of Jainism as taught by its founder and interpreted by its later exponents may be envisaged. Here our immediate task is to see what light may be actually thrown on those points from the text of the Aṅgas considered in the light of the evidence of the Pāli Nikāyas.

1. Syādvāda.—This consists of certain *nayas* which, according to Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, are 'points of view or principles with reference to which certain judgments are arrived at or arrangements made'.[2] The number of *nayas* came to be finally fixed as seven, while the canonical texts are reticent about their number. The term *syādvāda* itself is met with in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga. One cannot fail to

1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, II, 5 ; Jaina-Sūtras, II, pp. 405-409.
2. Bhandarkar, Report, p. 112.

perceive the logical necessity of its formulation in the teachings of Mahāvīra. Both Mahāvīra and Buddha had to reckon with the sceptical position of Sañjayā suspending judgments where an assertion of truth appeared to be opposed by a counter-assertion, each, according to a verbal interpretation, excluding the other. If the question was mooted like this : Is the world eternal or not eternal ? The Master's advice to his disciples was neither to side with those who maintained that the world is eternal nor with those who maintained that it is not eternal. The reason assigned for this was that from neither of these alternatives they could arrive at truth, or that proceeding (exclusively) from either they would only be led to error. To avoid exclusiveness in judgments about all matters of fact is the chief thing aimed at in the above advice. Thus in deciding all such questions, the admirable way was one of *syādvāda* : 'The world is eternal as far as that part is concerned which is the substratum of the idea (sāmānya) "world" ; it is not eternal as far as its ever-changing state is meant'.[1] The *syād* mode was the real way of escape from the position of the dogmatist and that of the sceptic, from both of which Mahāvīra recoiled.

1. Jaina-Sūtras, II, p. 405, f. n. 1.

2. *Kriyāvāda*,—Jainism was launched forth by its founder as a *Kriyāvāda*,[1] which, according to the Pāli Nikāya usage, is the same term as *Karmavāda* or doctrine of action. The Pāli Nikāyas refer to an ancient householder teacher of India as the first expounder of the doctrine of action.[2] The Jaina Sūtrakṛtāṅga, too, speaks of other types of *Kriyāvāda* then current in India.[3] Buddhism, too, was promulgated as a form of *Kriyāvāda* or *Kārmavāda*. Further in the teaching of Mahāvīra, *Kriyāvāda* of Jainism is sharply distinguished from *akriyāvāda* (doctrine of non-action), *ajñānavāda* (scepticism), and *vinayavāda* (formalism), precisely as in the word of the Buddha, *kriyāvāda* of Buddhism is distinguished from *satkāyadṛṣṭi* involving various types of *akriyā*, *vicikitsā* (scepticism), and *śīlavrata-parāmarśa* (formalism).[4] Thus to arrive at a correct understanding of the doctrinal significance of *kriyāvāda* of Jainism it is necessary not only to see how it has been

1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 12. 21.
2. Majjhima-N., I, p. 483.
3. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 6. 27 ; I, 10. 17.
4. Khuddakapāṭha, p. 5.

distinguished from *akriyāvāda*, *ajñānavāda*, *and vinayavāda*, but also from other types of *kriyāvāda*.

As typical instances of *akriyāvāda*, the Pāli Nikāyas mention the doctrines and views of four teachers, all of whom are associated with Mahāvīra as his notable contemporaries and as great leaders of Indian thought of that age. These are the very doctrines and views that find mention in the Jaina Sūtrakṛtāṅga as types of *akriyāvāda*. The four teachers, according to Buddhist tradition, are Pūrana Kśāyapa, Maṣkari Gośāla, Kakudha Kātyāyana, and Ajita Keśakambalī.[1] The first of them is represented as a teacher who advocated a theory of chance to account for all actions of beings, while in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga similar views are interpreted as a theory of the passivity of souls (niṣkriyāvāda). The second man is introduced as a dangerous fatalist both in the Pāli Nikāyas and in the Jaina Aṅgas. The third man plays the role of an eternalist seeking to account for all phenomena, all happenings in the world by a mechanical combination and separation of seven factors in reality, the number being six as given in the Jaina Aṅgas. The fourth man appears as a veritable atheist denying the possibility of

1. Dīgha-N., I, pp. 47-48.

individual existence after death and the efficacy of all funeral rites performed for the benefit of the deceased person.[1]

The types of *akriyāvāda* mentioned in the Sūtra kṛtāṅga are as follows :

(i) There are these five gross elements : earth, water, fire, wind, and air. From them arises an intelligent principle called *ātman*. On the dissolution of the five elements living beings cease to exist.

Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual soul. These souls exist as long as the body exists, but after death they are no more, There are no souls which are born again.

There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond. On the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be.

There are individual souls. They experience pleasure and pain, and at death they lose their state of life.[2]

(2) when a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul (ātman) which acts or causes to act.[3]

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1. Jacobi, Jaina-Sūtras, II. pp. 236-239.

2. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I. 1. 1. 7, 8, 12 ; I, 1. 2. 1 ; I, 1. 1. 18. Jaina-Sūtras, II, pp. 236-239.

3. *Ibid.*, I. 1. 1. 13.

(3) There are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance. These six substances are imperishable and eternal by their very nature.[1]

(4) Pleasure, pain, and final beatitude are not caused by the souls themselves, but the individual souls experience them. It is the lot assigned to them by destiny.

Some beings have motion, others not. It depends on certain conditions whether they are in the one state or in the other.[2]

(5) The world has been created or is governed by the gods.

It has been created or is governed by Brahman,

It has been created or is governed by Iśvara.

It has been created by Svayambhū.

It is produced from the primeval egg, and Brahman created the things.

It is produced from chaos.[3]

(6) The world is boundless and eternal, it exists from eternity and does not perish.

It is limited, but eternal. The knowledge of the highest being is unlimited. It is limited in every way.[4]

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1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 1. 1. 1. 15-16.
2. *Ibid.*, I, 1. 2. 2. 3 ; I, 1. 4. 8.
3. *Ibid.*, I, 1. 3. 5-8 ; Jaina-Sūtras, Part II.
4. *Ibid.*, I, 1. 1. 17.

(7) Just as the earth, though it is but one pile, presents many forms, so *ātman*, the self, appears under various forms as the universe.[1]

All these views are again reduced to just four main types that correspond to those associated in the Pāli Nikāyas with four leading thinkers of the time, viz. atheism, like that of Ajita ; eternalism like that of Kātyāyana ; absolutism, like that of Kāśyapa ; and fatalism, like that of Gośāla,

The first type is represented thus :

The *ātman* is a living individual, a biological entity. The whole self lives and lasts as long as the body, it does not outlast the destruction of the body. With the body ends life. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village. Therefore, there is and exists no soul apart from the body, those who believe it speak the truth.

The second type stands as follows ;

' The five substances with the soul as the sixth are not created, directly or indirecly. They are without beginning and end. They always produce effect through an intermixture, and are independent of a directing cause or everything else. They are

1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, 1, I. I. 9.

eternal. What is, does not perish. From nothing, nothing comes.

The third type teaches :

All things have the ātman, self or ego for their cause and object, they are produced by the self, they are manifested by the self, they are intimately connected with the self, they are bound up in the self. As, for instance, a water bubble is produced in water, grows in water, is not separate from water, but is bound up in water, so as to all things and the self.

The fourth type teaches :

One man admits action, another man does not admit action. Both men are alike, their case is the same, because they are actuated by the same force, i.e. by fate. It is their destiny that all beings, movable or immovable, come to have a body, to undergo the vicissitudes of life, and to experience pleasure and pain.

Each of these four types stands as an example of *akriyāvāda* in as much as it fails to inspire moral and pious action, or to make an individual responsible for an action and its consequences.[1]

The *ajñānavāda vinayavāda*, and other types of *kriyāvāda* are nowhere clearly described. We are

1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, II, I. 15—34 : Jaina-Sūtras, II, pp. 329-347.

simply told that the upholders of the first cannot lead to knowledge, that they cannot reach the truth by themselves, still less teach it to other men.[1] In the Pāli Nikāyas, they are described as prevaricators in their judgments and statements. Whenever they are confronted with two alternatives in thought, appearing to be equally tenable and untenable, they refrain from giving their own judgments and begin to point to the need of seeking peace by avoiding both the alternatives. According to the Uttāradhyayana-Sūtra, the 'inefficiency of knowledge' is the real upshot of *ajñānavāda*.[2] In the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, the upholders of *ajñānavāda* are represented as those thinkers who pretending to be clever, reason incoherently, and do not get beyond the confusion of their ideas.[3]

The Vinayavāda may be supposed to have been the same doctrine as what is called *Sīlabbata-parāmāsa* in Pāli. The *sīlabbata-parāmāsa* is a view of those who maintain that the purity of oneself may be reached through the observance of certain moral precepts (sīlena) or by means of keeping

1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, 1, I. 2. 17.
2. Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra, XVIII. 23.
3. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, 1. 12. 2.

certain vows (vatena) as prescribed. According to the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, the upholders of *vinayavāda* are those who assert : 'The goal of religious life is realized by confirmation to the rules of discipline'.[1] 'Some say that perfection is reached by abstaining from the seasoner of food (salt), others by the use of cold water (by ablutions), others again by (tending) a fire.'[2]

The types of *kriyāvāda* that do not come up to the standard of Jainism are two in number :

(1) The soul of him who is pure will become free from bad *karman* on reaching beatitude but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hatred. As clear water which is free from defilement becomes again defiled. so will be the soul.[3]

(2) If a man with the intention of killing a baby hurts a gourd, mistaking it for a baby, he will be guilty of murder. If, on the other hand, a man with the intention of roasting a gourd roasts a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder. This is the view of the Buddhist with whom intention is the criterion of the moral guilt or innocence in man's action.[4]

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1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I. 12, 4.
2. *Ibid.*, I. 7. 12.
3. *Ibid.*, I, 1. 3. 11. 12,
4. *Ibid.*, II, 6, 26, 27.

The main formula of the *kriyāvāda* of Mahāvīra reads :

Sayaṁkaḍaṁ ca dukkhaṃ, nāṇṇakaḍaṁ.

The painful condition of the self is brought about by one's own action, it is not brought about by any other cause (fate, creator, chance, or the like).'[1]

The same is stated thus in the Pāli Nikāyas :

Sukha-dukkhaṁ sayamkataṁ.

in contradistinction to

Sukha-dukkhaṁ paramkataṁ,

'Pleasure and pain are brought about by one's own action.'[2]

'Individually a man is born, individually he dies, individually he falls (from this state of existence), individually he rises (to another). His passions, consciousness. intellect, perceptions, and impressions belong to the individual exclusively. Here, indeed, the bonds of relationship are not able to help nor save one.'[3]

'All living beings own their present form of existence to their own karman ; timid, wicked,

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1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 12. 11.

2. Aṅguttara-Nikāya, III, p. 440 ; Saṃyutta-Nikāya, II, p. 22.

3. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, II, 1. 41 ; Jaina-Sūtras, II. p. 349.

suffering latent misery. they err about (in the circle of births), subject to birth, old age, and death.'[1]

'The sinners cannot annihilate works by new works ; the pious annihilate their works by abstention from works.'[2]

'Pleasant things are not produced from pleasant things.'[3]

'He who intends (to kill) a living being but does not do it by his body. and he who unknowingly kills one, both are affected by that through a slight contact (with it) only. But the demerit (in their case) is not fully developed.'[4]

'He who knows himself and the world ; who knows where (the creatures) go, and whence they will not return ; who knows what is internal and what is transient ; birth and death, and the future existances of men.'

'He who knows the tortures of beings below (in hell) ; who knows the influx of sin and its stoppage ; who knows misery and its annihilation,—he is entitled to expound the Kriyāvāda.'[5]

The texts cited above suffice to indicate that the Jaina doctrine of nine terms (navatattva) developed

1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 2. 3, 18 ; Jaina-Sūras, II, p. 260.
2. *Ibid.*, I, 12. 15, 3. Implied in *ibid.*, I, 3. 4..6.
4. *Ibid.*, I, 1. 2. 25. 5. *Ibid.*, I, 12. 20. 21.

from the necessity for a systematic exposition of *kriyāvāda*, which is in its essential feature only a theory of soul and *karma:* According to this theory, there are as many souls as living individuals, and *karma* consists of acts, intentional and unintentional, that produce effects on the nature of soul. Thus soul is not passive in the sense that it remains untouched or unaffected by what a person does for the sake of some interests but is susceptible to the influences of *karma*. The effects or impressions of individual acts or efforts on soul are called *lesā* or *leśyās*. The *lesā* is, according to the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, a term signifying 'colour'.[1] The classification of living beings in terms of six colours may be traced in Parśva's doctrine of six *jīvanikāyas*.[2] The Ājīvika expression, *chaḷābhijātiyo*. as explained by Buddhaghosa, implies the same method of classification of men in terms of six colours.[3] The Mahābhārata expression, *jīva-ṣaṭvarṇāḥ*., hardly leaves room for doubt.that the *lesā* is a term to denote colour. The Buddhist idea of contamination of mind by the influx of impurities from outside,

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1.Sūtrakṛtāṅga. I. 6. 13. Jaina-Sūtras, II, p. 196 f.n

2. Ācārāṅga, II. 15. 16.

3. Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, pp. 309 and 318.

illustrated by the simile of a piece of cloth dyed blue, red, yellow, or the like[1] would seem to have some bearing on the Jaina doctrine of six *leśyās* which is merely hinted at, here and there, in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga,[2] and fully explained in the Uttarādhyayana.[3] The Jaina religious efforts are directed towards the acquisition of pure *leśyā*.[4]

3. *Jñāna*, *Darśana*, *Chāritra*,—Knowledge, Faith, and Virtue are the three terms that signify the comprehensiveness of Jainism as taught by Mahāvīra. The Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra adds Austerities as a fourth to the usual earlier list of three terms.[5] Knowledge is characterized as right knowledge, Faith, as right faith, and Virtue, as right conduct. These three constitute the path to beatitude, to liberation, to Nirvāṇa.

The Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra speaks of five kinds of knowledge. (1) *śruta*, or that which is derived from the study of sacred books ; (2) *abhinibodhika*, or that which is derived from one's experience,

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1. Barua, Cittaviśuddh īprakaraṇa and its Pāli Basis, in Indian Culture,

2. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 4. 21, where a Jaina saint is described as a person 'whose soul is in a pure condition (leśyā).'

3. Uttarādhyayana, XXXIV. 4. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 10. 15.

5. Jaina-Sūtras, II, 152.

thought or understanding ; (3) *avadhi*, or that which is co-extensive with the object ; (4) *manaḥparyāya*, or knowledge of the thoughts of other people ; and (5) *kevala*, or the highest, unlimited knowledge. The first kind of knowledge corresponds to what the Buddhists call *sutamaya paññā* ; the second kind to what they call *cintāmaya paññā* ; the third kind, to what they call *vilokana* ; the fourth kind, to what they call *cetopariyā-nāṇa* ; and the fifth kind, to what they call *sabbaññutā* or omniscience consisting in three faculties : of reviewing and recalling to mind all past existences with details, of perceiving the destiny of other beings according to their deeds, and of being conscious of the final destruction of sins.

The *Avadhi-jñāna* is rather knowledge which is co-extensive with the object rather than knowledge, which is supernatural. The Kalpa-Sūtra for instance, says : he viewed the whole Jambudvīpa with his knowledge called *avadhi*.[1] Here *avadhi* means that which is limited by the object, that which is just sufficient to survey the field of observation.

The *manaḥparyāya-jñāna* is defined in the Ācārāṅga-Sūtra as a knowledge of the thoughts of

1. Kalpa-Sūtra, 15 ; Jaina-Sūtras, I, p. 223.

all sentient beings.[1] And the *kevala-jñāna* is defined in the same text as omniscience enabling a person to comprehend all objects, to know all conditions of the world of gods, men and demons : whence they come, where they go. where they are born, etc.[2]

Knowledge, as represented in the Aṅgas and other texts of the Canon, is rather religious vision, intuition or wisdom than knowledge in a meta-physical sense.

The *samyak darśana* or right faith consists in an insight into the meaning of truths as proclaimed and taught, a mental perception of the excellence of the system as propounded, a personal conviction as to the greatness and goodness of the teacher, and a ready acceptance of certain articles of faith for one's guidance. *Samyak darśana* is intended to remove all doubt and scepticism from one's mind,[3] and to establish or re-establish faith. It is such a form of faith as is likely to inspire action by opening a new vista of life and its perfection. Right faith on the one hand and inaction, vacillation, on the other, are mutually incompatible.[4] The articles of

1. Ācāraṅga, II, 15.23.
2. *Ibid.*, II, 15.25.
3. Uttarādhyayana, XXXII, 2.
4. *Ibid.*, XXVIII, 16-28, Note the nine kinds of obstruction to right faith in *ibid.*, XXXIII, 5.6.

the Jaina faith are all formulated with a view to producing a mental disposition and outlook which is different from that which is likely to be produced by the various types of *akriyāvāda*, *ajñānavāda*, and *vinayavāda*.[1]

The excellence of faith depends on the following points : that one has no doubts about the truth of the tenets, that one has no preference for the tenets of others, that one does not doubt the saving qualities of one's own faith, that one is not shaken in the right belief, that one praises the pious, that one encourages the weak fellows, that one supports and loves the confessors of the law, and that one endeavours to evalt one's own faith.[2]

A man of knowledge is a man of faith, and a man of faith is a man of action. Virtue consists in right conduct. But there is no right conduct without right belief, and no right belief without the right perception of truth.[3] The quintessence of right conduct is the purity of morals[4] which is achieved by the threefold restraint : the restraint of the body, the restraint of speech, the restraint of mind. The first step to virtue lies in the avoidance of sins.

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1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga. II. 5 : the Lecture called Freedom from Error.
2. Uttarādhyāyana-Sūtra. XXVIII.
3. *Ibid.*, XXVIII. 28.29
4. Sūtrakṛtāṅga. 1. 1. 2. 27.

There are various ways of committing sins, directly and indirectly, by bodily acts, by the word of mouth and even by thoughts,[1] Thus to avoid sins one must guard oneself by the *samitis* and *guptis*. Not to kill anything, to live according to the rules of conduct and without greed, to take care of the highest good, to control oneself always in walking, in sitting and lying down, and in the matter of food and drink, to leave off pride, wrath, deceit, and greed, to possess the *samitis*, to be protected by the five *samvaras*, and to reach perfection by remaining unfettered among the fettered, —these are, in short, the cardinal principles of *chāritra* as taught by Mahāvīra.[2]

4. *Doctrine of nine terms*.—Right knowledge, faith, and conduct, the three essential points in Mahāvīra's teachings, constitute the path of Jainism which leads to the destruction of *karma* and to perfection.[3] Destruction means, on the one hand, the exhaustion of accumulated effects of action in the past, and it means, on the other, the stoppage of the future rise of such effects. Perfection (siddhi)

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1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 1. 2. 26 : Three ways of committing sins : by one's own activity ; by commission : by approval of the deed.
2. *Ibid.*, I. 1. 4. 10-13.
3. *Ibid.*, I, 2. 1. 21, 22.

consists in the consciousness of one's liberation, and liberation means the freedom of soul from its bondage. The doctrine of nine terms is formulated with a view to explaining systematically these two points. Of the nine terms, some are to explain how the bondage of souls arises by way of effects of *karma* upon it, and some to explain how those effects are got rid of and the liberation of soul is obtained.

The first pair of terms consists of *jīva* and *ajīva*. These two terms comprehend the world of existance as known and experienced. The *jīva* signifies all that has life and the *ajīva* signifies the things without life. The world of life is represented by the six classes of living things and beings, the first three of which are immovable and the last three movable. The earth lives, water lives, and plants are immovable beings, while the movable beings are the fire lives, wind lives, and those with an organic body. The living things are either subtile or gross, and the living beings are either those still belonging to *saṁsāra* or those whose souls are perfected. Through the gradation of lilving things and beings one can trace the evolution of the senses, the lowest form of beings being provided with only one sense, the sense of touch.[1]

1. Uttarādhyayana, XXXVI : Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 7, 1.

The study of the category of *jīva* is important because it is in connection or inter-connection with the six classes of beings that the process of *karma* sets in and the nature of man's conduct is determined. The Jina taught : 'Know and understand that they all desire happiness ; by hurting these beings men do harm to their own souls, and will again and again be born as one of them. Every being born high or low in the scale of the living creation, among movable and immovable beings, will meet with its death. Whatever sins the evil doer commits in every birth, for them he must die.'[1]

The things without life are either formed or formless. The formed are compound things and atoms constituting the world of matter. The world of the formless is represented by the first four of the *astikāyas*, viz. *dharma, adharma,* space, and time. *Dharma* and *adharma* explain motion and absence of motion respectively, Space explains how things and beings appear mutually distinct, and time explains their duration of existence. Thus the category of *ajīva* helps us in completing our study of the world of life and existence.[2]

The third term or category is *bandha* or bondage of soul. Bondage is the subjection of soul to the

1. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 7. 2, 3 : Jaina-Sūtras II, p. 292.
2. Uttarādhyayana. XXXVI.

laws of birth and death, old age and decay, pleasure and pain, and other vicissitudes of life brought about by the effect of *karma*. The soul which is the fifth of the five *astikāyas* represents the principle of intelligence. 'The characteristic of soul is knowledge, faith, conduct, austerities, energy, and realization of its developments.'[1]

The categories of merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa) comprehend all acts or deeds, pious and sinful, which keep the soul bound to the circle of births and deaths.[2]

Āsrava is that which causes the soul to be affected by sins, and *saṁvara* is the principle of self-control by which the influx of sins is checked or stopped. The category of *saṁvara* comprehends the whole sphere of right conduct.

Nirjarā consists in the wearing out of accumulated effects of *karma* on the soul by the practice of austerities, and *mokṣa* which logically follows from *nirjarā* signifies the final deliverance of the soul from the bondage of *karma*, the bondage of sin. Siddhi or perfection is just the other aspect of liberation.

5. *A gloomy view of the world*—The world as painted in the words of Mahāvīra presents a gloomy

1. Uttarādhyayana, XXVIII, II 2. *Ibid.*, XXXI, 3.

picture. It represents that state of existence of the soul in which it has to undergo repeated births and deaths and all their concomitant experiences. It is *saṁsāra* or course of life and death which appears like a boundless flood of water with its dangerous current. Earth, water, fire, and air, all contain lives. The senses and mental faculties become manifest in varying degrees in various forms of beings. Man finds himself in an awful situation where he has to work under the influence of affection, passion, and attachment. The world presents a constant scene of quarrel and strife, death and carnage, and of all mad pursuits of life, the ultimate end of which is utter disappointment. For the sake of food and drink, lodging and comfort, woman and wealth a man is involved in various works that lead the soul from sin to sin. Attached to the agreeable sounds and colours, tastes and smells, touches and perceptions, in short, to all seductive pleasures of the senses, the living beings suffer and find no escape from pain. The path to these pleasures is the path to birth, disease, decay, and death. A reflection on these conditions of the world as one daily sees them all around leads a man away from them to seek a safe island, to seek peace, to seek liberation, deliverance. and perfection.

6. *Brightness of the prospect.*—In contrast to the gloomy picture of the world as commonly known stands in bold relief the bright prospect of the religious life as lived and taught by Mahāvīra. The reassuring message which uuderlies all his teachings is that soul is the highest reality of life, and *nirvāṇa* is not extinction but the eternal and blissful condition of the soul in its perfection. This condition of soul is realizable in this very existence and solely by human efforts, if they are well- directed. The development and manifestation of supreme personality is the visible fruition of religious efforts leading to liberation. The life of the Master offered for imitation by his earnest disciples stands as one of the highest examples of such a personality. The heart of Jainism is not empty as Mrs. Stevenson thinks, it is only emptied of all that go to constitute selfishness, naughtiness, cruelty, wickedness, inconsideration, and such immoral propensities. These are removed so as to find the human heart filled with love, kindness, meekness, sincerity, and such other best qualities of character. The best emblem of purity, nobility, beauty, and fullness of the Jaina life is the white lotus. Thus one reads in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, II, 1, 2, 3, 4 : 'There is a lotus-pool containing much water and mud, very full and

complete, answering to the idea one has of a lotus-pool, full of white lotuses, delightful, conspicuous, magnificent, and splendid. And everywhere all over the lotus-pool there grew many white lotuses, the best Nymphaeds, . . , in beautiful array, tall, brilliant, of fine colour, small, taste, and touch. And in the very middle of this lotus-pool there grew one big white lotus, the best of Nymphaeds.'

7. *General view*.—Accoriding to Mahāvīra, the four precepts and self-privation and the recognized roads to the blissful state of the soul. The soul-substance is not a single all-pervading reality without a second of its kind. The soul has no beginning or end. So long it has to go round and round through the cycle of births and deaths, it has a form. If the soul is to have a form by virtue of its own, then it cannot but be dull in sentient matter devoid of all consciousness and intelligence. If it be absolutely formless, they by the virtue of its being free from all activities, bondage, and freedom would become incompatible with its own nature, and *saṁsāra*, too, would be impossible. Mahāvīra laid a great stress on the activity of souls. The individual soul has innumerable units of space. The soul is uncreated and possessed of the quality of existence. The soul knows and sees all, desires happiness, is afraid of

pain, does friendly or unfriendly actions, and enjoys the fruits of them.[1] That which has consciousness is soul.[2] The soul in combination with the body is the doer of all actions. One should abstain from killing beings, theft, falsehood, sensual pleasure, and spirituous liquor. Those who do not renounce these, go to hell. A person will suffer the consequences of whatever may preponderate as between an act and forbearance from it. A sage should wander about free from sins. Self should be subdued. A monk should avoid untruth, sinful speech and should not be deceitful. Nothing sinful, hurtful, and meaningless should be told by him. He should sally forth and return at the right time. He should collect alms freely given. He must conquer twenty-two troubles, e.g. hunger, thirst, cold, heat, nakedness, erratic life, women, dirt, ignorance. etc. He should not walk beyond the prescribed time, remembering the teachings of Mahāvīra. The pious obtains purity and the pure stands firmly in the law. Delusion, pride, deceit, and greed should be avoided. Monks or householders who are trained in self-control and penance and who have obtained liberations by the absence of passion, go to the highest region. Those

1. Pañcāstikāya, p. 122.
2. Dravyasaṁgraha, 2, 3.

who are ignorant of the truth are subject to pain. A person of pure faith always realizes the truth. Those who have attachments for this world suffer. An ignorant man kills, tells lies, steals foreign goods, and is desirous of women and pleasures. The sinners go to the world of Asuras and to the dark place.

A monk should cast aside all fetters and all hatred. Pious ascetics get over the impassable saṁsāra. Stupid sinners go to hell through their superstitious beliefs. One should not permit the killing of living beings. He should not commit sins in thoughts, words, and acts. The pleasures are like a venomous snake. The pleasures are the thorn that rankles and they should be given up like poison. A true monk is one who does not care for his life, who abandons every delusion, who always practises austerities and avoids contact with wicked men and women. A monk should not take from the householder, bed, lodging, food, drink, etc. He who practises self-discipline meditates on his soul, wise, hardy, calm, and does not hurt anybody is a true monk. He should not occupy places for sleep or rest frequented by women. He should take up a detached lodging not frequented by women to preserve his chastity. The pious monk should abstain from ornaments. A monk should be steadfast, righteous, content, restrained, and attentive to his

duties. Birth is misery. Old age is misery and so are disease and death. Nothing but misery is the saṁsāra, in which men suffer distress. A monk should be impartial towards all beings in the world and should be careful to speak truth. He should keep the severe vow of chastity. Mental and bodily penances should be practised. He who possesses virtuous conduct and life, who has practised the best self-control, who keeps from sinful influences, and who has destroyed karma, will obtain *mukti*. An ascetic will by means of his simplicity enter the path of *Nirvāṇa*. Those who truly believe in the subject of exertion in righteousness taught by Mahāvīra, put faith in it, give credence to it, accept it, practise it, comply with it, study it, understand it, learn it, and act up to it, have obtained perfection, enlightenment, deliverance, final beatitude, and have put an end to all miseries.

Meditation means abstaining to meditate on painful and sinful things. One should with a collected mind engage in pure meditation on the law.

There are three ways of committing sins : by one's own activity, by commission, and by approval of the dead. By purity of heart one reaches *Nirvāṇa*. Misery arises from wicked deeds. A very learned

or a virtuous man or Brahman or an ascetic will be severely punished for his deed when he is given to actions of deceit. A sage should always vanquish his passions. He should expound the law correctly. He should not neglect even the smallest duty. A wise man should abandon worldliness. He who abstains from cold water, and who does not eat food out of the dish of a householder, possesses right conduct. Those who are not subdued by the wicked pleasures know meditation to be their duty. A monk should not tell stories. He should not indulge in deceit, greed, pride, and wrath. He should be free from attachment. The virtuous men regard pleasures as equal to diseases. One should not kill living beings in the threefold way, being intent on his spiritual welfare and his soul, putting aside all undertakings. He should abstain from untrue speech and will not take that which is not freely given to him. *Nirvāṇa* consists in peace. Cruel sinners commit bad deeds and will sink into the dreadful hell which is full of darkness and sufferings. Those who are wicked, kill beings for the sake of their own pleasures. Deceivers practise deceits in order to procure for themselves pleasures and amusement. Sinful undertaking will in the end bring miseries.

Sinners acquire *karma* arising from passions and commit many sins. The virtuous exert themselves for liberation. A pious man should eat little, drink little, and talk little. He should also exert himself being calm, indifferent, and free from greed. A monk who vigorously practises, austerities, avoids anger and pride. A wise man should renounce his interest in everything. A monk should be modest. He should know correctly the sacred texts. He should practise austerities and understand all details of the law. Wise men teach the true law. A monk should conform himself to the opinion expressed by the Jinas and wander about till he reaches final liberation.

According to the Ācārāṅga-Sūtra a wise man should not act sinfully towards the aggregate of six kinds of life nor allow others to do so. He should neither himself commit violence by various acts, nor order others to commit violence by such acts, nor consent to the violence done by somebody else. He should adopt the true faith and stand in the right place. A hero does not tolerate discontent and lust. He is not attached to the objects of the senses and not careless. A wise man who knows the world and has cast off the idea of the world

should prudently do away with the destructions to righteousness. A liberated man conquers wrath, pride, deceit, greed, and passion. He should avoid wrath, pride, deceit, greed, love, hatred, delusion, conception, birth, death, hell, animal existence, and pain. A wise man should not be inflamed by wrath. A man who exerts himself and is of a steady mind without attachment, unmoved by passion and having no worldly desires, should lead the life of an ascetic.

A monk or a nun on a begging tour should not accept alms which are impure and unacceptable. He or she should not attend any festive entertainment. Food placed on a platform or any such elevated place should not be accepted. Food placed on vegetable or animal matter, unripe wild rice, sediments of liquor, raw plants, and raw substances, should not be accepted. He or she should not accept clothes which are full of living beings, but should accept clothes that are fit, strong, and lasting. A monk or a nun should not accept a bowl which a layman has bought, He or she should not accept very expensive bowl, made of tin, silver, gold, brass, mother-of-pearl, etc. He or she must have to observe certain rules if they desire to go to a sugarcane plantation or to a garlic field. He or she should not go to any place where there are many temp-

tations. A monk must know and avoid five typical offences against the law of right belief : abstention from gross ill-usage of living beings, abstention from grossly lying speech, abstention from gross taking of things not given, limiting one's own desires, keeping uposatha (sabbath), right distribution of alms, etc. Karma accumulates energy and automatically works it off without any outside intervention. Karma is latent in all actions. When the soul by means of austerities and good actions has got rid of ignorance, it attains omniscience. Karma is intimately bound up with the soul.

Mahāvīra's great message to mankind is that birth is nothing, that caste is nothing, and that karma is everything and on the destruction of karma, the future happiness depends.

Concentration is indispensable for getting equanimity of mind and consequent spiritual illumination. We have to contemplate on blissfulness, truthfulness, honesty, chastity, contentedness, purity of body, and purity of mind. There are four ways to meditate on purity of mind : (1) love (2) love towards the suffering world, (3) love towards the happy, and (4) love towards the criminal or cruel person.

In this world of misery, disease, old age, and death, there is no other protection, refuge or help than the practice of the truth. The continual cycle of briths and deaths is not ended and therefore we should make some efforts to free ourselves from it. Right knowledge, belief, and conduct, these three are the sources of happiness. There are twenty-one qualities, the majority of which must be possessed before a person is ready to undertake the higher religious life : (1) he must be earnest, (2) he must be of sound mind, (3) he must be pleasing by nature, (4) he must be popular, charitable, well-behaved, and of good moral character, (5) he must not be cruel, (6) he must be cautious and honest, (7) he will live according to some principle, (8) he will be compassionate and sympathetic, (9) he must be just and impartial. (10) he must be grateful, polite, intelligent, and of quick understanding, and (11) he must be self-controlled.

Knowledge is of five kinds : *(a) mati-jñāna* (knowledge acquired by sense-perceptions) : *(b) śruta-jñāna* (knowledge acquired by reading the scriptures) ; *(c) avadhi-jñāna* (knowledge of the distant, non-sensible in time or space possessed by divine and internal souls) ; *(d) manaḥparyāya-jñāna*

(knowledge of thoughts and feelings of others) ; and *(e) kevala-jñāna* (full or perfect knowledge).[1]

Leśyā is said to be that by means of which the soul is tinted with merit and demerit. The *leśyās* arise from *yoga* or *kashāya*, namely, the vibrations due to the activity of body, mind or speech or the passions.

Karma is the deed of the soul. It is a material forming a subtle bond of extremely refined *karmic* matter which keeps the soul confined to its place of origin or the natural abode of full knowledge and everlasting peace. There are four *ghātiya* or obstructive *karmas* : (1) knowledge-obscuring *karma* ; (2) faith-obscuring or perception-obscuring *karma* ; (3) that which obstructs the progress or success of the soul ; and (4) that which infatuates or deludes the soul. All these destructive *karmas* retain the soul in mundane existence.

According to Mahāvīra, this universe is eternal and it is nothing but the sum total of substances which have been existing from eternity and shall remain so for ever. In this universe nothing new is created nor is anything annihilated. The substances

1. Tatthvārtha-Sūtra, i. 9.

of this eternal universe are described as *jīva* and *ajīva*, soul and no-soul. The characteristic of living substance is attention, consciousness, and attentiveness.

Mokṣa is the essential point in the teaching of Mahāvīra which is generally understood as emancipation. It really means the attainment of the highest state of sanctification by the avoidance of pain and miseries of worldly life. Even at this stage the soul appears to be the same without the least change in its state. It is the *summum bonum* or the state of perfect beatitude as attained. It may also mean final deliverance or liberation from the fetters of worldly life and total annihilation or extinction of human passion.

Much importance has been given to soul (attā) and *puggala* or individuality and personality. *Karma* Plays, no doubt, an important part in Jain metaphysics. The Jain ethics has for its end the liberation or *mokṣa*. The three jewels or three excellences are : right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. The vows must be strictly observed by the monks. Laymen must observe them so far as their conditions admit. Then comes the *tapa which* is one of the most important institutions of Jainism.

It is divided into internal and external *tapas*. The former comprises the austerities practised by the Jains and the latter, spiritual exercises. Fasting, as we know, is the most conspicuous austerity. Jains have developed it to a kind of art and have reached a high proficiency in it.

The tenets of Jainism as a practical religion consist of the following points : longing for liberation, disregard of worldly objects, desire of the law, obedience to the co-religionists and to the Guru, confession of sins before the Guru, repenting of one's sins to oneself and also before the Guru, moral and intellectual purity of the soul, adoration of the 24 Jinas, paying reverence to the Guru, adoption of a particular posture of the body, self-denial, praises and hymns, punctuality, practice of penances, foregiveness, study and recital of sacred texts . . . concentration of thoughts, self-control, practice of austerities, purging oneself of impurities arising from *karma*, mental independence, using unfrequented places, remaining away from the world, renouncing pleasure, food, passions, company, etc., conforming to the standard, doing service, fulfilling all virtues, freedom from passion, forbearance, freedom from greed, simplicity, modesty, sincerity of heart, watchfulness of the mind,

speech, and body, discipline of the mind, speech, and body, possession of knowledge, faith, and virtue, subduing the organs of sense, conquering anger, pride, deceit, greed, love, hatred, and wrong belief, stability, and freedom from *karma.*[1]

1. Uttarādhyayana, XXIX.

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Cullavagga (Vinaya).

Mahāvagga (Vinaya).

Aṭṭhakavagga—Cūlaviyūha, Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka, Mahāviyūha., Māgandiya, Paramaṭṭhaka, Pasūra, and Suddhaṭṭhaka Suttas.

Majjhima Nikāya—Upāli Sutta.

3. BRAHMANIC TEXTS

Bhagavadgītā.

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.

Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.

Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad.

Taittirīya Upaniṣad.

4. MISCELLANEOUS WORKS

A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, B. M. Barua, Cal Univ.

Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa of Āryadeva, JASB. Vol. LXVII, 1898.

Ṣaḍdarasanasamuccaya of Haribhadra, Bib. Ind.

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Tarkarahasyadīpikā of Guṇaratna, Bib. Ind.

The Ājīvikas, B. M. Barua, Cal. Univ.

INTRODUCTION

The canonica literature of the Svetāmbara Jainas contains many references to various philosophical schools and religious sects apparently contemporaneous with itself. Although the canon in the form we have it now is a creation of the Council of Valabhi held in *circa* 454 A. C. under the presidentship of Devardhigaṇin, yet the matter contained in it is much older. This Council reduced the text to writing. The first collection was, however, made by the Council of Pāṭaliputra which, according to Hemacandra, met during the reign of Aśoka Maurya. Additions were made no doubt during the subsequent redactions, but the essentials remained unchanged throught the long years of canonical revision which brought with it accretions of extraneous matter. The statements which form the subject matter of discussion in the following pages picture a state of things much earlier than Devardhigaṇin's age and earlier even than the Council of Pāṭaliputra.

The beliefs and practices discussed in the Jaina texts were considered heretical from the point of view of the Jainas or the Nirgranthas, as they were called in the earlier days, and as such it was necessary for them to state and criticise the views and practices of many of those schools and sects.

An attempt has been made in the following pages to give a comprehensive account of all these sects and schools. Some works outside the Jaina canon have also been sometimes referred to for the purpose of illustrating the matter contained in the canon. References in the later works of Svetāmbaras and Digambaras to systems of thought adverse to them have been rejected for the simple reason that they deal with circumstances of later ages influenced by conditions of later times when such works were composed. In many cases parallel references and accounts have been mentioned from the literature of the Buddhists, as they and the Jainas having started their career about the same time the former are likely to furnish reliable evidence on matters referred to by the latter, both being outside the Brahmanical fold and having a strong critical outlook.

That the time the Jaina canon treats of was one bristling with conflicting views and rival schemes may easily be gathered from such statements as "See, there are men who control themselves, whilst others only pretend to be houseless."[1] The *Ācārāṇga Sūtra*, one of the oldest of the canonical texts, says that "To friendly or hostile heretics one should not

1. Ācār. S. I.i.2.2 ; I.i.3.4 ; I.i.6.3. ; with a slight variation in I.i.7.2

give alms, drink, dainties and spices. . . nor do them service. . . . .Some here are not well instructed as regards the subject of conduct ; . . . .they pronounce opinions. . . Know that all this is without reason."[1] The *Sūtrakṛtāṇga Sūtra,* another of the most authoritative texts, says "These heretics will never be saved. . . some unworthy *śramaṇas* who hold wrong doctrines are afraid of what is free from danger and are not afraid of real danger."[2] "Some who search after truth and pretend to practise the Law, follow the false Law and do not arrive at the right thing . . . . . ignorant of what is right and wrong they do not get out of misery . . . they praise their own creed and blame that of their opponents."[3] In a passage of fierce denunciation it has been said that the heretics will never be saved from the sufferings of the world.[4] In the *Sthānāṇga Sūtra* false belief is spoken as an instrument that causes pain (*micchādaṁsanasalla*).[5] It has been divided into two classes, *abhiggahiya* and *anabhiggahiya* which Abhayadeva, the commentator, explains as that proceeding from acceptance of wrong doctrine and

1. Ibid. I.vii.1.1-3.
2. Sūt.S. I.i.2. 5-10.
3. Ibid. I.I.ii. 15-23.
4. Ibid. II.ii. 79-81.
5. Sth.S. i. 48 ; Bhag. I. 6, 52.

that proceeding from other causes. In the *Bhagavatī* there are frequent mentions of heretical schools and of heretical ascetics who came to question Mahāvīra. The *Jñātādharmakathā*, *Antaḥkṛtadaśā* and *Praśnavyākaraṇāṅga Sūtras* also contain occasional references to *micchādaṁsanasalla.*

In the *Upāsakadaśā* praising of heretical teachers and intimacy with them have been regarded as offences against the law of right belief.[1] The animosities of the time are well illustrated by the remark of the newly converted lay disciple Ānanda made to Mahāvīra : "Truly, Reverend Sir, it does not befit me from this day forward to praise and worship any man of a heretical community, or any of the devas of a heretical community, or any of the objects of reverence to them ; or without being first addressed by them, to address them or converse with them ; or to give or supply them with food or drink ; except it be by the command of the king or the community or any powerful man or deva or one's own elders or by the exigencies of living."[2] Frequently does Mahāvīra refer to the need of refuting heretical doctrines : "Surely, venerable companions," says Mahāvīra to his disciples,

1. Upās.S.i.44.
2. Ibid. i.58

"if those servants of the *Śramaṇa* who are householders living among householders, refute the theories of heretics, then much more, venerable companions, must the Nirgrantha ascetics who are students of the sacred collection of the twelve Aṅgas be able to refute the theories of heretics by means of these arguments, questions, proofs and explanations."[1]

In the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* bad monks who do not protect themselves from sin, who though having the appearance of monks are the lowest among their worthy brethren, have been likened to heretics : they are despised in this world like poison, they are nobodies in this world or in that beyond.[2] The views and teachings of heretics have been called delusive talk which is untrue and without any meaning.[3] Opinions and manifold doctrines not conforming to the Nirgrantha creed were declared to be contemptible which a monk was advised to abandon, for they were productive of evil everywhere.[4] Faith has been held to be easier to obtain for those who though not versed in the sacred doctrines are not acquainted with other systems and hold no wrong doctrines. Right faith

1. Ibid. vi. 174.
2. Uttar. S. xvii.20
3. Ibid. xviii.26.
4. Ibid xviii.26, 30.

depends on the avoiding of schismatical and heretical tenets.[1] Among the eight principles on which excellence of faith rests, are counted absence of preference for heresies, and non-shaking of right belief at the prosperity of heretical sects.[2]

In the *Nandi Sūtra* Mahāvīra has been culogised as the moon who ever vanquishes the Rāhu of *Akriyā-vāda*,[3] as the destroyer of the lustre of other schools,[4] and as the destroyer of the pride of false faiths.

It will be seen from the remarks quoted above that the time was full of various opinions, views, beliefs, schools, sects and teachings.[5] They were not at all friendly towards each other as can be easily gathered. It will now be our task to examine the many references throughout the canon with a

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1. Ibid. xvii. 26, 28.
2. Ibid. xvii. 31.
3. Nan.S. 9.
4. Ibid. 10 & 22.
5. How differences and disputes arose over subjects that would be regarded as beyond the scope of religion in the present day is illustrated in Bhag. S. 11.9. 418, in the story of Prince Siva where cosmographic details form the subject of the disputes ; and in 11.12.435, where duration of the gods' lives in different heavens is hotly debated. Manifold disputes and their uselessness are also referred to by the Buddhists in *Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka*, *Suddhaṭṭhaka, Paramaṭṭhaka, Pasūra, Māganḍiva, Cūlaviyūha* and *Mahāviyūha Suttas* of the *Atthakavagga.*

view to find out what views each of them upheld and whether any of them can be identified with schools whose doctrines we are familiar with. This will serve a double purpose of showing in the first place what was the historical background of the Nirgrantha doctrine, what views they felt called upon to refute and thereby establish the superiority of the Nirgrantha creed, and secondly of showing though in an indirect manner, the condition of many doctrines of the time by means of the light thrown by the Jainas regarding the philosophical and religious atmosphere of India of that period. It is agreed that a hostile critic's remarks cannot be accepted in full in judging the value or contents of a creed it took upon itself to criticise, yet the opinion of an adverse critic seen through a proper perspective has its own value for historical purposes, indicating as it does the currents of popular opinion. It is to be remembered that this work is not intended to be a history of the philosophies of the time. The principal object is to get as clear an idea as is possible of the tenets, as they appeared to the Nirgranthas, of other schools and sects in those ancient days with a view to create a suitable background for the study of Jainism.

Many of the statements met with in different places are vague, such as the vehement denunciation

of those who injure earth-bodies, water-bodies, plants, wind-bodies, animals, etc.[1] for such would apply to many non-Nirgranthas Jacobi thinks[2] on the authority as Sīlānka, the commentator, that "others only pretend to be houseless" refers to the Buddhists. It must be pointed out, however, that we know now that there were in those days many kinds of houseless ascetics besides the Buddhists, to whom the remarks of the Jainas would equally apply.[3] We shall deal, however, with only those statements which are particular, precise, and identifiable, and consider them in the order of importance given them in the Jaina texts.

1. Acār. S. I.i.2.2 ; I.i.3.4 ; I.i.5.4 ; I.i.7.2 ; I.i.6.4.

2. SBE.xxii.p.4.

3. See also Sūt. S. I.i.1.6 & I.ii.1.8 ; and the long disputes between Nirgranthas and others in Bhag. 8.7.337 ; 13.2.595-596 ; 18.7.632-634 ; and 18.8.640 ; Sth. S. 3.2.167 ; Aup. S. 38.

PART I.

(I) THE ĀJIVIYAS.

The doctrines of the Ājīviyas are the best known heresy to the Nirgranthas. Judging from the frequency of their appearance and the vehemence and care with which they are denounced it seems probabic that the doctrines of the Ājīviyas played an important part in the life of the times.

The Ājīviyas believed that though it is proved that there are individual souls, they experience pleasure and pain, and on dying lose their state of existence, yet misery and pleasure are not caused by the souls themselves, for how could it be caused, they asked, by other agents as time, etc ? Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal pleasure, and pain are not caused by the souls themselves nor by others ; but the individual souls experience them ; it is the fate assigned them by Destiny.[1]

Another account states that there is no such things as exertion or labour or power or vigour or manly strength, but that all things are caused by destiny which is unalterably fixed.[2] This has been called the doctrine of Gosāla Maṇkhāliputta. From the story of Saddālaputta, the potter of Palāsapura,

1. Sūt.S. I.i.2.1-3.
2. Upās. 6.166.

and an adherent of the Ājīviyas, we get the leading doctrine of Gosāla. The story runs thus :

Saddālaputta once brought out his potter's ware from within his workshop and placed them in the sun. Mahāvīra happened to come upon the scene and asked "Saddālaputta, how is this potter's ware made ?"

Saddālaputta : "Reverend Sir, this ware is at first clay, then it is kneaded with water, and then it is mixed well together with ashes and dung ; then it is placed on the wheel, and finally many bowls and jars of various sizes are made."

Mahāvīra : "Saddālaputta, is your ware made by dint of exertion and manly strength, or on the other hand, is it made without exertion and manly strength—*kim uṭṭhāṇoṇam vā kammeṇam vā baleṇam vā viricṇam vā purisakkāraparakkameṇam kajjanti udāhu anuṭṭhāṇeṇam jāva apurisakkāraparakkameṇam kajjanti ?*"

Saddālaputta : "Reverend Sir, it is made without exertion and manly strength, and all things are unalterably fixed."

Mahāvīra : "Saddālaputta, if any one of thy men were to steal thy unbaked or baked ware or scatter it about or make holes in it or let it drop into pieces or place it outside unguarded or if he were to indulge in outrageous familiarities with thy wife Aggimittā, what punishment would thou inflict on that man ?"

Saddālaputta : "Reverend Sir, that man I will curse or beat or tie up or frighten or threaten or cuff or fine or bully or even before his time deprive him of his life."

Mahāvīra then pointed out that if all things were unalterably fixed and depended not on exertion then he outght not to take any action against his servant's conduct for the servant was not responsible for it. This convinced Saddālaputta of the falseness of Ājīviya doctrines and he was converted to the creed of Mahāvīra.[1]

The Parable of the Lotus-pool is an important chapter in which the views of some of the leading schools have been stated.

There was a lotus-pool containing much water and mud, full of white lotuses, delightful and magnificent. In the very middle of this lotus-pool grew one big white lotus. Now there came from each of the four quarters a man proud of his own abilities and attempted to fetch the big white lotus. To each of them as he proceeded the water and mud seemed to extend, so that he could neither reach the white lotus nor return to the bank and was stuck in the mud. Then came a restrained monk who called aloud standing on the bank and the big white lotus flew to him. Mahāvīra narrated this story and asked his disciples if they understood the meaning of

1. Upās 7 195-200 ; 6. 166

the simile and on their answering in the negative explained that the lotus-pool meant the world, the water meant *karman*, the mud meant pleasures, the lotuses meant people in general, the big white lotus meant the king, the four men meant the heretics, the monk meant the Law, the bank meant the Order, and the monk's voice meant the preaching of the Law, and the big lotus flying up meant *nirvāṇa*. Different teachers went to the king to teach him but only the Nirgrantha ascetic succeeded.

One of these four teachers, an Ājīviya, states his doctrines as follows :

There are two kinds of men, one admits and another does not admit action. Both are alike, their case is the same because they are actuated by the same force. An ignorant man thinks of the case as follows : "When I suffer, grieve, blame myself, grow feeble, am afflicted or undergo punishment. I have caused it ; or when another man suffers, etc., he has caused it." Thus an ignorant man thinks himself or another to be the cause of what he or the other man experiences. A wise man thinks about the cause as follows : "When I suffer I did not cause it or when another man suffers he did not cause it. By the will of fate all beings are been, are made to suffer changes of life or to die."[1]

1. Sūt.S. II.1.30-33.

Adda's discussions with various teachers, while renouncing the life of a Prince he was on his way to Mahāvīra, are interesting. In these discussions one man states that if an ascetic living alone uses cold water, eats seeds, accepts things prepared for him or has intercourse with women, he commits no sins thereby.[1] Harṣakula, author of the *Dīpikā* on the *Sūtrakṛtāṇga*, and *Śilāṇka* identify this man as Gosāla which is corroborated by the fierce personal attacks he makes of Mahāvīra in course of the discussions. This is natural enough, for the relations between the two were notoriously bitter. The fact, however, appears to be that the Ājīviya doctrines have been put forward through this fictitious person.

The soul of him who is pure will become free from bad *karman* on reaching beatitude, but in that state it will again become difiled through pleasant excitement or hate ; and that he who has lived on earth as a restrained monk will become free from *karman*, and as clear water which was free from defilement again becomes defiled, so will be the soul. This doctrine has been attributed to a school. Harṣakula thinks that the Ājīviyas are meant. Śilāṇka mentions the Trairāśikas besides Ājīviyas. The Trairāśikas are the Jaina followers

1. Ibid. II.vi. 7.

of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.[1] They are so called because they believed in a third state of existence besides *jīva* and *ajīva*.[2]

In some places the Ājīviyas are mentioned by name but hardly anything is mentioned regarding their views.[3] Once we find them asking the Nirgrantha elders the question whether an article belonging to a young monk belongs to himself or to another, if it is stolen by a thief when the young ascetic is observing the *sāmāyikas* and the monk goes after the thief.[4] They are said not to accept Mahāvīra's doctrine of abstention from sin of body, mind and speech in the three-fold divisions of doing it oneself, getting it done by another, or approving of another's doing it.[5]

On the life of Gosāla we have the following details supplied by the Jainas. His father was called Maṇkhali who used to wander about from place to place exhibiting a picture. Maṇkhali once came with his wife Bhaddā to Ṣaravaṇa and took up his lodging in the cow-shed of a wealthy Brahman called Gobahula and Gosāla was born here. He followed his father's calling. At one time Mahāvīra

1. SBE.xiv. p. 245, n.2.
2. See *infra* the sixth schism led by Rohagupta
3. Bhag. 1.2.24.
4. Bhag. 8.5.328.
5. Bhag. 8.5.329.

was residing in a weaver's house at Nālandā where Gosāla also happened to come in course of his wanderings. A householder named Vijaya of the city of Rāyagaha entertained Mahāvīra with great honours. Gosāla heard of this from the people and meeting Mahāvīra offered to be his disciple whereupon the latter gave no reply. The same offer was made by Gosāla on two subsequent occasions with the same result. Mahāvīra left Nālandā and Gosāla in his mood of dejection gave away his belongings, shaved his head and went away. He met Mahāvīra again in Paṇiyabhūmi, repeated his offer and it was accepted this time. They lived together in that place for six years.[1]

Once on the road from Siddhatthaggāma to Kummaggāma they came across a sesamum shrub in blossom. Gosāla asked if it would die and if so where its seeds would reappear. Mahāvīra replied that the shrub would die but its seeds would appear again in the pods of the same shrub. Gosāla disbelieved this, called Mahāvīra a liar, and going up to the shrub uprooted it but a shower of rain having fallen the shrub took root again and

1. According to Kalpa. S.5.122, Mahāvīra lived only a year in Paṇiyabhūmi.

Mahāvīra's prophecy was fulfilled. Now they went on to Kuṇḍa on the outskrits of which they met the ascetic Vessayaṇa practising penances with his arms uplifted, his face turned towards the sun, and his body covered with lice. Gosāla asked the ascetic if he was an ascetic or a lice-heap. This enraged Vessayaṇa who released his fiery forces (*teullesc*) to burn Gosāla but Mahāvīra out of pity for Gosāla counteracted the forces by releasing his own forces. Finding himself thwarted Vessayaṇa exclaimed. "That will do, Sir, that will do." Gosāla questioned Mahāvīra about the meaning of such exclamation and the latter explained what was about to happen. Then Gosāla enquired how long it took to acquire such forces and how such forces could be acquired. Mahāvīra answered that it could be acquired by dint of penances. Afterwards when they were on their way to Siddhatthaggāma they happened to pass the sesamum shrub mentioned before. Gosāla narrated to Mahāvīra his past prophecy and claimed that it had been falsified as the shrub was yet alive. Mahāvīra explained that Gosāla's uprooting it on the previous occasion had fulfilled his prophecy about its death and the coming down of the shower which revived it had caused the seeds to appear in the pods, for all plants were capable of re-animation.

Gosāla disbelieved it, went up to the spot and on closely examining the shrub found the seeds. This led him to conclude that not only plants but all living beings were capable of re-animation. Then he left Mahāvīra.

Gosāla then practised the severe penances for acquiring fiery forces and succeeded after six months. Now he proclaimed himself a Jina and founded the Order of the Ājīviyas. The headquarters of the Order was in Sāvatthi in the shop of the potter woman Hālāhalā. In the twenty-fourth year of Gosāla's ascetic life he was visited by six ascetics with whom he discussed their doctrines and propounded his own theory from the eight Mahānimittas belonging to the Puvvas consisting of the principles of obtainment and non-obtainment, pleasure and pain, life and death. He met a disciple of Mahāvīra and notified to him his intention of destroying Mahāvīra by means of his fiery forces. The threat was conveyed to Mahāvīra who forbade Nirgrantha ascetics to hold any communication with Gosāla. Surrounded by his disciples, Gosāla called on Mahāvīra and angrily ridiculed him for having called Gosāla a disciple of Mahāvīra. "Maṇkhaliputta who was a disciple of Mahāvīra,"

said Gosāla "was dead and reborn in the heavens as a god. But I whose name was Udayi was born in the body of Ajjuna and entered in the seventh re-animation the body of Gosāla, which I still hold." He then went on to narrate in detail the processes of re-animation he had undergone in the bodies of different persons in different places and how in his seventh and last reanimation he obtained ominiscience in the body of Gosāla in the potter shop of Hālāhalā. Mahāvīra in reply told him that he was like a thief who being chased by villagers attempted to conceal his identity under various disguises and in various places of hiding. Gosāla was enraged at this and hotly abused Mahāvīra. A disciple of the latter intervened but was burnt up by Gosāla's fiery forces. Another disciple also met with the same fate. Mahāvīra himself now rebuked Gosāla who attempted to burn him but was unsuccessful. A scene followed of trial of strength between the two teachers. They parted and Mahāvīra instructed his disciples to go and annoy Gosāla with questions.

After sometime Gosāla was stricken with a fever and being delirious he held a mango in his hand, drank liquors, sang, danced and made improper advances to Hālāhalā, and sprinkled on him-

self the cool muddy water from the potter's vessels, which acts, Mahāvīra explained to his disciples, led to the Ājīviya doctrines of the eight Finalities (*aṭṭhacarimāiṁ*). The first four of the eight Finalities were the last four acts performed by Gosāla, *viz.*, the last drink, the last song, the last dance and the last improper solicitation. The other four were the last tornado, the last sprinkling elephant, the last fight with big stones and missils,[1] and the last Tīrthaṇkara who is Gosāla himself.

Gosāla's sprinkling himself with the muddy water from the earthen vessels gave rise to the doctrine of the four things that may be used as drinks, and the four things as their substitutes by virtue of the coolingness. Those that may be used as water are the cow's urine, water accidentally collected in potter's vessels, water heated by the sun, and water dripping from a rock. Those that may be used as substitutes are holding in the hand a dish or a bottle or a jar or a pot which is cool or moist ; squeezing in the mouth a mango or a hog-plum or

1. The first three of the latter four refer to historical events of the time. The sprinkling elephant was known as *Sceanaka* and belonged to king Śreṇika of Magadha who gave it to his younger son by queen Cellanā. His elder son Kuṇika on becoming king demanded the elephant from his brother which was refused. This gave rise to war in which stone missiles were used.

a jujube or a *tinduka* fruit when it is unripe or uncooked, but not drinking its juice ; squeezing in the mouth *kalāya* or *mugga* or *māsa* or *simbalī* beans when they are unripe or uncooked, but not drinking the juice ; and feeling the touch of the moist hands of the gods Puṇṇabhadda and Maṇi when they appear on the last night of six months to one who eats pure food for six months, lies successively for two months each on bare ground, on wooden planks, and on *darba* grass. He who submits to the touch of the two gods furthers the work of venomous snakes but he who does not do so generates in himself a fire which burns his body and he dies and attains liberation.

Ayambula, an Ājīviya came to visit Gosāla at the time and felt ashamed finding Gosāla in a delirium. He was about to go away but Ājīviya elders called him back, explained the new doctrines and asked him to put his question to Gosāla after throwing away the mango in his hand. Ayambula did so and asked about the *halla* insect. Gosāla replied: "This which you see is not a mango but only the skin of a mango. You ask about the *halla* insect—it is like the root of the bamboo ; play the lute, man, play the lute." Then Gośāla feeling the end approaching called his disciples and requested

n'atthi Purisathāmo, n'atthi purisaparakkamo—the attainment of anything does not depend either on one's own acts or on the acts of another or on human effort ; there is no such thing as power or energy, or human strength or human vigour."—Digha-nīkāya, Vol. II, p. 53. Every thing depends on fate, and salvation depends on a long series of births of different kinds. No change can be effected in this long series of transmigrations by any effort on the part of an individual.

Dr. Barua has reviewed in an exhaustive manner all the matter available on the life and teachings of Gosāla.[1] We do not intend to go here into any detailed examination of Gosāla's teachings, for which one must be referred to Dr. Barua's work. The conclusions reached by him hold up Gosāla and his teachings in a far better light of course. But the fact remains that his teachings were stubbornly opposed by Mahāvīra and Buddha alike. It is essential to remember that Mahāvīra's opposition was due to Gosāla's main doctrines of man's destiny being pre-ordained, that human effort could effect no change in it, and that emancipation was to be obtained only after a long series of transmigrations.

1. *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, Chap. xxi. for a fuller treatment see Barua, *The Ajīvikas*.

These views come out prominently in both the Jaina and Buddhist accounts of Gosāla's teachings.

Jacobi and Dr. Barua are of opinion that contrary to the Jaina account Mahāvīra was a disciple of Gosāla for sometime. The reasons put forward in support of this hypothesis are that Mahāvīra was a mere learner in the first twelve years of his monkhood, that he became a nude ascetic in the second year of his monkhood, that Gosāla predeceased Mahāvīra by twelve years and was therefore his senior, and that Gosāla was recognised as a teacher at least two years before Mahāvīra. Against this hypothesis may be urged certain considerations. Gosāla's being a recognised teacher before Mahāvīra does not prove anything. Accepting the Jaina version Gosāla was not recognised as a teacher so long as he was associated with Mahāvīra, and proclaimed himself as such only after his separation from the latter. Such proclamation may have taken place before Mahāvīra won recognition as a teacher. Again, if Gosāla had ever been Mahāvīra's teacher we would have expected the Buddhists to record something to that effect. We would have expected also that Gosāla would be made to say something regarding his claim when he visited Mahāvīra to upbraid him for the latter's

them to observe his funeral with all honours and proclaim that he was the last Tīrthaṇkara. But afterwards he felt that he was not an omniscient but a false teacher and a humbug but that Mahāvīra was the true Jina. Then he called his disciples and asked them to treat him with dishonour after he was dead and proclaim his misdeeds and the Jinahood of Mahāvīra. Then he died. The Ājīviya *theras* closed the door and pretended to carry out Gosāla's last instructions, and then they opened the doors and gave him a funeral according to his original wishes.[1]

The austerities practised by the Ājīviyas are classified into four kinds, *viz.*, severe austerities, fierce austerties, abstention from ghee and other delicacies, and indifference to pleasant and unpleasant food.[2]

It is said in the system of the Ājīviyas that all the living beings are subject to an ungratified desire to enjoy, and hence their earning of livelihood is by killing, cutting, etc.[3]

The varieties of the Ājīviya ascetics are these:— those who beg in every second house, those who beg in every

1. Bhag. 15.539-554.
2. Sth.S. 4.2.310
3. Bhag. 8.5.330.

fourth house, those who beg in every fifth house, those who beg in every sixth house, those who beg in every seventh house, those who accept lotus-stalks only as alms under certain conditions, those who beg in every house, those who do not beg if there is a flash of lightning, and those who practise penances by entering big earthen vessels.[1]

The names of the twelve adherents of the Ājīviya doctrine are given as Tāla, Tālapalamba, Uvviha, Saṁviha, Udaya, Avaviha, Nāmudaya, Namudaya, Anuvālaya, Saṁkhavālaya, Ayambula and Kayaraya. They abstained from eating five kinds of fruit, *viz.*, *umbara, vaḍa, bora, satara* and *pilaṇkhu* and are said to have given up eating roots, bulbous roots, etc.[2]

The Sāmaññaphala Sūtta of the Buddhists, which contains an account of the doctrines of the six principal teachers contemporary with Buddha, gives an account of Gosāla's teachings from where we get the same denial of the usefulness of effort or manly vigour. *"N'atthi atthakāre n'atthi parakāre n'atthi purisakāre, n'atthi balam n'atthi viriyam,*

1. Aūp. S. 41. For Buddhist evidence of Mahāvagga 3.12.9 for the last of these classes, and Kassapa-Sihanāda Sūtta for ascetic practices resembling these.

2. Bhag. 8.5.330

perfection by some.,[5] this suggests the Brahmanical priests who would support a non-ascetic religion of rituals and ceremonies and themselves possess wealth and properties. Buddha's criticism of the Brahmans as owners of property in contrast with the possessionless Brahmā whom they worshipped is significant in this connection.[1]

The gods are declared by some as putting an end to misery.[2] The meaning is that only the gods and not men are capable of attaining *mokṣa*, *i.e.*, in order to obtain *mokṣa* a man must first attain a god's status and then progress onwards to final liberation, for as mere man he cannot obtain liberation. This is probably a piece of casuistry on the part of the Brahmanical priests to tempt *yajamānas* to engage their services for securing by means of sacrifices the status of gods after death.

While arguing with Adda one man says[3] that those who always feed two thousand holy mendicants acquire great merit, become gods and that is the teaching of the Veda. This is clearly a statement put into the mouth of a follower of Brahmanism.

Stories are mentioned of various Brahmanical adherents engaging in disputes with Nirgrantha

1. Cf. Tevijja Sutta.
2. Sūt.S. I.xv. 16-17.
3. Sūt.S. II. 6.43.

ascetics. The subject matter of the discussion is not of much importance but the descriptions which precede about the intellectual equipment of the Brahmanical disputant are very interesting. As for instance, in Sāvatthi dwelt a mendicant Khandaya by name of the Kaccāyana gotra, a disciple of Gaddabhāli. To him went Piṇgalaya, a Nirgrantha adherent, and asked whether the world was with or without an end, whether the *jīva* was with or without an end, etc. Khandaya was terribly upset, we are told, by these questions, could give no answer, kept quiet, and at last went to Mahāvīra for setting at ease his severe discomfiture. All we can inferentially gather from such accounts is that in the opinion of the authors of these narratives the followers of Brahmanism and other schools concerned could not give a satisfactory solution of such vital problems, but we must beware of reading too much in these statements. Probably to set off Khandaya's indifference to high metaphysical curiosity we are told that he was a teacher of, prevented corruption from entering into, retained in his memory, and was well-versed in the four Vedas Ṛik, Yajus, Sāman, and Atharvan, to which is added Itihāsa as the fifth, Nighaṇṭu as the sixth, along with the Aṇgas, Upāṇgas, and the Rahasya, knew the six Aṇgas and the philosophy of the sixty categories, arithmetic, phonetics, ceremonial,

calling Gosāla a disciple.[1] Further, if Mahāvīra borrowed nudity from Gosāla he would not have continued in it when he renounced the discipleship of Gosāla. Although the *Bhagavatī* account of the relation subsisting between the two teachers cannot be accepted in full, it is doubtful whether a reversal of the relation can be accepted as true. The truth very probably was that the two ascetics joined and lived together for sometime during the years of their probation. Difference of opinion on very important matters separated the two as we can infer from the *Bhagavatī* account.[2] Their joint life must have been of short duration, one year only,—which was prolonged in later accounts to six years.

(II) THE BRAHAMANIC SCHOOLS

About the cult of popular Brahmanism we have many references in Jaina literature. Many Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas support it, they claim to have seen, heard, acknowledged, thoroughly understood in the upper, nether, and side-long directions, and in all ways to have examined it ; with such extensive experience and deep wisdom they declare that all sorts of living beings may be slain or tormented or

1. Bhag. 15.550.
2. Bhag. 15.554

treated with violence or abused or driven away, and there is no wrong in it.[1]

The creation and governance of the world by the gods, as taught by some philosophers, has been regarded as an error.[2] This can be attributed to the Brahmans, for no other contemporary school would regard the gods as creators or governors of the world.

The creation of the universe, according to a "great Ṛṣi" whose name is neither mentioned in the text nor preserved by Śīlāṇka or Harṣakula, is by Svayambhū,[3] according to some Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas it is from the primeval egg.[4] Both of these evidently refer to Brahmanical views and this conclusion is corroborated by the allusions to the doctrine of Brahman almost in the same breath with these Brahmanical views, for the doctrine of Brahman, as we know, sprang from followers of Brahmanism.

Owning of possessions and engaging in undertakings is held to be compatible with reaching

1. Ācār.S. I.iv.2.3.
2. Sūt. S. I.i.3.5.
3. Sūt.S. I.i.3.7.
4. Sūt.S. I.i.3.8.
5. Sūt.S. I.i.4.3.

SAMKHYA AND YOGA

The world was created according to some by Iśvara ; according to others this world with living beings and lifeless things with its variety of pleasure and pain was produced from *pahāṇa* (*pradhāna*).[1] The first of these two views is to be ascribed to the adherents of a theistic school, and the second to the Sāṁkhya system, or we may take them to refer to the theistic and atheistic followers of the Sāṁkhya philosophy.[2]

The attainment of perfection is possible, it has been maintained by some,[3] only by their method of religious life and not otherwise, and that even before the attainment of salvation they obtain power over others and possess everything to be wished for. Śīlaṇka thinks that the Śaivas and Ekadaṇḍins[4] are meant here. The possession even before emancipation is obtained, of everything to be wished for refers to the *siddhis* or supernatural powers with which we are familiar with in the later Yoga system of Patañjali. Perfection and freedom from disease are the aim of some[5] who are taken to be

1. Sūt.S. I.i.3.6.
2. Sec Jacobi, SBE, xiv, p. 244, n.4.
3. Sūt.S. I.i.3.14.
4. They hold that emancipation is obtained by a knowledge of the twenty-five principles, says Śīlāṇka.
5. Sūt.S. I.i.3.15.

Śaivas by Śīlāṇka. A sound mind in a sound body seems to be their aim in common with Patañjali.

According to one school, when a man acts or causes another to act it is not his soul which acts or causes to act.[1] Harṣakula and Śīlāṇka ascribe this view to the adherents of the Sāṁkhya philosophy according to whom *prakṛti* acts while the *puruṣa* looks, on, and because the *puruṣa* or the soul has no form and it is all-pervading it has no responsibility or agency. The doctrine of Pūraṇa Kassapa, as stated in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* of the Buddhists upholds this view. He taught that when one acts or causes another to act or commits sins no guilt follows. By doing virtuous acts, by generosity or truthfulness no increase of merit follows. There is neither merit nor demerit. Buddhaghoṣa says that Pūraṇa Kassapa was a naked mendicant, but he is probably confusing him with Acelaka Kassapa, a different person. Kassapa's idea is that the soul is passive and not affected by good or bad deeds.[2]

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1. Sūt.S. I.i.1.13.

2. See Barua : *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*. p. 278. The Buddhist version is an exaggerated account of Kassapa's views. Although af first sight it appears like Nāstika-vāda, it is not so as a perusal of Ajita Kesakambali's views would show—Ajita's being true Nāstikavāda.

grammar, prosody, etymology, and astronomy and in many other branches of knowledge suited for Brahmanic medicants.[1]

There is an interesting account of a Brahman priest named Mahessaradatta who was learned in the Vedas, etc. and who in order to enhance the realm and power of his patron King Jiyasattu caused everyday a Brahman boy, a Kṣatriya boy, a Vaiśya boy and a Sūdra boy to be seized and their hearts extracted alive with which he performed *homa* sacrifices to propitiate the gods on behalf of the king. On the eighth and fourteenth lunar days he sacrificed two boys from each of the four castes, in the fourth month four boys from each caste, in the sixth month eight boys, and after a year sixteen boys from each caste. Whenever the king was attacked by an enemy, the priest caused eight hundred boys from each caste to be seized and performed *homa* 'sacrifices' with their hearts

1. Bhag. 2.1.90 ; the same enumeration is referred to by a rubric in 15.541 and 18.10.646 , repeated in Vip. S. 1.5., Aup 38, and Kalpa S. 2.10. 'The philosophy of the sixty categories' is explained by Abhayadeva as 'the doctrine of Kapila' *saṣṭhitantra* which means the Sāṃkhya system. The analogous formula of the Buddhists for describing a Brahman, as given in the Ambaṭṭha S., is pretty much the same with a few minor additions.

extracted alive.[1] Although this story is too monstrous to deserve credence it is curious how the underlying idea of offering human sacrifice on the eve of important undertakings, hinted in the older Brahmanic literature, still lingered in the popular mind.[2]

In all the narrative passages in the canonical literature of the Jainas the constantly recurring formula about people performing domestic sacrifices, expiatory ceremonies, etc.,—*ṇhāyā kayavalikammā kayakouyamaṇglapāyachhittā*—is used to describe the daily life of people who are not yet converted by Mahāvīra to the Nirgrantha doctrine or in respect of whom the question of conversion does not arise. All these persons, from princes to peasants, belonged apparently to the Brahmanical fold in the absence of any reference pointing to their adherence to any other creed.

Making a slight departure from the order we are following in our treatment of these various philosophical system, we shall take up at this stage some views which are associated with the Brahmanical fold.

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1. Vip.S. 1.5.
2. Cf. Sat. Br. VI.ii.1.5 ; XIII.vii.1.8.

view to allude to Brahmā's sleep for a thousand years alternating with his wakefulness for another thousand years during which he is unconscious and conscious respectively and so the knowledge is both limited and unlimited. The context of the verse is that the Nirgrantha ascetics should know the ordinary views of the common people for some of them say things which are the outcome of a wrong understanding, and as an illustration mentions apparently contradictory views held by Vedāntins and Purānists.

In Adda's discussions one man appears and says[1] that he and his predecessor (whom we have already identified as an adherent of Brahmanism) follow very much the same law, that they stand firm in it, and shall do so in the time to come ; he says that he believes that virtue consists in good conduct and that knowledge in necessary for liberation, that with regard to the circle of births there is no difference between them, but that they assume an invisible, great, eternal, imperishable, and indestructible Soul who excels all other beings in every respect as the moon excels the start. This is clearly the opinion of Vedānta, but Śīlāṅka ascribes this view to Ekadaṇḍins, and refers to their *āçārapradhānam śīlam uktam yamaniyamalakṣaṇam*

1. Sūt.S. II.6. 46-47.

which suggests Patañjali's system of Yoga. It would appear from this that the Śaivas, Ekadaṇḍins, and Vedāntins held in the early days closely allied views.

In the Parable of the Lotus-pool one of the teachers states his doctrines in the following way.[1] All things have the Self for their cause and their object. They are produced by the Self, manifested by the Self, intimately connected with the Self, and are bound in the Self. As for instance a tumour or a feeling of disposition is generated in, grows with, is not separate from, but is bound up with the body, so all things have the Self for their cause. Just as an ant-hill or a tree or a lotus springs up, grows in, is not separate from but bound up in the earth, or just as a mass of water or a water-bubble is produced in water, grows in water, and is not separate from water, so all things have the Self for their cause.[2]

In the above statements the word which has been put into the mouth of the speaker to mean the Self is *purisa* (*puruṣa*). But the same speaker has been described elsewhere[3] as *īsarakāraṇiya* (*īśvarakāraṇika*), one who holds Iśvara the Supreme

1. Sūt.S. II.1.26.27.

2. *Cf.* Muṇḍaka Up. II.1.9 ; Tait. Up. II. vi, III.i ; Bṛhad. Up. II.i.20 ; III.vii.3-23 ; and Śvetāś. Up. 1.6.

3. Sūt.S. II.i.25.28.

ŚASVATAVADINS (ETERNALISTS)

In the opinion of another philosopher[1] the world is boundless and eternal and it exists from eternity and does not perish. Harṣakula and Śīlaṇka say that the eternal aspect of the universe means, according to this view, that it has no destruction and that the natural order of things is immutably fixed—one who is a male now will ever be such hereafter, one who is a female will always continue to be such and so on.

PURANISTS

Another philosopher says[2] that the world is limited but eternal. This view is ascribed by Harṣakula and Śīlaṇka to Vyāsa, for Vyāsa says that the world consists of seven islands.

THE UPANISADS

The view is said to be held by some fools that as the earth, though it is but one pile, presents many forms, so the inteiligent principle, *viz.*, the *ātman*, appears under various forms as the universe.[3]

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1. Sūt.S. I.i.4.6.
2. Sūt.S. I.i.4.6.
3. Sūt.S. I.i.1.9.
4. Sūt.S. I.i.3.9. *Cf* Kaṭha Up II.v. 9-12.

That the world is created is said to be an error committed by some philosophers.[4]

The universe again is said by some Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas to have been produced from the primeval egg and that He (Brahmā) created the things.[1] Some say,[2] that the knowledge of the highest authority is unlimited. Harṣakula and Śīlaṇka argue that which has no limit in time and space is called unlimited by some teachers ; but those who possess a knowledge of this unlimited by means of super-sensual vision do not thereby necessarily become omniscient. The meaning appears to be that the Vedāntin's idea of the Absolute is that it transcends knowledge and that one who knows the Absolute becomes, as it were, the Absolute himself, both the ideas being very frequent in the Upaniṣads. The Jainas, however, contend that those who possess a knowledge of the Absolute as a transcendental. Being do not thereby themselves become entitled to be called omniscient. The text goes on to say that the same philosopher holds that the knowledge is limited in every way. Harṣakula and Śīlāṇka regard these two apparently contradictory views to belong to the same philosophers, and solve the difficulty by taking the latter

1. Sūt.S. I.i.3.8.
2. Sūt.S. I.i.4.7.

Soul as the cause of everything. We find thus that *Iśvara* and *puruṣa* have been synonymously used in the same way as the Upaniṣads establish the identity of Brahman and the ātman.

(III) ĀTMASASTHA-VADA.

According to one school there are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance ; the soul and the world of five elements are eternal ; these six substances do not perish either with or without a cause ; the non-existent does not come into existence, and all things are eternal by their very nature.[1] This is known as the "Doctrine of the soul as the sixth substance." Harṣakula includes the Sāṁkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas amongst its adherents, and Śīlāṇka includes the Sāṁkhyas and Śaivādhikārins who accept the authority of the Vedas.[2] Śilāṇka quotes many verses of the *Bhagavadgītā* to illustrate the philosophy of the indestructibility of the soul and the non-coming into existence of the non-existent. "If the non-existent came into existence," remark Śīlāṇka, "it would make the growth of a horn possible to an ass." This doctrine of the eternal existence of the soul and the five elements,

1. Sūt.S. I.i.1i 15-16.

2. In the Sāṁkhya system there are other elements besides these five.

viz., earth, water, fire, air, and sky is a criticism of the Buddhist view that things are changing every moment without any cause, and of the Vaiśeṣika view that things are destructible just as a pitcher is destroyed if struck with a staff. The reply of this school is that a thing is not destroyed either with or without a cause, a pitcher smashed with a staff exists, lives, and continues in the broken pieces, for out of that lump came its existence.

We have to compare in this connection the doctrine of Pakudha Kaccāyana stated in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (Dīgha, II, p. 56). Pakudha held that seven things, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air, ease, pain, and the soul are neither made nor commanded to be made, are not created and are of a permanent existence. There is nothing called slayer or the slain. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain no one thereby deprives another of life, a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances.

(IV) TAJJIVATACCHARIRA-VADA.

The five gross elements are the original causes of things and from them arises another thing, *viz.*, the soul. This is another philosophy well-known to the Jainas. The soul is a product of the elements and has no independent existence of its own. On the dissolution of the body of five elements a living being

ceases to exist and nothing is left over.[1] Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual *jīva* 'soul.' These souls exist as long as the body, but after death they are no more, there are no souls which are born again. There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond, and on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be.[2]

The Parable of the Lotus-pool explains the theory thus.[3] Upwards from the soles of the fact, downwards from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin's surface is what is called *jīva* or what is the same, *ātman*. The whole soul lives ; when the body is dead it does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction of the body. With the body ends life. Other men carry the corpse away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire only dove-coloured bones remain and the four bearers return to the village with the hearse. Therefore there is and exists no soul different from the body. Those who say that the body is distinet from the soul cannot tell whether the soul is long or small, globular or circular, traingular or square, sexagonal or octagonal,

1. Sūt.S. I.i.1.8. Jacobi has linked this verse with the following one. This is not justified, for the latter refers to Vedānta.

2. Sūt.S. I.i.11.12.

3. Sūt.S. II:i.15-17,19.

black or blue, red or yellow or white, sweet or bitter, hard or soft, heavy or light, cold or hot. As a man draws a sword from the scabbard and shows the sword and the scabbard separately, as he draws a fibre from the *muñja* grass and shows the stalk and the fibre separately, or as he can take bone and flesh, butter and milk, oil and oil-cake, juice and sugarcane, and fire and *araṇi* wood and show them separately, so no one can show the soul and the body separately and therefore no soul exists. Life ends here, as it naturally follows, and there is nothing beyond.

The discussion between king Payesi and Kesi, a young ascetic lucidly explains the logic on which this philosophy was based.[1] The discussion as compressed is as follows :

Payesi : "Sir, is it your doctrine that the soul and body are two different things and not the same things ?"

Kesi : "O Payesi, it is the doctrine with us, the Nirgrantha ascetics that the soul and the body are two separate things and that they are not the same thing."

Payesi : "If, Sir, that is your doctrine then why does not my grandfather who was a tyrannical ruler and must have been reborn in the hells for many

1. Rāj. 65-71

of the sins committed by him, come and warn me, his favourite grandchild, against committing such sins ? If he did then I would believe that his soul is still alive and that the soul and the body are separate things."

Kesi replied at length to the effect that if a person offended against his queen and if when Payesi seized the offender in order to punish him the latter wanted to be allowed to come away so that he might warn his relations against committing such acts lest they also be punished as he was, then would Payesi allow him to come away ? Similar was the case with those suffering torments in hell, they could not come away howsoever they might long for it.

Payesi : "I had a grandmother who was a very pious lady and must have been born in the heavens after death. If she would come and exhort me to righteousness then I would believe that the soul and the body are different things."

Kesi answered at length pointing out that as Payesi would not respond to another's call to come away while Payesi was entering a temple properly sanctified, through fear lest he be defiled so also his grandmother too would not come.

Payesi : "Once while I was seated in my outer hall of audience surrounded by many chiefs, my Prefect of the Police brought a thief in chains whom

I ordered to be put alive in an iron vessel which was hermetically sealed and guards were placed around it. Then after some days I went to the iron vessel, caused it to be unsealed and myself looked for the soul of that thief. If there were holes in the vessel I would have believed that the soul had escaped but as there were none therefore no soul exists apart from the body."

Kesi answered that just as if a man took a trumpet inside a house, closed every opening carefully, and then sounded the trumpet it would be heard outside although there was no apparent outlet, so the soul also could penetrate through earth, stone, etc.

Payesi : "Once I cut into pieces a thief, and put the body inside a closely guarded hermetically-sealed iron vessel. Opening it after sometime I found countless number of worms, Because these living worms originated out of the dead body—for there was no opening for them to enter–my doctrine is sound that the soul and the body are not different things."

Kesi replied that the king must have had occasion sometime or other to watch the heating of iron and he must have then seen how it became red-hot. There were no opening in the iron through which the fire could have entered, and in the same manner the soul of the dead man had gone out

and the souls of the worms had entered the iron vessel unperceived by the senses.

Payesi then argued that the decay of the body in old age showed there was no permanent underlying *jīva*, to which it was said in reply that the body was merely the material which was liable to decay without effecting any changes or decay in the underlying energy of the *jīva*. He then argued that he once killed a robber weighing him immediately before and after his death and found no difference between the two weights. If the robber had a soul different from the body there would certainly have been some difference in his weight before and after the soul left the body. Again he argued that he cut into many pieces a robber, looked very closely into it for a soul but found it nowhere. Kesi replied that the weight and form of the soul were not perceptible by the ordinary organs of sense.

(V) NASTIKA-VADA

The philosophy of the Nāstikas or those who deny the existence of the soul was well-known to the Jainas. There is a reference to those who ignore and deny the tenets of the Nirgranthas.[1] which Śīlāṇka understands as an allusion to the Buddhists

1. Sūt.S. I.i.1.6.

and the followers of Bṛhaspati, the latter being a well-known school of Nāstikas.

A more precise reference speaks of those that profess exclusive belief in the five gross elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air and sky. These five are all that exist and there is nothing in addition to these.[1] This ultramaterialistic view is in line with Cārvāka's famous doctrine of the non-existence of the soul or God or a life hereafter. Śīlāṇka quotes the notorious statement attributes to Cārvāka wherein the latter holds that there is nothing beyond what is perceived by the senses, the past never returns, there is no *karman* or its effects, the dead never comes back, there is no future life and that the body is but the fortuitous combination of the elements.

The Parable of the Lotus-pool states the doctrine in the following manner :

There are only the five elements through which is explained whether an action is good or bad. The five elements are not created, directly or indirectly, nor made ; they are neither effects nor products, they are without beginning and end, they always produce effects, are independent of a directing cause, they are eternal. What is does not perish, from nothing nothing comes. All living beings, all

1. Sūt.S. I.i. 1.7

things, the whole world consists of nothing but these five elements. They are the primary cause of the world even down to a blade of the grass. A man buys or causes to buy, kills or causes to kill, cooks and causes to cook, he may even sell and kill a man—and even then he does not do any wrong.[1]

In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Buddhists the doctrines said to belong to Ajita Kesakambali are an echo of Nāstika-vāda. Ajita taught that there is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. After death the elements constituting the body return to the elements. On the dissolution of the body everyone is cut off, annihilated and after death there is nothing.[2]

This doctrine is also called Lokāyata-vāda. Tajjivataccharira-vada held practically the same view with Nāstika-vada only with this difference that while the latter deny altogether the existence of

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1. Sūt.S. II.1.21.-24.

2. Barua : *A History of Pre-Buddhistic India Philosophy*, p. 293, points out that Ajita's views were not materialistic in the gross sense in which they were understood by Mahāvīra and Buddha, but what he really meant was a protest against the view that soul and body were entirely separated.

the soul the former admit it, but the logical end of both the views would be exactly the same.

(VI) BUDDHISM

A heretic says in connection with the use of water for various purposes that it is justified on the ground of his having permission to drink it or take it for toilet purposes.[1] Śīlāṇka takes these heretics to be Buddhists. This can be accepted without objection for we know that Buddha declared that no sin was committed by drinking water and he permitted bath and washing to his ascetic disciples.[2]

The Nirgranthas looked upon the Ājīviyas as their worst opponents but if facts are considered they suffered most at the hands of the Buddhists in later times. Buddha was a junior contemporary of Mahāvīra, and had therefore greater need and occasion for counteracting and criticising the creed of the latter than Mahāvīra had of fighting with the doctrines of a junior. The rivalry of the two sects grew stronger after Mahāvīra's death. These facts account to some extent for the comparatively scantier mention and criticism of Buddhistic

1. Ācār. S. I.i.3.7.
2. *Cf.* Mahāvagga 1.25.12 5.13.7

doctrines in the literature of the Jainas than what would normally be expected of the two chief sects of the time.

With regard to the suffering of cold by renouncing clothes and fire, some heretical monks are reported to say that they would put on more clothes and by kindling a fire they would be able to bear the very painful influence of the cold.[1] This may be regarded as applying to the Buddhists for they were certainly not indifferent to unnecessary suffering. We cannot of course be absolutely certain, for Brahmanical ascetics would also light a fire and take clothings for protection from cold.

The doctrine of five *skandhas* of momentary existence has been ascribed to "some fools." They are said not to admit that the soul is different from, nor identical with the elements, that it is produced from a cause (the elements), nor that it is without a cause, *i.e.*, that it is eternal.[2] This is a clear reference to the Buddhists with their *rūpa, vedanā, vijñana, samjñā* and *samskāra skandhas*. The existence of a soul in the popular sense of the term apart from the five *skandhas* was denied by Buddha.

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1. Ācār.S. I.vii.2.14.
2. Sūt. S. I.i.1.17.

Earth, water, fire, and air, these four *dhātus* are said to combine to form the body according to the *Jāṇakas* (*jñānins*).[1] Harṣakula explains *Jāṇakas* as *paṇḍitammanyā Bauddhāḥ*. A variant in the text reads *yāvare* (*ca+apare*) for *Jāṇayā*, and this also has been explained as referring to the Buddhists. Jacobi thinks.[2] that the word, *Jāṇaya*, may be derived from *yāna* 'vehicle,' which the Buddhists used to designate the two sections of the church, *viz.*, the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna. Against this may be pointed out that the Buddhists used the word in respect of themselves only after the great schism arose among them, whereas the present statement appears to be older in age. However all opinion is agreed in understanding this passage to be a reference to the Buddhists.

The Akriyāvāḍins who deny *karman* and do not admit that the action of the soul is transmitted to the future moments.[3] are understood by Śīlāṇka to refer to the Buddhists. The doctrine that everything has but a momentary existence and that there is no continuous identity of existence between a thing as it is now and as it will be in the next moment is

1. Sūt. S. I.i.1.18.
2. SBE. xlv, p. 238, n.4.
3. Sūt. S. I.xii.4.

one of the Buddhist theories. The Buddhists are included among Akriyāvādins by the Nirgranthas because by not admitting the existence of *jīva* they were considered to deny *karman* as well. Jacobi takes this to refer to Sāṁkhya, because according to it the *puruṣa* does not act.[1] We shall have to treat of Akriyāvāda at greater length later on, but in connection with the present verse it has to be pointed out that although this verse and the one following have been commented upon by Śīlāṇka at great length as applying to the Buddhists, yet we must widen the limits of Akriyāvāda beyond Buddhist doctrines.

In the discussions of Adda one man appears and says[2] that if one pierces a lump of oil-cake with a spit mistaking it for a man, or a gourd mistaking it for a baby, and roasts it one will be guilty of murder according to his views. If a savage puts a man on a spit and roasts him mistaking him for a lump of oil-cake, or a baby mistaking it for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder. If anybody thrusts a spit through a man or a baby mistaking him or it for a lump of oil-cake, puts him or it on the fire and roasts, that will be a meal fit for the

1. SBE. xlv., p. 316, n.3.
2. Sūt.S. II.6.26-29.

Buddhas to break fast upon.[1] Those who always feed two thousand worthy monks, says this man to Adda, acquire great merit and become powerful gods in Arūpadhātu. This is an account, although exaggerated, of the Buddhist view that motive determines whether an act is sinful or not. If the state of mind was murderous it was a sin even though the act committed in execution of this intention did not actually result in the loss of life; again, no sin is committed by the accidental killing of life when the act intended was not murder. It has to be taken as an echo of Buddha's statement that the state of mind accompanying an act was more important than the actual result of the act.[2] The Arūpadhatu is the highest heaven of the Buddhists. The combination of all this is sufficient to establish its reference to the Buddhists.

Another verse credits some with holding that salvation which was a pleasant thing was produced

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1. *Buddhāna tam kappati pāranāya.* Harṣakula explains *buddhānam* as *śākyānām,* white Śīlaṇka says *Buddhānām api bhojanāya yogyam bhavati*, which shows he took it to mean 'for the Buddhas.' 'Buddha' was used by Jainas and Bhddhists alike to denote thier master and in itself is not sufficient to indicate its applicability to the latter.

2. *Cf.* Buddha's conversation with Dīgha Tapassī a Nirgrantha ascetic and with Upāli, a lay disciple of Mahavīra and Upāli's conversion in *Upāli Sutta.*

by enjoying pleasures.[1] Harṣakula and Śīlāṅka take it to refer to the Buddhists and quote many passages in support of their identification :

sarvāṇi sattvāni sukhe ratāni, sarvāṇi duḥkhāc ca samudvijanti I

tasmāt sukhārthi sukham eva dadyāt sukhapradātā labhate sukhāni II

All beings seek happiness and turn away from suffering ; therefore the seeker of happiness should give happiness, for the giver of happiness obtains happiness.

maṇuṇṇam bhoyaṇam bhoccā maṇuṇṇam sayaṇāsanam I

maṇuṇṇamsi agāramsi maṇuṇāam jhāyae muṇīā II

Having enjoyed a pleasant dinner, a pleasant bed and seat, a saint dwells in a pleasant abode and meditales pleasantly.

mṛdvī śayyā prātarutthāya peyā, bhuktam madhye pānakam cāparāhṇe drākṣākhaṇḍam śarkarā cārdharātre mokṣascānte Śākyaputreṇa dṛṣṭaḥ II

A soft bed, drinks in the morning, dinner at midday, drinks in the afternoon, and grapes and sugar at night—these have been laid down by Śākya-putra as leading to salvation.

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1. Sūt.S. I.iii.4.6.

These are supposed to be drawn from works of the Buddhists themselves explaining their faith or from the writing of others professing to explain it. It is quite clear that as a matter of fact they are taken from the writings of hostile critics and from satires on the teachings of Buddha. Harṣakula thinks that the verse in the text might refer to *svatīrthyas*, some members of the same order as the speaker's *i.e.*, the Nirgranthas. The events of later days led the commentators, one feels constrained to say, to fasten every possible adverse criticism on to the Buddhists to make up, as it were, for the dearth of anti-Buddhist statements in the texts. The present instance is a very strained attempt to drag in the Buddhists. Both in this verse as well as in another[1] Harṣakula is undecided about its exact application and names several possible alternatives. The truth probably is that the allusion was to a distinct view which held that like is produced by like and therefore mokṣa being an agreeable thing is obtained by living an agreeable and comfortable life. This is the view held by the Tāntrikas.[2] The Sātavādins also held the same view.[3]

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1. Sūt.S. I.iii.4.10.

2. See *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa* attributed to Āryadeva, JASB, lxvii, 1898, p. 175, and *Subhāṣitasamgraha*, p. 37. I am indebted to Pandit Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya for these references.

3. This has been discussed later.

The doctrine of Buddha has been included among those false beliefs which are the products of wrong knowledge.[1]

(VII) MINOR SCHOOLS

A school of philosophers thought that a *jīva* performed *sammattakiriyam* (*samyaktvakriyā*) right conduct and *micchattakiriyam* (*mithyātvakriyā*) wrong conduct at the same time, *i.e.*, while it performed right conduct at the same time it performed wrong conduct also, and while it performed wrong conduct it performed also right conduct at the same time.[2] Malayagiri, the commentator, says that it is the doctrine of Caraka. Guṇa-ratna says that Caraka represented a school of Sāṁkhya.[3]

Another view held by some was to the effect that there was no harm in enjoying the pleasures of the senses for it gave relief to the enjoyer without causing harm to any one else, just as the squeezing of a blister or boil gave relief and has no dangerous consequences. A ram drinks the quiet water which gives it relief. If this harmed the ram we could have said that the act was harmful but as

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1. Anu. 40 ; Nandi 42.

2. Jivā. S. 3. 104.

3. *Tarkarahasyadipīkā*, a commentary on *Ṣaḍdarsanasamuccaya*, p. 31.

it did not there is surely no harm in it.[1] In the identification of the upholder of this view Harṣakula has the same doubts which he had with regard to Sātavādins mentioned above.

According to another school it is not only the soul which does not exist but nothing exists. Everything is mere appearance, a mirage, an illusion, a dream or phantasy. There rises no sun nor does it set ; there waxes no moon nor does it wane ; there are no rivers running nor any wind blowing ; the whole world is unreal.[2] The Mādhyamika school of the Buddhists and the popular Māyāvāda which arose as an off-shoot of Vedānta owe their origin probably to this school which is met here in the literature of the Jainas for the first time in the history of Indian philosophical thought.

In Sāvatthi there were two rival schools who disputed the point whether knowledge was superior to conduct or conduct was superior to knowledge.[3] Abhayadeva, the commentator, quotes some of their views, *e.g.*,

kriyaiva phaladā puṁsāṁ na jñānaṁ phaladaṁ matam I

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1. Sūt.S. I.iii.4.10-12.
2. Sūt.S. I.xii.7.
3. Bhag. S. S.10.354

yataḥ strībhakṣyabhogajño na jñānāt sukhito bhavet. II

Conduct always bears fruit, not so knowledge—just as one having merely the knowledge of enjoyment of women does not thereby become happy.

jahā kharo candanabhāravāhī bhārassa bhāgī na hu candaṇassa I

evaṁ khu nāṇī caraṇeṇa hīṇo nāṇassa bhāgī na hu sogaīc. II

As ass carrying a load of sandal wood carries only a load but does not enjoy the sandal wood, so the man possessing knowledge but devoid of conduct enjoys his knowledge but does not obtain progress.

The supporters of knowledge on the other hand said :

vijñaptiḥ phaladā puṁsāṁ na kriyā phaladā matā I

mithyājñānāt pravṛttasya phalāsaṁvādadarśanāt. II

It is knowledge which bears fruit, not so conduct, for wrong knowledge does not produce the desired result.

paḍhamaṁ nāṇaṁ tao dayā evaṁ ciṭṭhai savvasaṁjae I

annāṇī kiṁ kāhī vā nāhī cheyapāvayaṁ. II

First comes knowledge, then charity—thus are constituted all those who are restrained : one lacking in knowledge knows not what to do or what to know, and whether one is wise or a sinner.

PART II.

CLASSIFICATION INTO FOUR GREAT SCHOOLS.

The account of philosophical schools mentioned in the Jaina canonical literature has been dealt with exhaustively above but the most important part of the work yet remains unfinished, *viz.*, their classification according to a method well-known in this literature.

The heretical creeds of the time were all comprehended by Mahāvīra under four heads.[1], *viz.*

1. Kriyāvāda.
2. Akriyāvāda.
3. Ajñānavāda.
4. Vinayavāda

These four great schools comprise three hundred and sixty-three schools[2] : Kriyāvāda consists of one hundred and eighty schools, Akriyāvāda consists of eighty-four schools, Ajñānavāda consists of sixty-seven schools, and Vinayavāda consists of thirty-two schools[3].

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1. Sūt. S. I. xii.1 ; Sth. S. 4.4 345 ; Bhag. S. 30.1.824 ; Utt. S. 18.23 ; Nandi 47 ; and Sūt. S. II. ii. 79.

2. Sūt. Ş. II.ii.79.

3. Nandi 47 ; Guṇaratna quotes the following couplet—

Asiisayaṁ kiriyāṇaṁ akiriyavāiṇa hoi culasīi I
Annāṇia sattaṭṭhī veṇaiyāṇaṁ ca battīsaṁ II

The scheme of classification in details is as follows :

1. Kriyāvāda

Kriyā denotes the existence of Jīva, etc., and those who admit the existence of jīva, etc., are called *Kriyāvādins.*

The Jains have the "nine principles" of *jīva* soul, *ajīva* non-soul, *āsrava* the inflow of karmic matter into the soul, *bandha* the consequent bondage of the soul, *saṁvara* stoppage of the inflow, *nirjarā* shedding off the karmic matter, *puṇya* merit, *apuṇya* demerit, and *mokṣa* emancipation. Let us take the first, *jīva* and draw a table as below :



Those who admit the existence of the soul (*jīva*) by itself (*svataḥ*), for all eternity (*nitya*), through Time (*kāla*) are the first school. They say that the soul exists in its own nature, it is eternal, and acts through Time. They are called *Kālavādins*. Guṇaratna

quotes the following as stating their doctrine :

na kālavyatirekeṇa garbhabālaśubhādikam I
yat kiñcij jāyate loke tadasau kāraṇaṁ kila II
kiṁ ca kālād ṛte naiva mudgapaktirapīkṣyate I
sthālyādisannidhāne'pi tataḥ kālādasau matā II
kālābhāve ca garbhādi sarvaṁ syād avyavasthayā I
pareṣṭahetusadbhāvamātrād eva tadudbhavāt II
kālaḥ pacati bhutāni kālaḥ saṁharate prajāḥ I
kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ II

The blossoming of trees and plants, the appearance of fruits, the change of seasons, the movement of stars and planets, the periods of gestation, infancy, adolescence, youth, old age, etc., could not have taken place if there were no Time. In the absence of Time everything would be in disorder, but such disorder we neither find nor desire. Cooking, for instance, depends not on the bringing together of fire, pan and other materials, but on Time. It is not at the sweet will of man that causes happen, but according to the order Time and we cannot dispense with it.

Those who say that the soul exists in itself eternally through *īśvara* (God) are the second school called *Iśvaravādins*. They regard the universe as made by God who is endowed with the attributes

of perfection and is the ordainer of heaven or hell for men.

Those who say that the soul exists by itself eternally through *ātman* (Self) are the third school called *Ātmavādins*. According to them the Self creates everything.

Those who say that the soul exists in itself eternally through *niyati* ('the fixed order of thing') are the fourth school called *Niyātivādins*. According to them there is a principle called *niyati* by which all that exist assume their form in a prescribed manner, and not otherwise. Whatever comes out of something at one time always comes out of that things in a regular manner, as otherwise the law of cause and effect and the law of uniformity of nature would not be in operation, for there would be nothing to determine the order of events (*anyathā kāryyakāraṇavyavasthā pratiniyatarūpavyavasthā ca na bhavet niyāmakābhāvāt*).

Those who say that the soul exists by itself eternally through *svabhāva* (Nature) are the fifth school called *Svabhāvavādins*. They hold that everything is caused by Nature, *e.g.*, the clay becomes a jar and not a piece of cloth, a piece of cloth comes from yarn, while a jar does not do so. The uniform production of jars from clay shows

the order of Nature. Guṇaratna quotes the following as illustrating the doctrine of *Svabhāvavādins* :

Kaḥ kaṇṭakānāṁ prakaroti taikṣṇyaṁ I
vicitrabhāvaṁ mṛgapakṣiṇāṁ ca II
svabhāvataḥ sarvamidaṁ pravṛttaṁ I
na kāmacāro 'sti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ II
badaryāḥ kaṇṭakas tīkṣṇa rjur ekaśca kuñcitaḥ I
phalaṁ ca vartulaṁ tasyā vada kena vinirmitam II

'What causes thorns to have sharp points and birds and beasts to have their own wonderful ways? All this is ordained by Nature and there is no caprice anywhere. Of the jujube tree the thorns are sharp pointed, some straight, some bent, the fruit is round—by whom are all these made ?'

Even the simple phenomenon of the cooking of the *mudga* also depends on Nature. The *kaṃkaduka mudga*, for instance, cannot be cooked even after the combination of a pan, fuel and Time, for by nature it is a kind of cereal that is not softened by boiling. Therefore that in the presence of which effects follow and in the absence of which effects do not follow is to be regarded as the cause.

We have thus obtained five schools under *asti jīvaḥ svataḥ "nityaḥ."* Under *asti jivaḥ svataḥ "antiyaḥ"* we shall have another five schools accordingly as the non-eternity is predicated of *kāla*,

etc. Then under the head *asti jīvaḥ parataḥ "nityaḥ"* we shall have another five schools according as "not of itself" is predicated of *kāla*, etc. The five classes of *kāla*, etc., are to be supplied under both *nitya* and *anitya* varieties of *svataḥ* and *parataḥ*. The *paratah* schools mean that the existence of *jīva* is admitted not of itself but as it is distinguished from other objects, for it is well-known how things are known by contrast with other things just as shortness is known as that which is not long, and in the same way the soul is known by distinguishing it from such objects as pillars, etc. The *anitya* varieties of *parataḥ* would give us yet another set of five schools. So we have twenty schools on *jīva*, the first of the "nine principles" and by extending the same classification to each of the eight other "principles" we have altogether nine times twenty or one hundred and eighty schools comprised in *kriyāvāda*.

To *kriyāvādins* have been ascribed the views that unless a sinful thought is translated into action or a sinful act performed with a sinful motive the full karmic consequences will not follow and such acts will affect the soul but slightly[1], and that misery is produced by one's own works and not by the work of somebody else, *viz.*, fate, creator, etc.[2]

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1. Sūt.S. I.i.2.25-28.
2. Sūt.S. I.xii.11.

The meaning is that the state of mind and conduct must combine to constitute sin for any one of them without the other would not give rise to the consequences of a sinful *karman*. Śīlāṅka points out that they hold that action alone leads to liberation even though it be unaccompanied by right knowledge and right faith.

2. Akriyāvāda.

The *Akriyāvādins* deny the existence of the soul, etc., for according to them everything is of a momentary existence and a state comes to an end the moment it comes into existence, and therefore it cannot have any *kriyā*. Without continuity of existence to *kriyā* is possible, the existence itself is the cause and effect of it.

The *Akriyāvādins* are of eighty-four varieties obtained in the manner shown below. Let us take seven of the "nine principles" leaving out *puṇya* and *apuṇya*. Of these seven let us take the first, *jīva*, and draw a table thus :



The divisions of *nitya* and *anitya*, as in the *Kriyāvāda* table, are not necessary here as the question of eternity and non-eternity does not arise when the existence itself of soul, etc., is denied. *Yadṛcchā* is put last because all *Akriyāvādins* are *Yadṛcchāvādins*. The same six divisions from *kāla* to *yadṛcchā* are also to be considered under *parataḥ* as under *svataḥ*.

Those who say that no soul exists in itself through Time are the first school. According to them the existence of objects is established from their signs or effects and there are no such signs or effects from which the existence of the soul can be established. The same argument is applied in denying the existence of the soul through *īśvara, ātman, niyati* and *svabhāva* as in regard to *kāla*. *Yadṛcchā* means obtainment of results without any determining cause. The *Yadṛcchāvādins* see no uniformity of causal relation in the world. *śāluka* 'the root of a particular kind of water-lily' comes of a *śāluka* as well as of cowdung ; fire comes of fire as well as of *araṇi* 'a piece of wood' ; smoke comes of smoke as well as of a combination of fire and fuel ; *kandalī* 'a particular kind of plant with white flowers appearing very plentifully in the rainy season' comes of *kanda* 'bulbous root' as

well as of seeds ; the *Vaṭa* tree comes of seeds as well as of a section of a branch, and wheat comes of wheat-seeds as well as of bamboo-seeds. So there is plurality and not uniformity in causal relations and everything comes into existence accidentally (*yadṛcchātaḥ*) as in a freak. Guṇaratna quotes the following as illustrating the views of Akriyāvādins :

atarkitopasthitameva sarvaṁ
citraṁ janānāṁ sukhaduḥkhajātam I
kākasya tālena yathābhighāto
na buddhipurvo 'sti vṛthābhimānaḥ II

All this has come into existence by accident—the various joys and sorrows of men ; all this is like the striking a crow by a plam-fruit, which is not preceded by design. It is useless to think (that the origination of things is preceded by design).

Thus under *nāsti jīvaḥ "svataḥ"* we have obtained six schools and under *nāsti jīvaḥ "parataḥ"* we shall have a set of another six schools. Therefore there are obtained twelve schools under the first of seven "principles" and by extending the same classification to each of the other six "principles" we have altogether seven times twelve or eighty-four schools comprised in Akriyāvāda.

Another classification of *Akriyāvādins* divides them into eight classes[1], *viz.*

Ekavādins who believe in one supreme soul as the first couse.

Anekavādins who believe in one supreme principle manifesting itself in several principles.

Mitavādins who gave a fixed size to the soul.

Nirmitavādins who regard the universe as created by God.

Sātavādins[2] who believe in obtaining mokṣa by living a comfortable life.

Samucchedavādins who believe in the constant destructibility of things.

Nityavādins who believe in the eternity of things.

And *Na-santi-paralokavādins* who do not believe in a future life or soul, etc.

It will appear from the above classification that all possible non-Jaina creeds have been comprised under those eight classes of *Akriyāvāda*, the scope of which is certainly wider than in the previous classification into eighty-four classes.

The *Akriyāvādins* are mentioned in the texts as not admitting that the action of the soul is transmitted

1. Sth. S. 8. 3.607.
2. See notes 90-93 and 110.

to future moments[1], and as holding that nothing exists and all forecasts of the future are false.[2]

3. Ajñānavāda.

The *Ajñānavādins* deny the necessity or importance of knowledge. According to them knowledge is not the highest thing for where there is knowledge there is assertion of contradictory statements by different disputants resulting in dissensions which soil the mind and bring on a longer period of wordly bondage. But if *ajñāna* or negation of knowledge is upheld it generates no pride and there is no ill-feeling towards others and therefore the chances of wordly bondage are removed. The result of volition is *karman* and the result of *karman* is bondage which is of dire consequences and has to be suffered from, it having been produced by resolute and determined volitional activity. But that *karman* which results from the activity of mere body and speech unprompted by mental action is not volitional and therefore is not productive of severe suffering nor does it entail dire consequences. Such unvolitional effects of *karman* are swept off easily by good activities like the easy blowing off

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1. Sūt. S. I.xii.4.
2. Sūt. S. I.xii.10.

by the wind of dust particles adhering to a very dry and white wall.

The absence of volition of mind is generated by the force of *ajñāna* for where there is knowledge there is volition. Therefore one desiring *mokṣa* should adopt *ajñāna* and not knowledge to lead him along the path of perfection.

Supposing for argument's sake that knowledge is necessary, how is one to know for certain what is knowledge ? It cannot be known. All philosophers differ in their idea of knowledge. We cannot say which of them spoke the truth. The followers of Mahāvīra may say that he obtained omniscient knowledge and therefore the knowledge that proceeds from him is right knowledge. But how is one to know in the absence of any evidence to prove it that Mahāvīra alone obtained omniscient knowledge and no one else ? The story of the gods coming down from heaven to worship Mahāvīra and thus testifying to his omniscient knowledge is not to be trusted for there is no evidence to prove that it really so happened. Traditional evidence is also untrustworthy because it cannot be definitely known whether such tradition was set on foot by an imposter or a worthy man. What has not been proved cannot be believed. The phenomenon of the coming down of gods from

heaven is shown by magicians also and in itself is not enough to prove the omniscience of anyone.

Granting even, say the *Ajñānavādins*, that Mahāvīra was omniscient how do we know that the Nirgrantha scriptures are really his teachings and not circulated by knaves ? How again are we to know if Mahāvīra used the words in the scriptures in the same sense as they are taken now ? How do we know what his real intention was ?

Therefore it is established that owing to its being the cause of longer bondage in the world and owing to want of definite certainty, knowledge is not the highest thing but *ajñāna* is the highest thing.

There are sixty-seven schools under Ajñānavāda obtained in the following manner. Let us take the first of the nine "principles" and draw a table as below :



Here *sattva* means existence in its own form. *Asattva* means non-existence in other forms. *Sadasattava* means simultaneous existence in its own form and non-existence in other forms. When such existence and non-existence are to be expressed at

one and the same time in one world it becomes indescribable, there being no such word and therefore it is said to be *avācyatva* 'indescribableness.' When from one point of view it is existent and from another it is indescribable and the two are to be simulancously expressed it is called *sadavācyatva*. When from one point of view it is non-existent and from another it is indescribable and the two aspects are to be simultaneously expressed it is called *asadavācyatva*. When from one point of view it is existent, from another it is non-existent and from yet another indescribable, and all these aspects are to be simultaneously expressed it is called *sadasadavācyatva*. Thus we have these seven schools under the first "principle" and extending the same classification to each of the other eight "principles" we have nine times seven, *i.e.*, sixty-three schools. These refer to the nature of the nine "principles" severally, but as for their origin in general four other schools are possible, *viz.*, *sattva, asattva, sadasattva,* and *avācyatva*—the other three forms of the seven possible variations are not used in this case as they are used only in respect of the several parts of thing only after its origin has taken place which is not the case here. The last four added to the previous sixty-three give us sixty-seven schools under *Ajñānavāda.*

The first school on *jīva*, for instance, says "Who knows if there is jīva ? No one does, because there is no evidence to prove its existence. What again is the use of knowing it ? If it is known it will give rise to volition which will stand in the way of attaining to the next world (*jñātasyābhiniveśahetutayā paralokapratipanthitvāt*). In the same way are to be described the other varieties of *asattva*, etc., as also their origin in general.

It is obvious that although the *Ajñānavādins* say they have no need of knowledge and that it is unnecessary, they happen yet to be the employers of the acutest arguments.

4. Vinayavāda.

The *Vinayavādins* or *Vainayikas* do not accept signs, external rules of ceremony, and scriptures but uphold the supremacy or reverence as the cardinal virtue leading to perfection. There are thirty-two schools of *Vinayavāda* obtained in this way. Reverence may be shown to eight classes of beings, *viz.*, god or master, ascetic, man, aged persons, inferiors, mother or father, and to each of these eight classes of persons reverence may be shown in four ways, *i.e.*, by body, mind, speech and gifts. There are thus four times eight or thirty-two schools of *Vinayavāda*.

The three hundred and sixty-three philosophical schools of Jaina literature are thus obtained by totalling one hundred and eighty schools of *Kriyāvāda, eighty-four schools of Akriyāvāda*, sixty-seven schools of *Ajñānavāda* and thirty-two schools of *Vinayavāda*[1]. The commentators Śīlānka, Abhayadeva and Malayagiri as well as Hemacandra accept this classification as a standard.

Buddhists Classification of Contemporary Schools

It is of interest to compare in this connection Buddha's classification given in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya* of contemporary philosophical thought into sixty-two schools, *viz.*

The four schools of Eternalists or *Sassatavādas*. They held that the soul and the world are both eternal. The first three schools held this view as a result of their having perceived through a recollection of the memories of past lives that the soul and the body have always been in existence, and the fourth schools held this view not as a result of memory but on logical grounds.

The four schools of Semi-Eternalists or *Ekacca-Sassatikas*. The first school believed that Brahmā

1. *Tarkarahasyadipika,* a commentary by Guṇaratna on the *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* of Haribhadra, B. I., p. 19

was eternal but not individual souls, having come to this conclusion through partial remembrance of past states of existence in higher worlds. The second school believed that debauched souls are not eternal but that underbauched souls are eternal. The third school believed exactly the same things as the second school except that in the case of the former the debauchery of the gods is mental unlike the debauchery of the gods of the latter school which is physical. The fourth school held that the soul was eternal but not the body.

The four schools of Extensionists or *Antānantikas*. The first school held that the world was finite, the second that it was infinite, the third that it was infinite sidewise but finite upward and downward, and the fourth that it was neither finite nor infinite.

The four schools of Eel-wrigglers or *Amarāvikkhepikas*. They did not give categorical replies to any question but avoided them by ambiguous and equivocating replies, and differed only in respect of the motives for giving such replies.

The two schools of Fortuitous-Originists or *Adhiccasamuppannikas*. They held that the soul and the world came into being without a cause, having come to this conclusion as a result of remembrance of past lives in the case of the first, and as a result of logical reasoning in the case of the second.

Kandappiyas. They earned a living by performing antics and making people laugh by making various movements with the eyebrows, mouth, teeth, lips, hands, feet, and ears.—They made others laugh but did not laugh themselves.[1]

Caragas. They went about begging and carried a *dhāṭi*.[2] They went out to beg only after meal[3], says Hemacandra in his commentary on the *Anuyogadvāra*.

The names of the following sects are mentioned in long lists of ascetical orders in several places.[4]

Kibbisiyas. They went about speaking ill of religious teachers and holy people.

Tericchiyas. They dwelt in places unfrequented by cows, horses and other animals.

Ābhiogias. They earned a living by gaining the confidence of people by administering auspicious baths, exorcising evil spirits and interpreting dreams. The *Brahmajāla Sutta* of the Buddhists also mention these as the ways by practising which many mendicants earned their living.

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1. Bhag. 1.2.25 ; Aup. 38.
2. This is the explanation of Abhayadeva ; the word however seems to be *ghaṭī* a begging-bowl.
3. Bhag. 1.2.25 ; Anuyog. 20 and 26.
4. Bhag 1.2.25 and 11.9.418 ; Aup. 38 and 41 ; Anu. 20 and 26.

Hottiyas. They performed *agnihotras.*

Pottiyas. They put on a special kind of clothes.

Kottiyas. They slept on the bare ground.

Jaṇṇais. They performed *yajñas.*

Thālais. They carried all their belongings with them.

Huṁvauṭṭas. They carried a water vessel with them.[1]

Dantukkhaliyas. They lived on fruits and used their teeth as mortar.

Ummajjagas. They bathed by taking only a dip.

Sammajjagas. They bathed without dipping in water.

Nimajjagas. They remained in water only for a short time.

Sampakkhālas. They rubbed and cleansed their limbs with mud.

Uḍḍhakaṇḍūyagas. They never scratched the lower parts of the body.

Ahokaṇḍūyagas. They never scratched the upper parts of the body.

Dāhiṇakūlagas. They dwelt only on the south bank of the Ganges.

Uttarakūlagas. They dwelt only on the north bank of the Ganges.

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1. *Cf. Cullavagga* 5.10.1.

Dagaviiyas. They took water as the second item in the meal.

Dagataias. They took water as the third item in the meal.

Dagacauṭṭhas. They took water as the fourth item in the meal.

Dagapañcamas. They took water as the fifth item in the meal.

Dagachaṭṭhas. They book water as the sixth item in the meal.

Dagasattamas. They took water as the seventh item in the meal.

Mohariyas. They went about sying all sorts of incoherent and absurd things also indulging in great garrulity in order to amuse people.

Some sects went about dancing and singing to entertain people.

Bahudayas. They stopped one night in a village, five nights in a town and lived on whatever alms they got.

Kuḍivvayas. They lived in houses and regarded conquering of anger, greed, pride and illusion as their goal.

Cīrigas. They put on rags collected from the road-side.

Cammakhaṇḍiyas. They put on a dress of hide.

Paṇḍuraṇgas. They besmeared their body with ashes.

Bhikkhoṇḍas. They would eat nothing except what has been obtained as alms and would not take milk unless it had been milked by another.

Haṁsas. They lived in mountain caves, roads; hermitages, temples and gardens and entered a village only for begging alms.

Paramahaṁsas. They lived on river banks, the confluence of streams and wore discarded clothes and rags.

Besides these there are mentions of mendicants who worshipped Nārāyaṇa ; of eight Brahmanical mendicants named Kaṇha, Karakaṇḍa, Ambada, Parāsara, Kaṇha, Dīvāyaṇa, Devagutta and Nāraya ; of eight Kṣatriya mendicants named Sīlai, Sasihāra, Naggai, Bhaggai, Videha, Rāyarāya, Rāyarāma and Bala ; of Saṁkhas *(Sāṁkhyas)*, Jois (*Yogins*), Kavilas, Bhiuccas (disciples of Kapila and Bhṛgu) ; of those who practised penances in the sun or surrounded by fire ; of ascetics who practised austerities with an arm uplifted[1]; of mendicants in Vajjabhūmi who ate rough food and carried a staff with them[2]; of the six Disāyāras named Sāṇa, Kalaṇḍa Kaṇiyāra, Acchidda, Aggivesayaṇa, Ajjuna and Gomāyuputta[3].

1. Bhag. 15.543.
2. Ācar. S.1.8.3.5.
3. Bhāg. 15.539.

The texts mention only the names of these sects of ascetics but give no other details. The little information which is collected here is from the remarks of commentators. It is apparent that the information supplied by the latter is not full, but nothing more is available.

II. THE SECT OF PARSVA.

The sect of Pārśva came to be amalgamated with the Nirgranthas. A discussion once took place between Goyama, the chief disciple of Mahāv ra and Udaka, a follower of Pārśva, on whether a movable being is to be called a movable being or beings which are for the time being movable. Udaka went on to argue that one who took the vow of abstention from killing one class of animals abstained in fact from killing all classes of animals, for the same being who was now born in one class may be born in other classes as well, and beings which are outside the class now may come later on into the class. To this Goyama replied at length pointing out its incorrectness on the ground that as the vow of not killing an ascetic is not broken by one who kills a man who used to be an ascetic but is no longer so, in the same way all classes cannot be brought within one class.[1]

1. Sūt. S. II. vii. 14.

Kalāsavesiyaputta, a disciple of Pārśva, questioned the knowledge of Nirgrantha elders and finally wanted to be converted from his own doctrine of four vows to that of five vows (*Cāujjāmāo dhammāo pañcamahavvaiyam sapaḍikkamaṇṃ dhammaṃ uvasaṃpajjittā*[1]). On another occasion elders belonging to the sect of Pārśva came to Mahāvīra, asked him questions and finally were converted by him at their own instance from the doctrine of the four vows to that of five vows.[2] The five vows were of *ahiṁsa* non-injury, *aṃṛta* truthfulness, *asteya* non-theiving, *aparigraha* possessionlessness, and abstention from *abrahma* unchastity.

There is a very instructive discussion between Goyama, a disciple of Mahāvīra and Kesi, a follower of Pārśva. Two important points which emerge from this discussion are first, that Pārśva omitted the vow of celibacy because he included it in the vow of possessionlessness. The absence of its specific mention however led to corruption which was set right by Mahāvīra's inclusion of celibacy as a distinct vow. Secondly, Pārśva allowed an upper and an under garment to his disciples while Mahāvīra recommended complete nudity, the explanation being that there is

1. Bhag. 1.9.76.
2. Bhag. 5.9.226.

really no conflict in this for Pārśva's direction was with the purpose of giving his disciples a characteristic mark to distinguish them from others while Mahāvīra's nudity symbolised that knowledge, faith and right conduct are the true causes of final liberation and not outward marks.[1]

The parents of Māhāvīra were lay disciples of Pārśva, and Mahāvīra was therefore brought up as such and continued in it till after he renounced the world. A man of outstanding personality and gifts as he was he could not be content merely with the knowledge of the law. He wandered about alone and single to realise the truth for himself. We have already noticed his association with Gosāla. His teachings bear testimony to his having associated with other schools. This is an important matter in the proper study of Mahāvīra's religion but full justice cannot be done to this subject here as it is outside the scope of the present enquiry. It will suffice for our present purposes to note that Mahāvīra reverted ultimately to his former sect and effected improvements in it.

1. Uttar. S. 23.33.

III. SCHISMATIC SCHOOLS AMONG THE NIRGRANTHAS.

Although nothing compared with the material contained in the *Kathāvatthu* of the Buddhists regarding various opinions on doctrinal matters among themselves the literatue of the Jainas yields some information on schisms within the order of the Nirgranthas.

Jamāli, who was Mahāvīra's sister's son and also married his daughter, was the first man to start the schism. He was a prince and renounced the world in order to be an ascetic follower of Mahāvīra. Once he begged permission of Mahāvīra to go out on a tour with five hundred ascetics, and although permission was asked three times Mahāvīra vouched no reply. Jamāli took the law in his own hand, went away wandering and fell ill on account of having taken bad and improper food. During his illness he asked his companions to spread a bed dry grass for him and when it was being done he enquired if the bed was ready. His companions said the bed was ready but going up to it he found that it had been only half ready. Instantly it occured to him that "a thing is done when it is being done" as taught by Mahāvīra was false. He announced his new idea to his companions some of whom agreed with him. He thereupon declared himself a

Kevalin. Jamāli's followers are called Bahurayas because they held that the completion of an act required more than one unit of time. This is the first schism and it arose in Sāvatthi.[1]

The second schism was started by Tissagutta at Usabhapura or Rāyagaha. His followers are called *Jīvapaesiyas* because they identified the jīva with the space occupied by it.

The third schism was led by Āsāḍha and had its origin in Syetavi. Āsāḍha doubted if gods and saints were really so. His followers are called *Avvattiyas*.

The fourth schism arose in Mithilā and was started by Assamitta. His followers are called *Samuccheiyas* because they held that in as much as every thing is subject to destruction after having come into existence, the effects of good or bad deeds are not to be enjoyed or suffered from.

The fifth schism was started by Gaṇga at Ullakātira. His followers held that it is not true that only one feeling can be felt by the mind at one time and are therefore called *Dokiriyas*.

The sixth schism arose in Antarañjī and was started by Saḍuluya or Rohagutta. His followers are called *Terāsiyas* because they held that there is a third state of existence besides jīva and ajīva.

1. Bhag. 9. 33. 383-387.

The seventh schism was started by Goṭṭhamāhilla at Dasapura. His followers are called *Abaddhiyas* because according to them the jiva is not bound by *karman*.[1]

IV. NIRGRANTHA CRITICISM OF OTHER SCHOOLS.

The Jaina literature contains some criticism specifically directed against the beliefs and practices of some of the contemporary schools. Later commentators have read into many of the passages in the cannon criticism of others by implication. These might or might not have been meant in the texts to be criticism against the parties, the commentators take them to be directed against, and are therefore unnecessary to deal with. But the other class wherein we find in a very clear manner the criticism made as also the party it is directed against, is important as it shows from yet another point of view the stand the early nirgranthas took in contrast with their contemporaries.

The Ājīviyas have been criticised on the ground that they do not understand that things depend partly on fate and partly on human exertion.[2]

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1. Sth. S. 7.3. 587.
2. Sūt. S. I.i.2.4.

If everything was unalterably fixed, as the Ājīviyas believed, and if there was no *purisakāra* how was it that the gods only were gods and not everybody ? A god attained to that status by dint of his exertion, otherwise all would have been gods or none would have been such. From our everyday experience we find that the course of things can be altered by human exertion,[1] our reason dictates exertion which none can deny.

The Vedānta doctrine of the *ātman* being the substratum of all existence is criticised on the ground that if that were true how can the consequences of evil *karman* performed by one result in the suffering of the same individual ?[2] The one *ātman* underlying all would make the consequences sufferable by all of the wrong deeds done by one or by another individual who had nothing to do with the wrong deed. Again, if there were one *ātman* common to all there would be no difference in the lots of individuals or in their castes or station in life, and all would be sharing equally the perfection of the *ātman*.[3] The inactivity of the *puruṣa* of the Sāṁkhya would also be open to the

1. Upās. 7.200.
2. Sūt. S. I.i.1.10.
3. Sūt. S. II.vi.48.

same objection of not accounting for the variety we find in the world in the lots of men.[1]

The *Tajjīvataccharīravādins* are criticised as offering no solution to such problems as whether or not an action is good, whether or not there is a life after death or whether perfection is attainable.[2]

The Buddhists are criticised as placing unreasoning faith on the authority of Buddha. They have permission, they say, of doing this or that. Any one familiar with the rules of Vinaya of the Buddhists knows how frequently the necessity arose for Buddha to accord his permission to this act or that on the part of his disciples, and this has been criticised on the ground that Buddha's permission does not justify a wrong act.[3]

Kriyāvādins are criticised on the ground that they put all the emphasis on outward acts which is not correct for a sinful thought even though not carried out into execution is none the less sinful.[4]

Akriyāvādins are criticised for not believing that there is *karman* and its transmission to future moments.[5]

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1. Sūt. S. I.i.1.14.
2. Sūt. S. II.i.17.
3. Ācār. S. I.i.3.7.
4. Sūt. S. I.i.2.29.
5. Sūt. S. I.xii.4.

Brāhmaṇs, Ajñānavādins and V*inayavādins* are criticised in general terms and the Jaina emphasis on non-injury, necessity of right thinking, and right knowledge come out prominently from these criticisms.[1]

The *Sūnyavādins* who deny the existence of all visible world and all future are told in answer that as astrologers, dream-interpreters and other kinds of diviners are sometimes able to predict future events it cannot be said that there is no future.[2]

Those who believed in perfection to be attained by bath, abstention from some articles of food, or by tending a fire are criticised on the ground that if perfection was attainable by contact with water many fishes, tortoises etc., would easily obtain perfection.[3] If water washed off bad *karman* it would also wash off good *karman*, and if it washed off sin many people who killed living beings in water would be sinless.[4] If perfection was attainable by tending a fire many mechanics would easily obtain it.[5] By drinking liquor or eating meat and

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1. Ācār. S. I.iv.2.4. Sūt. S. I.xii.3 ; I.i.2.17.
2. Sūt. S. I.xii.9.
3. Sūt. S. I.vii.14-15.
4. Sūt. S. I.vii.16-17.
5. Sūt. S. I.vii.18.

garlic, people of course attain a state different from their normal state but that state is far from the state of perfection.[1] Clothed in humour though these criticism are yet they reveal a strong common sense on the part of the Nirgrantha critic.

The soil of India has always been very favourable to the growth of religions and philosophies and the information obtained from the literature of the Jainas fully bears testimony to it. It will be seen that the teachings of Mahāvīra whose disciples are yet a living body in the land of their birth, were an attempt on the part of the founder to provide a solution to the intense problems of religion and philosophy which stirred the heart of India in that distant age.

1. Sūt. S. I.vii.13.